

B
M.F.M. 11A
200M-5-40 (5185)
(H.Q. 1772-39-1658)

War Diaries
Appxs Checked
Date -17 June 1947

B

SECRET

ORIGINAL
~~DUPLICATE~~
~~TRIPPLICATE~~

(Strike out where not applicable)

WAR DIARY

OF

THE PRINCESS LOUISE FUSILIERS (11 Cdn Indép MG Coy)

FROM 1 Sep 44 TO 30 Sep 44

Dup seen



VOLUME 25 · 84

APPENDICES 13 TO 10

SEP 1944

ORIGINAL

355

WAR DIARIES, C.A.S.F.

Instructions for Compilation and Despatch

1. A War Diary is **SECRET**.

2. The War Diary takes the place of the Historical Record when on active service. (K.R. Can. Para. 1530). Its objects are: to supply authentic material for the history of the unit, and of the force; to furnish a historical record of operations; and to provide data upon which to base improvements in training, equipment, organization and administration.

3. Unless otherwise ordered, the original and duplicate copies are sent on the first day of the succeeding month, through the usual channels, to the A.G., 2nd Echelon, wherever that office may be. The triplicate copy may be held by the unit for three months and then forwarded, also through the usual channels, to A.G., 2nd Echelon.

4. Post-war disposal will be as under:

Original—retained at Ottawa for historical purposes.

Duplicate—to British Record Office for historical purposes.

Triplicate—to unit for custody with unit records.

5. The War Diary will be entered up daily on M.F.M. 11 and rendered monthly in triplicate (Mobn. Instr. for C.M. 1937. App. "C"). Each entry will be initialled by the officer detailed to keep the War Diary, which will be signed at the end of each month by the commander. (F.S.R. Vol. II, Sec. 35, para. 3 iii).

6. The following should be recorded daily as events occur:

(i) Important orders, instructions, reports, messages or despatches received and issued, and decisions taken. *Original documents* should be attached as appendices to the Original copy of the War Diary.

(ii) Daily map location, employment, movements and dispositions of unit headquarters and of batteries, companies, etc. March tables should be attached as appendices.

(iii) Important movements of officers and matters relating to the duties of each branch of the staff. A complete set of the *routine orders and instructions, Part I Orders*, issued by the unit during the month should be attached as an appendix to the original copy.

(iv) Detailed account of operations—to include:—
Exact hour, location and circumstances of important occurrences. Movements and names of neighbouring units. Commanders of batteries, companies, etc., names of Officers and number of O.R. (i) engaged and (ii) battle casualties. Dispositions, activities and identity of enemy forces. Prisoners and trophies captured. Ammunition expended. Factors affecting operations, topographical and climatic. *Maps and sketches* showing dispositions of batteries, companies etc., at important phases. The record of *communications, both written and verbal*, received or despatched during active operations as an appendix. A complete set of the *operation orders and instructions* issued during the month. Notes on conferences and *reports* rendered to higher formations, or received from lower formations, as appendices to the original copy.

(v) Nature and description of trenches, field works or accommodation occupied or constructed. Meteorological notes.

(vi) Changes in establishment or strength. Names and ranks of officers and number of O.R. Attachment of units and individuals. Reinforcements. *Copy of Part II Orders and Weekly Field Returns of Officers and O.R.* should be attached as appendices to the original copy. Changes in organization, stores, transport, etc.

7. It is essential that all copies of both text and appendices are legible. Appendices will be numbered and referenced to the text in the last column of the form. Current issues of any regimental publication should be attached.

8. It will be found convenient at the end of each month, when the War Diary is being completed and the correspondence in unit files for the month is being reviewed and distributed (F.S.R. Vol. I, sec. 171, para. 3) if the material considered to be of historical value in the light of the above is attached as appendices to the original copy of the War Diary.

9. A good war diary makes possible the accurate and detailed reconstruction of circumstances, conditions and action.

NOTE: If monthly diary is more than one inch thick, use a second folder. If appendices are bulky, tie folder up with tape or string to make a firm package.

PRESERVE IMPORTANT ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR POSTERITY: INSERT THEM AS APPENDICES IN ORIGINAL COPY OF WAR DIARY

THE EXTRACTION AND RETENTION OF APPENDICES, MAPS, ETC., FROM A WAR DIARY IS AN OFFENCE UNDER THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT

UNIT OFFICE FILING SYSTEM AND RECORDS

"Every office will arrange for the filing and custody of its own correspondence." (F.S.R. Vol. I. Sec. 171.3.)

1. *Titles and Numbering of Files.*

A simple filing system adaptable for use in any military office at home or in the field is illustrated by the "List of File Titles" overleaf.

All documents handled by a unit fall into one or other of the nine categories enumerated, 1 to 9. The titles of the nine main divisions are based on British army operations, organization, administration and the regulations governing. Each title may be broken down into ten component parts or sub-titles, by adding a dash and subsidiary numbers 0 to 9. In turn each of these may be further broken down by adding a second dash and a third digit, and if necessary a third dash and a fourth digit. Thus 4-7-3 might be "Cooking Course at Kingston." According to circumstances, a fighting unit would expand the 1-3 prefix to accommodate all arms and services with which it may be concerned.

2. *Date reference.*

In giving communications a reference number, it is convenient to use the date system of four figures indicating day and month, e.g. 0102 for 1st February; 3010 for 30th October.

3. *Combined Numeration.*

If the systems outlined in paras 1 and 2 are combined, by placing the four date figures under the subject file numbers, a simple and informative method of reference results, thus

$$\begin{array}{r} 2-6-1 \\ \hline 0804 \end{array}$$

might be immediately identified as a communication dealing with replacement of gas masks, dated 8th April.

NOTE.—This method is not applicable to signal messages, A.F.C. 2128, which bear serial numbers 1 to 9999. The use of dashes eliminates confusion between serial numbers and file numbers.

4. *Documents for Preservation.*

The monthly review of correspondence (F.S.R. Vol. I, sec. 171.3) is facilitated and future confusion avoided by jacketing the material in "Category ii" (i.e., "no longer required", etc.) to conform with the system.

5. *Correspondence in the Field.*

The functioning of the office of a formation or unit during active operations may be simplified by keeping a log or register of all orders and messages, written or verbal, received or sent during the action. This may conveniently be done by extending the use of the "Field Register of Communications Received or Despatched", (Army Form 2040, F.S.R. Vol. I. sec. 171) to include verbal as well as written orders and messages in chronological order as received or sent.

Time of sending and of receipt are of importance second only to time of event, and should be entered both on the office copy of every field message or other document, and in the log or register. A carbon copy for contemporary reference of the commander or others concerned is desirable.

A brief précis of written orders, reports and messages, with the sender's number, is sufficient, for they will be kept on file. But particular care is necessary in making entries of times of moves and of verbal orders, reports or conversations, by telephone or otherwise, which in the stress of action, may not otherwise be recorded on paper. In battle, operations messages dealt with by one officer may number over twenty-five per hour for several hours on end.

The record should be kept convenient to the telephone. Entries may be made by a clerk, or by the officer on duty at the telephone.

Such a record is invaluable to the commander in making appreciations of the situation during the action, and in compiling his report on the action afterwards. It is contemporary evidence of the highest quality, and therefore is of the highest historical value, and should be attached as an appendix to the original copy of the War Diary, together with the original documents sent and received.

(Appendix to Routine Order No. 147 C.A.S.F.
22 Nov. 39).

PRESERVE IMPORTANT ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR POSTERITY

LIST OF FILE TITLES

1. *Operations (G.S.) (or Technical Functioning).*

- 1-0. General.
- 1-1. Orders.
- 1-2. Instructions.
- 1-3. Co-operation and Liaison.
- 1-4. Intercommunication, sigs, etc.
- 1-5. Working Parties.
- 1-6. Scheme of Work.
- 1-7. }
- 1-8. } Available for allotment.
- 1-9. }

2. *Protection. (G.S.)*

- 2-0. General.
- 2-1. Guards and Patrols.
- 2-2. Alarm Posts.
- 2-3. Field defences.
- 2-4. Against air attacks.
- 2-5. Against A.F.V.
- 2-6. Gas.
- 2-7. Defence Schemes.
- 2-8. }
- 2-9. } Available for allotment.

3. *Intelligence.*

- 3-0. General.
- 3-1. Secrecy. Codes.
- 3-2. Censorship.
- 3-3. Enemy forces, Prisoners of war.
- 3-4. Reports and sketches.
- 3-5. Maps.
- 3-6. War diary.
- 3-7. Weather.
- 3-8. }
- 3-9. } Available for allotment.

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4. *Training. (G.S.) (or Technical).*

- 4-0. General.
- 4-1. Drill.
- 4-2. P.T.
- 4-3. Technical: Musketry, Gun Drill, etc.
- 4-4. Route Marches.
- 4-5. Tactical Schemes.
- 4-6. Courses and Schools.
- 4-7. Lessons learned and Pamphlets.
- 4-8. }
- 4-9. } Available for allotment.

5. *Organization and Administration (A.G.).*

- 5-0. General.
- 5-1. Establishments.
- 5-2. Medical and Sanitation. Dental.
- 5-3. Inspections. Ceremonial. Visitors.
- 5-4. Discipline. Police.
- 5-5. Office.
- 5-6. Routine Orders.
- 5-7. }
- 5-8. } Available for allotment.
- 5-9. }

6. *Personnel (A.G.).*

- 6-0. General.
- 6-1. Officers.
- 6-2. Strengths, Casualties, Reinforcements.
- 6-3. Part II Orders.
- 6-4. Chaplains and Welfare.
- 6-5. Pay. Financial.
- 6-6. Burials. Effects.
- 6-7. Honours and Rewards.
- 6-8. Demobilization and discharge.
- 6-9. Available for allotment.

7. *Movements and Quarters. (Q.M.G.)*

- 7-0. General.
- 7-1. Moves by road, rail, water, air.
- 7-2. Employment of transport.
- 7-3. Reliefs.
- 7-4. Barracks, Billets, Camps.
- 7-5. Baths and Laundry.
- 7-6. Boundaries and areas.
- 7-7. Traffic.
- 7-8. }
- 7-9. } Available for allotment.

8. *Supplies and Maintenance. (Q.M.G.)*

- 8-0. General.
- 8-1. Rations, forage, water, disinfectants.
- 8-2. Petrol and lubricants.
- 8-3. Fuel and Light.
- 8-4. Engineer Stores.
- 8-5. Postal.
- 8-6. Remounts and Veterinary.
- 8-7. Canteens, Comforts, and small consignments.
- 8-8. Printing and Stationery.
- 8-9. Available for allotment.

9. *Stores. (M.G.O.)*

- 9-0. General.
- 9-1. Arms and armament.
- 9-2. Ammunition.
- 9-3. Clothing and Necessaries.
- 9-4. Personal Equipment.
- 9-5. Unit equipment.
- 9-6. Vehicles.
- 9-7. Salvage.
- 9-8. }
- 9-9. } Available for allotment.

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WAR DIARY JACKET

APPENDICES TO WAR DIARY

SEPTEMBER 1944

	<u>Original</u>	<u>Duplicate</u>	<u>Triplicate</u>
1 Part I Orders	X	X	X
2 Part II Orders	.	-	X
3 Field Return Offrs	X	-	X
4 Field Return Other Ranks	X	-	X
5 Report on Ops	X	X	X
6 Op Instrs	X	-	X
7 Appreciation-Brig Johnston	X	-	X
8 Intelligence summaries	X	-	X
9 Adm Instrs	X	-	X
10 Message Corps Comd	X	-	X

Instructions regarding preparation of War Diaries (which will be kept from first day of mobilization, creation or embodiment), are contained in F.S. Regs. Vol. 1.

WAR DIARY

OR

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

M.F.M. 11
40/P & S/37 (3072)

Original, duplicate and triplicate to be forwarded to O. i/c 2nd Echelon for disposal.

Title pages will be prepared.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks, references to Appendices and initials
S Angelo Italy	1 Sep 44		<p style="text-align: center;"><u>THE PRINCESS LOUISE FUSILIERS</u> (page 1)</p> <p>Still at Bde area S Angelo. Mortars firing past Gothic line. MMGs report wireless set smashed, also Driver Operator wounded. CBH reported two coys firm on Monte Maroni. Ba firm by first light. Perth R exploited northwards to Volpa, point 204. Sp Gp pls across Foglia river. Irish to exploit forward through CBH. PLDG to secure point 253 and advance on Tomba de Pesaro.</p> <p>Stonk on Tomba De Pesaro- four pls mortar and one Pl MMG. 400 bombs in 10 minutes. Irish secure in Tomba de Pesaro, little if any resistance.</p>	<p>SSA</p> <p>SSA</p>
	2 Sep 44		<p>Camped just South of Tomba de Pesaro. S.P. gun firing at us once in awhile. Killed Capt K M Harrison, P L Fus, Camp Commandant at HQ 11 Cdn Inf Bde. Major P B Kennedy's jeep damaged by shell. 1 Pl Mortars in Sp of CBH and Perth R. 12 Cdn Lt Bde passed through. 1 and 2 Coys Mortars placed u/c 12 Cdn Indep MG Coy. Intention:- to establish bridgehead over Conca. TAC HQ 11 C.I.B. Sp Gp moved to MR 003794.</p>	<p>SSA</p>
	3 Sep 44	0400	<p>No church services to-day. Everybody on maitenance. Have just arrived at new area South of S Angelo. A lot of air activity, everybody staying near slit trenches. "O" Gp Comd 11 Cdn Inf Bde. One P Mortars and one Pl MMG u/c Irish. Intention to follow up 5 C.A.B. Remainder 11 C.I.B. Sp Gp moved to MR 968824.</p>	<p>SSA</p>
	4 Sep 44	2000	<p>Stayed in field South of S Angelo all day, moved up at night to new location MR 929865. Air attacks on convoy. One casualty in "A" Ech, one m/C smashed. Light bombers, strafing and bombing. "O" Gp by COMD 11 C.I.B. at O.P. overlooking Coriano. Intention: Irish to relieve Westmr R, CBH to pass through and secure feature to right of Irish. Reliefs to be completed by first light.</p>	<p>SSA</p> <p>SSA</p>
MR 929865	5 Sep 44		<p>Bright and warm. One Pl mortars attached to Irish R of C. MMGs moved up at 0500 hrs, no reports yet. We have many bombers and fighters overhead. Corps Arty fire on Coriano at 1700 hrs. Irish R of C have patrols up as far as Fuime Rodella but come back as 1 Br Arm'd Div have not yet taken Coriano.</p>	<p>SSA</p>

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			(Page 2)	
	6 Sep 44		<p>Situation very sticky. Hy cas inflicted on inf in Coriano "bowl". Recce made to get mortars and MMGs up to ridge.</p> <p>Cloudy. Very few Jerry planes over last night. One SP Gun fired intermittently on our left, harrassing fire, a more or less peaceful sleep was experienced by all thanks to our night fighters overhead. Major PMB Kennedy is setting up an Ops HQ at Bde. Recces have gone fwd from MMGs and Mortars on foot to see possibilities of manhandling weapons over bridge, vehicles are spotted too easily. 12 Cdn Lt Bde intend a flanking attack West and North of Coriano to cut the roads. 11 Cdn Inf Bde will push up to Fuime Rodella and will then be approx 6000 yds from Rimini. Situation unchanged.</p>	<p>DDH</p> <p>DDH</p>
	7 Sep 44		<p>Rained all day. Pte Tremblay, killed in action with 3 Pl MMGs was buried this morning. Lt-Gen Sir Oliver Leese is here conferring with Lt-Gen BL.M. Burns. Coriano is more than a Corps show. An army will take part in it now. Situation unchanged. Plans laid for siezing Lorenzo feature by 11 C.I.B. Recce by night to posn Mortars and MMGs forward to support advance.</p>	<p>DDH</p>
	8 Sep 44		<p>Rain. Jerry Arty fire has increased to-day. Mortars have two opportunity shoots. Rum ration was issued to all. No air acticity until two planes appeared at 0200 hrs 9 Sep. 5 casualties, 1 killed, four wounded. Situation unchanged. Positions heavily shelled and mortared.</p>	<p>DDH</p>
	9 Sep 44		<p>Bright and warm. Roads beginning to dry up. 2 reinforcements come up from 4 Bn. Enemy arty fire not so heavy. Allies have a terrific arty concentration around our camp. One casualty, wounded from MMG. Situation unchanged, Positions heavily shelled and mortared.</p>	<p>DDH</p>
	10 Sep		<p>Bright and warm. Constant enemy shelling. "A" Ech moved up to S Giovanni. Theatre opened for boys down the line for rest. Casualties - nil. Rum ration issued to all. "O" Gp held by Comd 11 Cdn Inf Bde. Plan - 11 C.I.B. to take Coriano ridge on night 13/14 Sep. Right - C.B.H. Left - Perth R, Irish to take town.</p>	<p>DDH</p>

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks, references to Appendices and initials
			(Page 3)	
	11 Sep 44		Bright and warm. Enemy shelled us at 0700 hrs., a growing habit with him. RCE kitchen 75 yds west of us hit. 2 killed, 10 wounded. Rest centre in S Giovanni proving very enjoyable to the boys. Theatre and canteen opened to 11 C.I.B. Few German planes over this evening. German airforce in this area seems to consist of four planes working in relays.	RCS
	12 Sep	1400	Bright and warm. Major P B Kennedy attends "O" Gp at HQ 11 Cdn Inf Bde. Ops instrs comes in giving detail of next attack. It is to be 3 phases and includes 5 Cdn Armd Div, 1 Cdn Inf Div and 4 Br Inf Div. Message arrives notifying us that the German Army has violated the neutrality of S Marino. This Div will not observe the neutrality of S Marino. Co-ordinating conference held by Comd 11 Cdn Inf Bde. Fire plan for Mortars and MMGs laid on. Mortars @ Counter Mortar.	RCS
	13 Sep 44	0100	Bright and warm. # 1 P ₁ Mortar arrives back from fwd position. It has three damaged mortars due to enemy fire. We receive notification to be ready to move back to rest area to-morrow. Beaufighters patrol sky to-night. No enemy aircraft overhead. H Hour fire plan carried out. Perth and CBH frim by first light. Irish entered town in morning - mopping up all day.	RCS
	14 Sep		Major P B Kennedy goes back to confer with Major Dutton of HQ 11 Cdn Inf Bde, re area near S Giovanni. We move back at 1400 hrs. No casualties en route, set up new camp completed by 2330 hrs.	RCS

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OR

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks, references to Appendices and initials
			(Page 4)	
S Giovanni	15Sep 44		Bright and warm. Men spent most of the day washing up after the period in the line. Notification comes in of shows and bathing allotments. Three shows in S Giovanni. A beach club is set up at Cattolica.	JSA
	16Sep 44		Bright and warm. Day spent in maintenance of vehicles. Small arms inspection. Ordnance inspection of all arms. Officers mess functioning in S Giovanni.	JSA
	17Sep 44		Bright and warm. A memorial service and church parade was held in unit lines. H/Capt Roland of Irish R of C conducted the service. The names of our fallen comrades were read out by Major P B Kennedy. We held a silent minute of prayer.	JSA
	18Sep 44		Bright and warm. Normal maintenance. Day spent in cleaning up. All shows were fully attended. Instruction for move cancelled. Sitrep shows Greeks on outskirts of Rimini.	JSA
	19Sep 44		Bright and warm. Normal maintenance. 600 maps come in from Bde for distribution. Greeks capture Rimini. Canadians across Bologna - Rimini road. Allies are now well past all mountain barriers leading to Lombardy Plains.	JSA
	20Sep 44		Move again cancelled, due to rain. Allies have successful advances over mountains. 7 more reinforcements arrive. New transfers and paint comes in for vehicles.	JSA
	21Sep 44		Rain, Instructions come in for service chevrons to be worn. Our vehicle establishment is cut by one 60-cwt and 1-15 cwt. Vehicles to go to Div pool. Move not yet teed up. Our area is now North of Rimini.	JSA
	22Sep 44		Bright and warm, slight showers. New traces arrive for boat route well up past Rimini. Routes much flatter as we are now past mountains. Many appear with 5 service stripes and less to-day on their right sleeves denoting the length of service in the Cdn Army (A).	JSA
	23Sep		Recce party under Lieut D M Smith moves off at 0500 hrs. Arrive new area at	JSA

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks, references to Appendices and initials
			(Page 5)	
MR808962	24Sep 44		MR 808962 at 2300 hrs. 2 carriers and one 60-cwt lost en route. 2 casualties. New area very crowded. We passed around the neutral state of S Marino. Cloudy and warm. We settled down in our new area. Expect to be here for the day. 12 Cdn Inf Bde has not yet moved out. Westmr R reported in S Vito. New camp is under heavy intermittent shelling.	JAN JAN
	25Sep 44		Cloudy with intermittent rains. Enemy shelling has slackend off somewhat. C.O's conference with Comd 11 Cdn Inf Bde, possible relief of 12 Cdn Inf Bde by first light in area Uso. Major P B Kennedy, Capts G S Bauld and R L Simmonds went forward to S Guistinia to liaise with Major N HM Minshull, Capts, R S Blair and A J Andrew. Mortar and MMG Pl Comds called forward to make recce. Recce called off on infm that relief would not take place.	JAN
	26Sep 44		Bright and warm. "O" Gp, Comd 11 Cdn Inf Bde. Intention - to relieve 12 Cdn Inf Bde at posns held across the Uso. Mortars reps and MMG Coy Comd move up to recce posn when 11 Cdn Inf Bde take over from 12 Cdn Inf Bde. Comd 11 Cdn Inf Bde Sp Gp briefed Capt G S Bauld. Instructions to recce mortar posns as far fwd as possible. Fire reps to report to CBH and Irish R of C. Major P B Kennedy moves to Variano to set up TAC HQ next to Bde, locn 785994. Capt G S Bauld est coy HQ at MR 985993, reported recce pl posns completed.	JAN
	27Sep 44		Cloudy. Main Hq moves to S Ginstano. "A" Ech remains at previous posn. New location recce at S Vito for Main HQ. Major P B Kennedy briefed Coy Comds, Mortar and MMG and PL Comd MMG. Bde intention to form up against Salto preparatory to set piece attack on Div axis. Capts G S Bauld and R L Simmonds went to liaise with Comds Irish R of C and CBH re recce of pl posns in fwd areas. Arrangements completed whereby fire reps would bring mortars pls fwd when situation permits. Two pls MMG ordered fwd from cone area to CBH and Irish R of C, to move fwd when situation permits. Irish patrols report S Mauro unoccupied. Irish to despatch coy immediately to occupy the town. Irish will move one coy into S Mauro, balance of regiment will move into posn North of S Mauro area 735036. CBH move as Bn along ENNIS route to Rubicone.	JAN

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WAR DIARY

M.F.M. 11
40/P & S/37 (8072)

OR


INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks, references to Appendices and initials
			(Page 6)	
S Ginstano	28Sep 44		Perth R take over area presently occupied by CBH. Sent instructions to coy to push pls fwd with view to support crossing of Rubicone. Capt R L Simmonds evacuated due to ankle injuries received in M/C accident. Capt K C Tracy detailed to take over Comd of coy. Sgt Corkum took over comd of 1 Pl MMG.	JAN
	29Sep 44		Cloudy, intermittent rains. Area reced vicinity of S Mauro for Main HQ	JAN
S Vito	30Sep 44		Cloudy with heavy rains. Minister of National Defence, Colonel Ralston paid a visit to H Q 11 Cdn Inf Bde and TAC H Q, 11 Cdn Inf Bde Sp Gp. Bright and warm. Few clouds. Lieut Bookbinder's platoon had a premature charge blow a barrell, killed two and wounded three. Bde and TAC HQ receive terrific shelling at 1240 hrs. Lines out. "A" Ech moved South of S Vito. Three fires started at Bde HQ.	JAN


 (P.B. Kennedy) Major
 O.C.
 Princess Louise Fusiliers

10

*Does
erase
company
numbers*

6-0-1/AQ

HQ 11 Cdn Inf Bde

24 Aug 44

List 'A'

MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDER, 1ST CDN CORPS

1. Attached hereto is message from the Commander of 1 Cdn Corps. This message will be read to all ranks NOT, repeat NOT before 1600 hrs 25 Aug 44.

W L Dutton
W L Dutton) Major
DAA & QMG 11 Cdn Inf Bde

DISTRIBUTION

- HQ 11 Cdn Inf Bde - 2
- Perth - 4
- CBH - 4
- IRC - 4
- PLF - 3

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 1
Based on infm received up
to 1200 hrs 23 Aug

23 Aug 44

PART I

I ENEMY SITUATION

The attention of the Hun has been diverted from the central sector (FLORENCE area) and appears to be divided now between the activities of 7 Army in SE FRANCE and the rapid adv of the POLCORPS on the ADRIATIC coast. To confirm this appreciation Tac R reports that much tpt, which logically would be 90 PG Div, is moving from REGGIO (L 3473) towards TORINO and pts WEST, while 3 PG Div is believed to be on its way towards the Central PO Valley, thus placing it in a posn from where it could speedily be committed to any part of the front. If the threat in the WEST increases, as it inevitably will, further demands will be made on the German Army in ITALY, as the bulk of its garrison protecting the prize cities of GENOA and TORINO and, for that matter, Northern ITALY from an attack in the WEST and SOUTHWEST, are a few divs from MUSSOLINI's not too reliable IRA. The approach of the POLCORPS to the GOTHIC Line on the EAST coast has increased the conc which has for some time been coast-watching and backing up this vulnerable sector. New recruits to the general area occupied by 162 Turcoman Div and 98 Inf Div are 15 PG Div near FORLI, and 1028 Gren Regt.

The report of elements of 1 Para Div in the PESARO area might either indicate that it is taking up a posn in the line or that it is preparing to move to posns between the METAURO and FOGLIA rivers. It should not be concluded from this latter supposition that the German would be forced to commit his immediate reserve because of the intensity of the battle, but rather that he is employing his experts to cover an orderly withdrawal back to the GOTHIC Line. Should 278 Div and 71 Div be left to this task alone there is a strong possibility of them falling back to the FOGLIA R in comparative confusion and with our own tps immediately on their heels; a situation which would not lend kindly to an immediate and well-organised manning of the defences there. The disadvantage to the enemy of this new move, i.e. employment of 1 Para Div between the METAURO R and the FOGLIA R, is that it may force the two inferior divs, 278 and 71, to take over the job of occupying the defence line. All that can hoped to be achieved by using the Paras at this pt is to delay our adv and reduce the punch that will be required to break through the line.

According to PW taken 18 Aug, 71 Div is to assume responsibility of the sector MONTECCHIO S 0076 to VERUCHIO R 7389. This leaves an eight to ten mile stretch to the coast, obviously a two div job. In view of this, if our PW has been 'put in the picture', we could expect the arrival of either 162 Turcoman Div or 98 Inf Div, more likely the former because of its proximity to the front. But time is growing short and as yet no indication has been given of either of these two divs making a move SOUTH.

[Handwritten Signature]
for (H Angle) Lt-Col
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS

Time of Signature.....B hrs

Distribution: 5 Cdn Armd Bde GGHC
11 Cdn Inf Bde RCA
12 Cdn Inf Bde RCE

THE EASTERN SECTOR OF THE "GOTHIC" LINE

(1) General

Then work first began on the GOTHIC Line the enemy's chief concern was to fortify the two coastal sectors of the line, at CARRARA in the WEST and at PESARO in the EAST, and also to take precautions against any possible landings on the LIGURIAN and ADRIATIC coasts behind the extremities of the line. Work on defences in the long mountain sector was postponed till later, and in general even now has not reached the fairly advanced stages of development which are apparent, chiefly on the WEST coast and also on the EAST coast NORTH of the R FOGLIA.

A partisan report dated 3 Jul speaks of "feverish activity" on the Eastern Sector of the GOTHIC Line, and this is borne out by air photos, which, taken over a period, show that constructional activity is continuing in a vigorous manner, especially in the area nearest to the coast. It would appear therefore that the enemy has taken stock of the fact that there is really only one natural and comparatively easy route into the PO Valley from Central ITALY, and that is the coastal route along the ADRIATIC, which he must defend at all costs.

(2) PESARO to BELVEDERE FOGLIENSE (Flat Valley Sub-Sector)

Throughout this sub-sector which is about 13 miles long the defences lie on the rising ground overlooking the wide flat valley of the FOGLIA to the SOUTH. The river bed itself, consisting of gravel and stones, is wide, of the TANGRO river type, and there are only few bridges across it, but it is not a continuous tk obstacle, having only broken stretches of steep banks in places, although these increase westwards. The river is fordable at several pts. At present there is little water in the river, which should be easy for inf to cross.

The line of defences is continuous throughout this sub-sector, and the defences themselves are closely spaced, consisting of concrete pillboxes and some casemates, besides large numbers of MG posns and fire trenches. A tk obstacles in part of the line are formed by (i) an A tk ditch from PESARO running almost unbroken to MONTECCHIO, and (ii), a minefd stretching from MONTECCHIO for approx 3 miles to just NORTH of S TERESA (R 9774). From here westwards to BELVEDERE FOGLIENSE there are no artificial obstacles, but natural obstacles exist in the steep banks of the R FOGLIA, and sharply rising hills NORTH of the river, and thus complete the line of obstacles in this sub-sector.

With regard to the depth of def, the town of PESARO and its outskirts have a wide arc of perimeter defences, and it is probable that this key town in the ADRIATIC defensive layout will be defended street by street and house by house, as were ORTONA and CASSINO. WEST of PESARO as far as OSTERIA NUOVA (S 0275) fairly thick defences are sited to a depth of about 1500 yds, while scattered minor defences and the preparation of some gun pits continue for a further 1000 yds. WEST of OSTERIA NUOVA to BELVEDERE FOGLIENSE defences thin out to an average depth of 800 to 1000 yds.

Minor defensive posns are of the usual type consisting mostly of a MG pit connected to a deep dug-out by a comm trench. They are sited either to cover the approaches to the R FOGLIA from the SOUTH or rds running NORTH through the line itself. Most of the trench systems seen in this area have been covered with earth and each has a dug-out built into it.

The use of concrete in the construction of casemates and pillboxes seems to have been almost entirely confined to this sub-sector of the line. Approx 20 casemates large enough to contain A tk guns or lt fd guns are spaced out among the other defences and all of them cover the river, the A tk ditch or the minefd WEST of MONTECCHIO.

Numerous pillboxes of varying sizes, ranging from the two to three man type to those capable of containing lt guns are seen along the entire length of this sub-sector, the majority of which also fire SOUTH to cover the A tk obstacles.

An A tk ditch runs from the suburbs of PESARO at S 114809 Westwards along the PESARO - MONTECCHIO rd, lying between this rd and the FOGLIA and just SOUTH of the rd. Gaps occur between S 073796 and S 074796 and between S 036766 and S 023758. Construction on the ditch continues and it is presumed these gaps will be excavated. The obstacle follows a zig-zag course and is approx 14 ft wide. It is not possible to say whether it is faced with concrete, but it appears to be strongly made and possibly revetted. Unlike the A tk ditch of the ADOLPH HITLER Line, this obstacle has been dug, NOT constructed by the detonation of a series of charges.

There is a 3 miles stretch of mines running from just WEST of MONTECCHIO at R 999747 to the banks of the FOGLIA at R 973742. It has been in existence for at least three months and consists of overlapping panels of mines approx 50 ft wide. There are between 6 and 7 rows of mines in each panel approx 7 ft apart, and the mines are 7 - 8 ft apart. It runs NORTH of the MONTECCHIO - S GIORGIO rd between that rd and the line of defences. Another small minefd of 5 small panels lies just SOUTH of the A tk ditch between S 092804 and S 095805.

Although the course of the wire defences cannot always be traced, it is considered that sufficient evidence has been obtained to make it certain that all gps of defensive posns in this sub-sector will be surrounded by belts of wire. Quite recently an almost continuous belt of wire has been erected from the rd at S 069801 along the front of the defences westward to S 052776. This belt is from 30 - 40 ft wide and from photographic evidence is considered possibly to contain anti-personnel mines laid under the wire itself.

Very few positive mortar posns have been seen, but several small groups of emplacements under construction are thought to be for mortars.

Construction of further defences and the completion of those at present unfinished is continuing rapidly.

All the buildings between the Line and the F FOGLIA have been or are being demolished to clear fds of fire. A few of them also contain MG posns. Many other buildings in the Line itself have also been demolished and must be considered as possibly defended.

(3) REPORT ON ENEMY DEFENCES FROM PESARO TO BADIA TRIDALDA (R 5459)

Source: Italian Engr offr who visited the area.
Other partisan sources confirm the accuracy of his report.

Date: 3 Jul 44

The above line runs parallel to the R FOGLIA. An A tk ditch measuring 4 metres across the top, 2 metres at the base and having a depth of 3 metres runs from COLLE S BARTOLO (S 102820) for a distance of 5 kms; it then continues for a further 10 kms as far as MONTECCHIO (S 0075) but the dimensions are reduced to one metre approx at the base and 2.50 metres depth. This ditch runs at a distance of about 500 metres from the FOGLIA, on the left bank of the river, and is interrupted at various pts where the land offers natural obstacles to the adv of tks.

(OVER)

It is considered that this ditch does not offer an appreciable obstacle, since the earth is not compact. Even a lt tk should be able to pass it easily, since the sides of the ditch will collapse at its approach. The action of the tracks on the other side of the ditch will have the same effect. Minefds have been laid in this sector, and these are being extended at present. It is not possible to say how much the Germans will still be able to do, but the offr noted feverish activity of late, and more than 1000 workmen have been brought into the district from Northern ITALY, due to the fact that local labour was compelled to stop all activity in Jun. The first posns, which are incidentally the largest, have been built on COLLE S BARTOLO and cover the entire coastal area and the rds which lead to the bridges on the river FOGLIA. These lt arty, A tk gun and MG posns are not, as a general rule, built in concrete. Even at those pts where cement has actually been used, it serves more as cam than as actual protection, since the thickness is rarely more than 50cms. Several posns built half-way up hillsides have protective walls as high as 3 to 5 metres, but there are also entirely unprotected posns. The shelters near the posns are frequent and are built into the earth, having a corrugated iron roof with earth on top. Wire entanglements complete the defensive posns, but these cover only limited areas. The same remark applies to the mine fds. The posns built on the slopes of the hills overlooking the FOGLIA are more numerous at the beginning of the line near PESARO, where work was started first. It is considered that as far as MONTECCHIO the posns are such as to concentrate a considerable mass of fire on the area in front of the FOGLIA. There are no pts which are not covered, since the country is more or less flat and obstacles such as trees and houses have been removed. From MONTECCHIO to MACERATA-FELTRIA (R 7469) there are only very few concrete posns, and these are at considerable distances from one another. The reason for this is that the land offers natural obstacles and furthermore the Germans have been handicapped by lack of men in particular, and cement as well. From MACERATA to BADIA TEDALDA concrete posns with dug-out shelters are very sparse. There are no minefds and wire entanglements are rare. Work on entanglements and posns for arty and automatic arms has been taken up again in this district. The Germans say that they will install 20 btys in the area of the CARPEGNA (R 6567) and the SASSO SIMONE (SIMONCELLO R 6265). Up to now (beginning of Jul) there has been no sign of tps having moved in to man the lines, nor has any arty arrived so far. A few coastal btys planted near FANO have been moved to RIMINI. Here and there there are AA btys and material in transit, but as already mentioned, no arms have been put into posn on the emplacements. Between MONTE LABBATE (S 0273) and OSTERIA NUOVA (S 0275) in the FOGLIA valley a small airfield measuring 400 metres by 900 metres has not yet been finished, this work is, however, nearing completion.

Comment: Apart from some details about the A tk ditch which differ from those found on air photos the above partisan report appears to be in general reliable.

(2) Posns of Hy Weapons

The distances between the posns of hy weapons and the MLR naturally vary considerably but fair average figures can nevertheless be struck.

(a) 8.1 cm Mortars

These are sited chiefly in pairs, the two mortars being well separated. Pairs of mortars are also frequently sited with the two mortars close together, and a number of "btys" of three and four have been noted. In the case of three, one mortar has probably been knocked out leading to the incorporation of the remaining mortar in another sec. More rarely, mortars may be concentrated in a complete pl of six. The average distance between mortar posns and the MLR is 850 - 900 yds, but they appeared to be sited quite often as little as 300 - 400 yds back. The extreme range is 1200 - 1500 yds. A few mortars may be positioned in rear of the second line at the same average distance as above, evidently to cover it if deep penetration beyond the MLR is achieved.

(b) 12cm Mortars

Too few hy mortar posns were located to est any rule. Two such were found, single mortars sited 3,000 yds back. It is considered probable that these weapons would remain near the Bn rear boundaries.

(c) Lt Inf Guns

The sub-allotment of Lt inf gun pls to the bns will depend on the location of the defensive Schwerpunkt. In the main, guns take up their posns about 2000 yds back with DF (barrage) zones 200 - 300 yds in front of the MLR.

(d) Hy Inf Guns

Few figures are available but, on an average, hy inf guns are sited 2500 yds in rear. One DF zone was at a range of 4000 yds, the remainder chiefly just in front of the fwd weapon pits.

(e) A Tk Guns and A Tk Rifles

The former are placed generally in rear of the second line at an average distance of 800 yds, a few are sited between the MLR and the second line at about the same distance. The few A tk rifles that are shown are all in the MLR. It appears that the main reliance in A Tk def under static conditions is founded in the first instance on minefids and close combat methods. This may be due to the weight and effect of Allied arty fire, forcing A tk gun units back to posns where they are less easily descried.

(3) Frontages

Bn frontages are about 2000 yds, and coy frontages roughly one half to one third of this according to the number of coys fwd.

(4) HQs

(a) RHQ is 4,000 - 5,000 yds in rear, but this figure should not be taken as normal as too few examples were available.

(b) Bn HQs are roughly a mile back organised in a strong pt with possibly an alternative location, not fortified, a further half mile in rear.

(c) Coy HQs for fwd coys are 600 yds from the MLR and

(OVER)

PART III

As the regts which will likely be encountered in future ops are of the two bn type, the following notes should prove to be of interest.


THE GERMAN TWO-BN REGT IN DEF

Introduction

A study of captured maps gives a good picture of the type of posns taken up by a two-bn Gren Regt in def. The maps captured only covered the frontages of two regts under different firms and the conclusions drawn should therefore be treated with some reserve, but from other infm available, it is considered that both regts were observing standard principles.

(1) General Layout (see diagram)

A two-bn regt will have both bns fwd, and two-three coys fwd in each bn sector, with the remainder in reserve.



The fwd line, the MLR, consists of a series of weapon pits for LMGs and riflemen, with dugouts in their immediate rear for sleeping. In front of these posns concertina wiring chiefly is employed to form a continuous barrier. Fwd of the wiring mines are laid in individual fds of A tk or anti-personnel mines, or with both types mixed. The dimensions of the fds vary but the average fd measures 150 yds by 25 yds.

At 1200 - 1500 yds behind the MLR a second line of def is est, formed of a series of strong pts. The distance between the MLR and the second line of def will depend on the terrain and may vary, as in one case, from 875 to 1650 yds.

Between the two lines, isolated MG posns are sited, if good fds of fire are available, and in this belt there are also scattered minefds and posns for A tk close combat teams using the Panzerfaust or Panzerschreck. In rear of the second line there are few prepared posns, except for an occasional strongpt, covering a vital approach or feature, or protecting a Bn HQ.

(OVER)

not normally wired to form a small strongpt. HQs of coys in sp are located within the strongpts.

(5) Strongpts

The second line of defence is based on a line of strong pts, not connected in any way except where their close proximity to one another makes possible some linking up by means of a comm trench or a thin chain of weapon pits. These posns are wired and prepared for all round def. Each one disposes of two to five MGs; most of them have one A tk gun, and several may have 8.1cm mortars. Lt inf guns also may be included.

(6) Conclusion

The posns shown on the maps providing the basis for these notes were held by units which had been in the front line for some time prior to the drawing of the maps. They were not therefore fully up to str in men or lt weapons, so the layout described should not be definitely treated as the ideal laid down. It does however represent the type of posns taken up and the str in which they were manned under actual conditions. It is considered that if the units were fully up to str, the accretion in men and weapons would go to thickening up the second line rather than the MLN, and towards forming additional strong pts between the two lines.

pass *8*
SECRET

5 CDN ARMD DIV

23-2/Int

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 5

28 Aug 44

PART ONE

I. ENEMY SITUATION

Stubborn resistance by the enemy in their withdrawal to the AVTO-ANSSTELUNG has resulted in a slower approach to the FOGLIA R than that generally anticipated. Tac 3 reports of arty moving back across the river last night points out preparation for a general withdrawal on our sector. To supplement this, SP guns were seen by air in S ANGELO area yesterday and have been reported by com to be at S049707 this morning. We know from PW taken that 171 A Bn is fighting with 211 GR, and so it is natural to conclude that these vehs are of their SP Coy and their task being to fight a rearguard NORTH-WEST along the rd to S ANGELO and thence to the river. Tonight we should see the last of 211 GR on this side of the FOGLIA.

This morning we made a quick adv up the 71 - 1 Para inter-div boundary apparently having found a gap. This push is being contained at the moment at S054734 but the salient will cause a certain amount of embarrassment to both 211 GR and 4 Para Regt and doubtless force the enemy flanks to conform to an even line more rapidly.

It is believed that the cause of the enemy's knowledge of our ops on the night 25/26 Aug has come to light in the person of two Italians who were apprehended complete with binoculars, maps and mirror in a church tower at ORCLANO DI PESARO S165559.

Rumours of two Italian divs in the GOTHIC area are most upsetting to those who attempt to prophecy the enemy's plan but on the other hand are encouraging to those considering an assault on the line. Probably Mussolini's Army of Liberation is going to be left holding the proverbial 'bag' A la El Alamein while Kesselring and Co embark on the BRENNER express.

K
(H Anglo) Lt-Col
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS

Time of Signature...1330.....B hrs

Distribution: As per Int Sum No 4 27 Aug 44.

UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS:

I 71 INF DIV (1) 171 Fus Bn:- 1 Cpn identified 27 Aug by P7 at 050690.
 (11) 171 A Tr Bn:- 3 Coy identified by P7 on 27 Aug area 50867.

II 1 PARA DIV (1) 1 Para Regt:- P7 states regt has been committed on ADRIATIC coast.
 (11) 3 Para Regt:- P7 heard rumours that HQ II Bn was at ROUBELJA (S11270).

ENEMY ORG & STR:

I 71 INF DIV - 211 Gren Regt:- 1 Coy 47-50, 3 Coy 35, 6 Coy 40. P7 state no large rfts received in 1 Coy in past three months - 6 rfts arrived 2 wks ago. Morale in 211 Gren Regt very low due to hy cas.

II 1 PARA DIV - 4 Para Regt:- Only 2 bns appear to exist in this regt. 5 Coy had to be withdrawn due to hy cas according to P7 statements. 6 Coy taking over.

PERSONALITIES:

71 INF DIV

Comd 211 GR - Lt-Col Ramohr
 Comd I Bn - Capt Klink
 Comd II Bn - Capt Steinbrenner
 1 Coy - Lt Glarg
 2 Coy - Lt Graessner
 3 Coy - Lt Teuteberg
 6 Coy - Capt Albert

1 ENEMY SITUATION:

The GOTHIC Line outposts on the ADRIATIC sector are falling back this morning across the PUGLIA River. It is not customary of the Hun to pull back during daylight hours, but it is believed that it was his intention to have completed this withdrawal last night and he was prevented in so doing by a continuous harrassing fire programme of our arty on the crossings. Consequently, and confirmed by Tac R reports, the enemy is still evacuating his posns SOUTH of the river this morning. No contact has been est with 71 Div today, so we can expect to occupy the high ground dominating the river before dusk.

The responsibilities of the Green Line (GOTHIC) defense from the mountains to the coast are coming to light with the aid of PW statements, and captured maps. 1 Para Div is to man the defences from the sea to incl the rd of 3 LORENZO 3053786 from where 71 Div takes over westwards to incl the rd running NW from MONTEGGHIO 3009752. The presence of Italian LOs with 71 Div suggests that one if not both of the two reported Alpine Divs will hold (?) on 71 right flank. The reappearance of 273 Div nearer the mountains is quite probable, as PW have already stated that elements are in front of the line to the WEST of 194 GR. Then what of 5 Mtn Div? Will it be spared the GOTHIC treatment and be sent off to help against the western threat, or will it be despatched to the NORTH to reserve a pass or two for the home-ward trip of the 10th and 14th Armies?


for (H-angle) Lt-Col
G3 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS

Time of Signature.....B hrs

Distribution:	5 Cdn Armd Bde (17)	RCA	(7)
	11 Cdn Inf Bde (17)	RCE	(5)
	12 Cdn Inf Bde (21)	1 Cdn Corps	(1) (G Int)
	GGHG (5)	1 Cdn Inf Div	(1) (G Int)

PART TWO

- 1 ENEMY IDENTIFICATION - 551 Army Arty Bty - PW captured 29 Aug belonged to 2 tp and was transferred 27 Aug with others to I/194 GR.
- 1 Para Div - A captured documents shows Western bdy. of 1 Para Div running NW from S105670 to 075720.
- 3 Para Regt PW taken from II Bn on 27 Aug at M GIOVE (151870)
- 4 Para Regt 2 and 3 Coys identified area S 0772 by PW.

- 2 ENEMY ORG & STR I 71 Inf Div - (i) 191 GR I Bn (1 Arty offr 25 ORs) was put under comd I/211 GR according to PW statements
- (ii) 194 GR II Bn has not suffered by cas and is believed to have fair str. I Bn str 68-70, under comd 211 GR. 1 Coy - 30, 4 Coy - 30.
- (iii) 211 GR PW state regt rapidly ceasing to exist. Absence of foreigners noticeable (only 6 out of 100 so far are "AUSLANDSDEUTSCH".
- 4 Coy 1, 2 and 3 pls merged and known as MG Pl which now consists of only 2 MGs - 10 men. Mortar pl thought to be full str.
- 5 Coy - 35, 8 Coy - 80 before battle.
- 14 Coy - 3 pls - 1 pl 2 x 7.5cm A tk
- 2 and 3 pls had 12 OPETROIRS each before battle.

II 551 Army Arty Bty

According to PW Bty has 17cm guns and 21 CMs. Hows. It is also mot.

- 3 PERSONALITIES 71 Inf Div 211 GR Lt Clarg OC. 1 Coy ran away as soon as going got tough!
- 2 Pl 4 Coy - 2/Lt Schussler
- Sigs Offr - 2/Lt Knorr

SECRET

5 CDN ARMD DIV

23-2/Int

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 7

30 Aug 44

PART ONE

1 ENEMY SITUATION

The enemy on our own front has withdrawn to the GOTHIC Line with the exceptions of a few stragglers who have preferred to take their chances with us rather than run the gauntlet of our arty fire and bombing. The Para Div on 71 Div left flank and the remainder of 71 confronting 5 Corps are conforming to this withdrawal. The fact that POLCORPS have advanced to the outskirts of PESARO and the remainder of perimeter of defences to the SOUTH of the city may not be according to the plan of 1 Para Div but from it we should not grow too optimistic as his posns NORTH of the town and beyond the FOGLIA R are as strong if not even more formidable. Then again giving up the town would lessen the danger of a regt being outflanked and cut off.

It has been stated quoting captured maps and PW, that 71 Div's right boundary was to be at MONTECCHIO on reaching the GOTHIC Line. Even though four bns of this div, EAST to WEST I/194, I/191, II/194, II/191, have been fighting on 5 Corps front, 71 Div might still be contained within the boundaries given, as these bns could fall back through other tps (Italian) already occupying the line WEST of MONTECCHIO. Should 71 Div in toto defend the sector on our Corps front we can expect a maximum fighting str in the neighbourhood of 1200 unless rfts are quickly brought in. The possibility of this latter is slim as gnrs, mechanics etc, from 557 Army Arty Bty (17cm) have been taken PW from 211 GR and 194 GR, and who have been in the past few days flung into the battle as inf. The results are not good and it is to be hoped that if further rfts arrive that they will fall in this category.

Our patrols last night had a good deal of freedom on the flat ground between the river and just fwd of the A tk ditch, encountering no enemy and finding only mines (German box type entirely) rather haphazardly and quickly laid.

[Signature]
(H Angle) Lt Col
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELN

Time of Signature: 30.12.44 B hrs

Distributions: 5 Cdn Armd Bde

11 Cdn Inf Bde

12 Cdn Inf Bde

GGHG

RCA

RCE

G Int 1 Cdn Corps

G Int 1 Cdn Inf Div

G Int 46 Inf Div

GOC

GSO 1

AA & QMG

G Ops

IO CSDIC

File

I ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

- 71 INF DIV (i) 194 GR - I Bn identified by deserter taken in MONTECICCARDO on 29 Aug (Bn passed from under comd 278 Div to under comd 211 GR)
- (ii) 171 Fus Bn - Identified by PW from 4 Sqn Cav Gun Pl taken at MONTELABBATE 29 Aug, 10 PW also taken from 2 and 3 Coys.
- (iii) 171 Arty Regt - 6 PW were taken from II Bty HQ, 4 Tp, 6 Tp and 10 Tp on 28 Aug (area not known)
- (iv) 171 A Tk Bn - 7 PW were taken from 3 Coy 171 A Tk Bn on 28 Aug. (area not known)
- (v) 557 Army Arty Bty - (previously reported incorrectly as 551 Army Arty Bty) PW from 2 Tp captured 290600B at GINESTRETO. (Inftr Rft for 2/194 GR)

II ENEMY ORG. STR. & RFTS

- 71 INF DIV (i) 194 GR - PW belonging to 'B' Ech 2 Tp 557 Army Arty Bty states that himself and 29 others were sent as inf rfts to I Bn on 27 Aug. He claims that in this bn stray signalmen, engr and gnr are fighting as inf.
- (ii) 171 Arty Regt - According to PW 4 Tp has 3 x 10.5 cm guns, 6 Tp 4 x 10.5 cm guns, 10 Tp 3 x 15cm guns. PW estimated II Bty str at 300.
- (iii) 171 Fus Bn - Bn has three lt sqns and one hy sqn, 4 Sqn (hy) has four pls.
 Cav Gun Pl - no guns, used as inf
 MMG Pl - 2 MMGs 42
 Mortar Pl - 1 x 8.1cm mortar
 Engr Pl - employed as inf
 Estimated str of 4 Sqn - 40.
- (iv) 171 A Tk Bn - PW from 3 Coy (AA) says it consists of three pls equipped with 2 cm Flak more often used in an anti-air role. The Bn now has three coys str about 50 and a hy coy 80 str, 2 Coy has only 2 pls. 3 Coy 3 pls, 4 (hy) only two pls. Estimated str of the Bn is 200 (1 Coy - 50, 2 Coy - 35, 3 Coy - 40, 4 Coy - 75)
- (v) 557 Army Arty Bty - PW states only 17cm guns in Bty consisting of 3 tps.

III ENEMY PERSONALITIES

71 INF DIV

- (i) 171 Fus Bn
 OC - Capt Von Schmidt - Pauli
 OC 1 Coy - Lt Schrick
 OC 2 Coy - Lt Brix
 OC 3 Coy - Lt Linau
 OC 4 Coy - Lt Wunderlich
- (ii) 171 A Tk Bn
 OC - Lt Col Zehe
 OC II Bty - Major Schreiner
 OC IV Bty - Major Von Jena
 OC 4 Tp - Lt Politiki (in hosp)

(OVER)

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 8
(based on infm up to 2359 hrs 31 Aug)

23-2/Int
1 Sep 44

PART ONE

1 ENEMY SITUATION

The comparative confusion of the past 36 hrs regarding the enemy's dispositions and intentions on our front is finally coming to light. After the FTR report of our patrol which entered MONTECCHIO at 1500 hrs 30 Aug, it was at first felt that the Hun had decided to forsake his invincible line in favour of a homeward migration. However, his activities since have abolished any such thoughts from our minds, and it is now quite definitely est that the German intention was to hold onto this sector of the GOTHIC Line. Had he wished to withdraw from the NORTH of ITALY it is certain that he would evacuate this sector last, not first, as the possibilities resulting from an advance on this coast are quite obvious. Further to this natural and simple deduction and confirming the statement re his desire to defend the ADRIATIC wing of his line, is the bringing of 26 Pz Div into the MONTECCHIO area. The employment of this once famous fan on the right of 1 Para Div certainly does not suggest an eagerness to make us a gift of the Green Line, and his reactions to our break-through have been and are an intense desire to restore the situation. His counter-attacks on our flanks and in particular on the right by the Paras have been repulsed and the mov of tps and tks in the area of TOMBA DI PESARO indicates the already obvious vital importance of this feature to him. He must try to deny us this ground as its occupation by either side is of mutual value, in that first it is the base from which the enemy can operate to either restore his line or to conform new defensive posns to contain our salient, and secondly it is the key to our progress NORTHWARD. As long as he holds this high ground we can expect counter-attacks from the NORTH and flanks until he is satisfied as to the firmness of his situation.

As yet only II/67 PGR has been identified, but owing to the now very depleted str of this bn I/67 PGR is certain to come into the fight very soon. This latter fmn in all probability will be found on and fwd of the TOMBA DI PESARO feature, supported by the as yet unidentified 26 Pz Regt or by I/4 Pz Regt. The disposition of II/67 PGR at the time of our unpremeditated (by the Hun) attack on the 30 Aug was 6 Coy in MONTECCHIO and on pt 111 S009757 with 5 Coy on their left on pt 115 S017760 and thence to the div boundary and 7 Coy on the right of 6 Coy. PW knew nothing of the whereabouts of 8 Coy. From PW taken during our push fwd II/67 PGR has fallen back in this order along the MONTECCHIO - TOMBA rd, with it as a centre line.

To meet the embarrassing posn of our tps on 1 Para Div right flank 4 Para Regt was forced to divide its efforts between the advances of the fmn on our right and ourselves, the result being a stretching of the regt front. It is probably being augmented by the introduction of the Para Engr Bn or the Para IG Bn. 9 PGR has been identified on our left, this leaves the Pz Regt, Engr Bn and Recce Bn yet to be found. However it is reasonable to assume that 26 Pz Div has taken over comd of a sector of the line. Assuming that 71 Div is directing its fmns on the MONTE CALVO - MONDAINO front we have the general line-up as follows from EAST to WEST; 1 Para Regt (PESARO area) 3 Para Regt, 4 Para Regt, (BORGO S MARIA area) possibly Para IG bn and Para Engr Bn, II/67 PGR, (MONTECCHIO - TOMBA rd) 9 PGR, 191 GR, 194 GR then 278 Div. As 191 GR and 194 GR are in no better condition than 231GR which was relieved by 67 PGR we might soon find a complete relief of 71 Div. The inf of 26 Pz Div could not stretch out to the right flank of 71 Div thus a new fmn could be expected should a relief take place. All that are known to be in a posn for such a change are 98 Div and 1st Turcoman.

ELS
Time of Signature... B hrs
Distributions as for I Sum No 7

[Signature]
G. R. Whiston) Maj
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

I NEW ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

- (i) 26 Pz Div 67 PGR 136 PW were taken from II Bn on 31 Aug. (117 were taken in MONTECCHIO when the town was captured.)
- (ii) 1 Para Div Para Engr Bn 14 PW were taken from 2 Coy on 31 Aug. Place of capture not known.
- (iii) Panther Turret Construction Coy 4 PW were captured on 31 Aug (area unknown)
- (iv) 71 Inf Div 171 Engr Bn 6 PW were taken from 1 Coy on 31 Aug. Place of capture unknown.
- (v) 450 Army Arty Bty 3 PW were taken from 3 tp of this bty.

II ENEMY ORG AND STR

- (i) 450 Army Arty Bty 3 tps each 4 x 15cm guns estimated str of bty 120
- (ii) 71 Inf Div
 - (a) 194 GR: 31 Aug I Bn str 70, 1 Coy - 30, 2 Coy - 10, 3 Coy - 10, 4 Coy - 20
 - (b) 171 Fus Bn: 31 Aug estimated str 70 - 80
 - (c) 278 Arty Regt: IV Bty - 10 Tp - 2 x 15cm, 11 Tp 3 x 15cm, 12 Tp 3 x 15cm.
- (iii) 1 Para Div 4 Para Regt 30 Aug, I Bn 4 Para estimated 150 PW states 14 Coy has no A tk guns only 6 Ofenrohrrs.
- (iv) 26 Pz Div 67 PGR II Bn lost 136 PW on 31 Aug, estimated str now 120.

III ENEMY PERSONALITIES

- (i) 26 Pz Div 67 PGR the following offrs were captured on 31 Aug from II/67 PGR.
 - 2/Lt Fuchsa - 5 Coy
 - Lt Voss - OC 6 Coy
 - 2/Lt Mische - 7 Coy
 - 2/Lt Wagner - 7 Coy
- (ii) 450 Army Arty Bty
 - Capt Anschvetz - OC
 - Capt Grimm - OC 1 Tp
 - Lt Dietzel - OC 2 Tp
 - Capt Franck - OC 3 Tp
 - Capt Siegmann - OC HQ Tp
- (iii) 1 Para Div 4 Para Regt
 - Capt Schrader - OC I Bn
 - Lt Wurt - OC 3 Coy

IV Return of PW through 5 Cdn Armd Div cage during period 2000 hrs 30 Aug to 2000 hrs 31 Aug.

- (i) 1 Para Div
 - (a) 4 Para Regt
 - II Bn HQ - 8
 - 1 Coy - 45
 - 2 Coy - 30
 - 3 Coy - 48
 - 4 Coy - 10
 - 14 Coy - 42
 - 13 Coy - 3
- (I/4 - 141)
- 186

III ENEMY PERSONALITIES

71 INF DIV (iii) 171 Arty Regt (continued)

- OC 5 Tp - Capt Birks
- OC 6 Tp - Lt Illermann
- OC 10 Tp - Lt Teuerkopf
- OC 11 Tp - Lt Koehler
- OC 12 Tp - Lt Peters

(iv) 557 Army Arty Bty

OC 2 Tp - Capt Bierschenk

IV TACTICAL SIGNS

557 Army Arty Bty - Reported by PW to be black gun silhouette pointing at 2 o'clock on a white square background.

V PW COUNT

<u>Unit</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>Place of Capture</u>
194 GR	5	MONTECICCARDO
171 Fus Bn	1	S023747
211 GR	1	S ANGELO
557 Army Arty Bty (att 2/194 GR)	1	GINESTRETO
TOTAL	- 8	

PART ONEI ENEMY SITUATION

The efforts of the Hun to restore order to the chaotic and critical situation on our Corps salient has elicited no success. On the contrary, he has lost the two remaining features, TOMBA DI PESARO and M JURCO, which offered him his only hope of holding us between the FOGLIA and the CONCA Rivers. His already low-str divs have suffered heavily in killed, wounded and PW and he is very low in armour and A tk guns; he is in no posn to make a stand without the aid of natural defences. The CONCA R is the first to offer this. Our progress up the I Para and 26 Pz inter-div boundary has lengthened the line of both to the pt where a committal of all his inf bns has been forced. The embarrassing bulge on I Para Div's right flank is growing hour by hour, and a cutting off or a withdrawal of that div is imminent. When this happens the div on its right flank, due to our pressure and their unhealthy posns, must conform by withdrawing to the next line of defense. The next 36 hours will confirm or deny this statement.

The introduction of 98 Inf Div into the foothills sector and the mov of tps and MT from No 9 Highway to the SOUTH further confirms our belief that the German really wanted to keep the Eighth Army SOUTH of the GREEN Line.

II ENEMY METHODS

Last night a counter-attack against one of our arm'd regts was easily repulsed by the inf. Not a single weapon was found on this aggressive party other than Faustpatronen. Apparently their sole purpose was to knock out our tks, but a protecting screen of inf firmly denied him this intention.

(Signature)
(G R Whiston) Maj
G5 5 Cdn Armd Div

EIS

Time of Signature...0500.....B'hrs

Distribution: same as for I Sum No 8.

I ENEMY IDENTIFICATION

(1) New Identifications

- (a) 26 Pz Div - 67 PGR PW were taken from 2 Coy at 995758 on 1 Sep. First identification of 1 Bn 10 Coy (assault) - PW were taken at Pt S0098 on 1 Sep.
- (b) 1/51 AA Arty Bty 1 offr formerly of 1 tp taken on 1 Sep.

(ii) Other Identifications

- (a) 1 Para Div - (a) Para A Tk Bn PW were taken from 2 Coy at 028778 on 1 Sep.
 (b) Para Engr Bn PW were taken from 1 and 2 Coys and from 3 and 4 Coys at pt 253 069795 on 1 Sep.
 (c) 4 Para Regt PW taken from 2 Coy at Pt 182 (M MARRONE) on 1 Sep.
- (b) 26 Pz Div - 67 PGR 24 PW from 2 Coy taken NORTH of TOMBA DI PESARO, PW from 5 Coy taken at 004750
- (c) 4 Engr Trg Bn 2 PW taken from 4 Coy area 0177.
- (d) 71 Werfer Regt 2 PW from 6 Tp were taken on 1 Sep.
- (e) 1 Para Div - Para Mortar Bn 3 PW from 1 Coy were captured on 1 Sep at Pt 182 (M MARRONE)

II ENEMY ORG & STR

(1) 26 Pz Div

- (a) II/67 PGR - PW claim that Bn has only 20 men left. 10 Coy str 50.

1 Para Div

- (ii) (a) Para A Tk Bn 2 Coy armament - 4 x 7.5cm PAK 40 but 2 KO'd. PW state each gun crew has one Faustpatrone per gun crew. Bn has now only 2, 3 & 4 Coys, and according to PW statements they were in sp of I/4 Para.

- (b) Para Engr Bn 1 Pl str 21 men - 2 x MMGs and 2 Faustpatrone - 1 Coy str 60.

- (iii) 4 Engr Trg Bn 4 Coy committed as inf, str now believed to be 40.

STRS

(i) 1 Para Div

1 Para Regt - Coy strs estimated at 40 - 60

3 Para Regt - Estimated str now approx 220.

4 Para Regt - On 30 Aug I Bn 175, PW losses 31 Aug 141. Bn may be considered as wiped out.

(ii) 71 Inf Div

191 GR, 194 GR and 211 GR all suf hy cas, 191 GR and 194 GR now be formed into Battle Gps.

(OVER)

(iii) 26 Pz Div - 67 PGR, II Bn PW losses 136, present str estimated at 50.

III PERSONALITIES

Para Engr Bn - OC - Maj PRÖMMING
OC 1 Coy - 2/Lt GEIGER

67 PGR - OC - Col VON GRAFENHORST

IV Return of PW through 5 Cdn Armd Div Cage during period 2000 hrs 31 Aug to 2000 hrs 1 Sep.

(i) 1 Para Div

(a) Para 1 Tk Bn	
2 Coy	- 4
(b) Para Engr Bn	-
1 Coy	- 6
2 Coy	- 2
3 Coy	- 11
4 Coy	- 4
(c) Para Mortar Bn	
1 Coy	- 3
(d) 4 Para Regt	
2 Coy	- 1
TOTAL 1 PARA DIV	- 31

(ii) 26 Pz Div

67 PGR	
2 Coy	- 24
5 Coy	- 1
10 Coy (Assault)	- 3
TOTAL 26 PZ DIV	- 28

(iii) 51 AA Artv Bty

1 Tp

-

1 offr (formerly of this unit)

(iv) 71 Werfer Regt

6 Tp

- 2

2

(v) 4 Engr Trg Bn

4 Coy

- 2

1 offr 63 ORs

Evacuated to Corps Cage
31/1 Aug Sep:

Paratps	27 ORs
Unidentified	98 ORs
	<u>1 offr 188 ORs</u>

Total PW 2000 hrs 30 Aug
to 2000 hrs 31 Aug: 5 offr 364 ORs

GRAND TOTAL 6 offr 552 ORs

A P P X

CONSOLIDATED INTERROGATION REPORT on 1 x 2/Lt, 1 Sgt, 4 ORs from
1 Pl/6 Coy/67 PGR/26 Pz Div. 4 ORs from 2 Pl/6 Coy/67 PGR/26 Pz Div.
One gnr from 10 Tp /N Bty/171 Arty Regt.

1 Unit

2 Function

The 2/Lt OC 7 Pl was a 22 yr old Party Member sublimely confident of Germany's chances, talked freely but could add little to the infm given by the ORs. None resisted interrogation; infm on other elements of 26 Pz Div purely negative.

3 Capture

10 PW from 6 Coy 67 PGR approx 302200B on pt 111.)S990-
The gnr, a Polish deserter; area MONTECCHIO same time.)579

4 Recent Moves

282000B II Bn 67 PGR left area IMOLA in MT after short period of rest. The bn lay low by day area RIMINI.
292000B II Bn moved SOUTH by truck debussing 15 kms NORTH of the MDL
300500B II Bn relieved unknown Bn in GOTHIC Line with 6 Coy on pt 111.

5 Unit

(a) Org

6 Coy 67 PGR - estimated str 60 - 70
1 Pl - 3 secs - now 24 men - 6 x LMG 42s - 2 Faustpatronen
2 Pl - 2 secs - 20 men - 4 LMG 42s - 2 discharge
3 Pl - 2 MMG secs - 15 men - 2 MMG 42s

(b) Str and Losses

5 and 7 Coys believed same str
8 Coy str not known
NO losses until these 10 PW taken

(c) Armament

6 Coy - 10 LMG 42s - at least 2 Faustpatronen
- 2 MMG 42s

(d) Morale

Amongst the offrns high, but little hope left amongst the ORs, unimpressed by the alleged str of GOTHIC Line, in line only 17 hrs.

(e) Tpt

4 trucks per coy.

(f) Rfts

A few reached the coy one week ago when in rest area.

(g) FPN

10 Tp 171 Arty Regt - 45414B
6 Coy - 06742C

(h) Dispositions

5 Coy known to be EAST of 6 Coy NTR on I Bn 67 PGR. Coy was sited on fwd slopes in concrete dugouts. NTR on movs of 26 Tk Regt.

6 Other Units

10 Tp IV Bty 171 Arty Regt
10 Tp - 2 x 15cm hows - 1 slightly damaged at wksp.
11 Tp - 3 x 15cm hows (All HD and oxen drawn)
12 Tp - 3 x 15cm hows

Average shoot per day, 30 x 40 rds per gun. Some days there was NO amm available for hows. Four days ago IV Bty believed 4 kms NORTH of SALOECIO.

7 Tks or Assault Guns seen - None seen.

8 Personalities

OC 67 PGR - Lt Col GRAFENHORST	OC IV Bty 171 AR - Maj VON JENA
OC 6 Coy - Lt VOSSI	OC 10 Tp - Lt TOERKAF
OC II Bn - Capt MICHELS	GPO 10 Tp - 2/Lt BRANDES
In II Bn - 2/Lt KLENNER	OC 12 Tp - Capt PETERS
OC 1 Pl 6 Coy - 2/Lt GROETZBACH (PW)	GPO 12 Tp - 2/Lt HOLSTEIN

	(b) <u>Engr Bn</u>	2 Coy	- 14	14
	(c) <u>Engr Trg Bn</u>	4 Coy	- 10	10
	TOTAL 1 PARA DIV		- 210	
(11)	<u>26 Pz Div</u>			
	<u>67 PCR</u>	5 Coy	- 59	
		6 Coy	- 29	
		7 Coy	- 44	
		II Bn HQ	- 4	136
	TOTAL 26 PZ DIV		- 136	
(111)	<u>71 Inf Div</u>			
	(a) <u>Engr Bn</u>	1 Coy	- 6	6
	(b) <u>171 Arty Regt</u>			
		6 Tp	- 2	2
	TOTAL 71 INF DIV		- 8	
(iv)	<u>OTHER UNITS</u>			
	(a) <u>450 Army Arty Bty</u>			
		3 Tp	- 3	
	(b) <u>Panther Turret Construction Coy</u>		- 4	
	TOTAL OTHER UNITS		- 7	
	TOTAL		- 361	

Total PW 2000 hrs 29 Aug to 2000 hrs 30 Aug, 1 offr 7 ORs.

GRAND TOTAL - 5 offr 364 ORs

23-2/Int
3 Sep 44

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 10

(Based on infm up to 0600 hrs 3 Sep 44)

1 GENERALPART ONE

The successes of the Allied armies in FRANCE and RUSSIA in their drives on the Fatherland are about to be rivaled in their spectacular advances by the gaining momentum of the break-out from the ITALIAN boot. The last thick skin of the soft under-belly of Europe has been pierced, and the German withdrawal completely from the country is but a matter of time, dependent upon the speed with which our forces follow up our initial gains. Pressure is being exerted all along the front and now in the central sector, and in the WEST the Hun is being forced onto his last defence line. His mobile reserves to the NORTH of the mountains have been committed elsewhere and his thinned-out forces, moving back to occupy the GOTHIC Line are confronted with two determined armies, and backed by nothing other than a number of DAF'd rds to the REICH. PW have stated "after the GREEN Line, then BRENNER". The German Army in ITALY must now pay the consequences for their apparent belief that the southern FRANCE expedition had drained on ITALY to the extent that a striking force was non-existent in this country.

2 ENEMY SITUATION

We have succeeded in preventing the enemy from making a stand on the CONCA river by keeping right on his tail. Two bridgeheads have been est, one on No 16 Highway and one in the area of MISANO R9286. The German withdrawal was forced in daylight and consequently much to his detriment as the airforce played havoc with his tracks, wheels and guns.

Study of the ground from air photos and maps does not reveal any lateral chain of defences before RIMINI, and the R MARECCHIA. No doubt he will attempt to use any heights there are in vain attempts to stay our advance in order that a more orderly retreat can be made. But unless the enemy can quickly muster a force along the R MARECCHIA he is not going to be able to upset our time-table for reaching the terminus of No 9 Highway, and the gate to the plains of LOMBARDY.

Enemy dispositions across the front can be assumed to be falling back as follows: from EAST to WEST: 1 Para Regt with I Bn fwd, then III Para Regt to approx R9288, a sqn of 26 Pz Recce Bn R9087, 10 Coy 67 PGR II/67 PGR and I/67 PGR in area S. CLEMENTE R8983, I/9 PGR, II/9 PGR 191 GR Gp, 194 GR Gp and II/290 GR and elements of I Bn from 98 Inf Div are disposed from right to left across our left neighbour's front. 290 GR are in the area of 191 GR Gp and is trying to effect a relief of that badly battered fmn. PW report that 289 GR is on the way to this part of the front in which case it will probably take over from 194 GR Gp, thus completing the relief of 71 Div by 98 Inf Div.

The Para standard is lowering day by day. The div has just received 180 to 200 rfts, men from 16 to 40, and recently employed on L of C duties.

2/Lt GWAND, OC 2 Coy Para Div Engr Bn, is the step-son of Dr Josef GOEBBELS, heredity has not crept in, and the 2/Lt is apparently neither mentally nor physically warped!

(Signature)
for (G R Whiston) Maj
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS

Time of Signature *12.22*...B hrs
Distribution: As for I Sum No 9

PART TWO

I ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

(i) New Identifications

(a) 26 Pz Div

26 Recce Bn PW from 3 Coy was captured area 9780 on 2 Sep.

(b) 62 Army Arty Bty

An offr from 1 Tp was captured at 982778.

(ii) Other Identifications

(a) 26 Pz Div

67 PGR 1 offr 15 ORs were taken in area 9877 on 2 Sep.

(b) 1 Para Div

3 Para Regt PW captured from 1 Coy on 2 Sep at 990815

(c) 71 Inf Div

171 Arty Regt PW taken from 1 Tp at 982778 on 2 Sep

II ENEMY ORG & STR

62 Army Arty Bty

consists of three med tps each 3 x 15 cms SPH 18 Hows, operationally the bty is in sp of 3 Para Regt.

71 Inf Div

171 Arty Regt PW state 1 Bty is a fd bty organised as follows: 3 Tps all 10.5 cm gun hows, present estimated str 9 guns all HD. The regt according to PW is once more under comd 71 Inf Div after 8 days in sp of 1 Para Div.

26 Pz Div

26 Recce Unit A PW (offr cadet sgt) makes the following statements: He had not seen the other coys of the bn, but assumed that they were all in the line. Org is similar to an inf recce bn. They have no armd cars and their tp carriers are far in rear. The coy is used purely as inf.

III PERSONALITIES

(i) 62 Army Arty Bty

OC - Maj FLAT
OC 1 Tp - Capt POETSCH
OC 2 Tp - Lt GRIMM
OC 3 Tp - Capt ANSCHUETZ

(ii) 171 Arty Regt

Lt Col ZEHM
OC 1 Bty - Capt RAWD

(iii) Para Div Engr Bn

OC 1 Coy - 2/Lt GEIER

(OVER)

(iii) Para Div Engr Bn (continued) OC 2 Coy - 2/Lt GWAND
 OC 4 Coy - 2/Lt HOLM

IV PW COUNT (2000 1 Sep to 2000 2 Sep)

<u>26 Pz Div</u>	<u>67 PGR</u>	3 Coy	-	1 offr	15 ORs
		HQ Coy	-		1
		2 Coy	-		4
		10 Coy	-		1
	<u>26 Recce Unit</u>	3 Coy	-		1
<u>1 Para Div</u>	<u>4 Para Regt</u>	1 Coy	-	1 offr	
	<u>3 Para Regt</u>	1 Coy	-		2
	<u>Para Engr Bn</u>	2 Coy	-		1
<u>62 Army Arty Bty</u>				1 offr	
<u>71 Inf Div</u>	<u>171 A R</u>	1 Tp	-		1
<u>Unknown Ersatz Bn</u>			-		1
TOTAL				-	3 offr 27 ORs
TOTAL PW, from 2000 hrs 1 Sep to 2000 hrs 3 Sep					3 offr 27 ORs
Previous Total					6 offr 579 ORs
GRAND TOTAL					<u>9 offr 606 ORs</u>

V ENEMY BOPT DESTROYED

(31 Aug - 1 Sep)

	<u>2 CAR</u>	<u>5 CAR</u>	<u>9 CAR</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Mk V (PANTHERS)	1	4		5
8.8 cm SP (HORNETS)		2	1	3
8.8 A tk guns		2		2
7.5 A tk guns	5	14	4	23
Probables		13	5	18
PW -	2 CAR	100 plus		
	5 CAR	117		
	9 CAR	60 plus		
		<u>277 plus</u>		

Chilmon pl. ready 175
Layed on L 214 Crest
you can count on Chilmon's
pl. at 0115'

P A R T T W O

I ENEMY IDENTIFICATION

(i) New Identification

(a) 26 Pz Div 26 Tk Regt 1 CSM and 4 ORs were taken from 2 tp 6 Sqn at 1500 hrs 3 Sep at 918857 to 934856

(ii) Other Identifications

(a) 26 Pz Div 26 Recce Unit PW were taken from 2 and 3 Coys area S9779 3 Sep, PW states all 4 Coys of unit are in the line.

(b) 1 Para Div 3 Para Regt PW were taken from sigs pl RHQ, 4, 5, 6, and 14 Coys on 3 Sep.

4 Para Regt PW taken from 6 Coy one km WEST of CATTOLICA on 2 Sep

Para A Tk Bn PW were taken from 2 Coy near S GIOVANNI on 3 Sep

(c) 71 Inf Div 171 Arty Regt PW captured from 3 Tp at 979807 on 3 Sep

II ENEMY ORG & STRS

(i) 26 Pz Div 26 Tk Regt only 1 Bn of 4 Sqn reported to be in ITALY, PW say 6 Sqn left PRATO with 12 x Mk IV SPECIALS. They travelled on tracks and only had seven runners when they arrived in RIMINI and believe 7 Sqn left for ADRIATIC sector before they did. They believe approx str of II Bn 26 Tk Regt to be 40 - 50 Mk IV SPECIALS. There are no PANTHERS, TIGERS or assault guns in the regt according to these PW.

(ii) 71 Werfer Regt PW state II Bty has three tps of 6 x 21 cm Nebelwerfers

(iii) 1 Para Div The div received 180 to 200 rfts drawn from airfids and base units and are definitely poor quality.

III PW COUNT (2000 2 Sep to 2000 3 Sep)

<u>26 Pz Div</u>	<u>26 Pz Recce</u>		
	2 Coy	1	
	3 Coy	<u>3</u>	4
	<u>26 Tk Regt</u>		
	6 Sqn	<u>5</u>	
	Total 26 Pz		<u>9</u>
<u>1 Para Div</u>	<u>3 Para Regt</u>		
	4 Coy	1	
	5 Coy	6	
	6 Coy	3	
	14 Coy	1	
	Sigs Pl RHQ	<u>1</u>	12
	<u>4 Para Regt</u>		
	6 Coy	<u>1</u>	1

(OVER)

Para A Tk Bn
2 Coy

21st Infantry (1)

Total Para Div

35

71 Inf Div 171 Arty Regt

3 Tp

1

Total PW from 2000 hrs 2 Sep to 2000 hrs 3 Sep - 25 ORs.

Previous Total 960 ORs

GRAND TOTAL 985 ORs

Breakdown by Div

I Para Div (b)

1 Para Div - 2 ORs 288 ORs

26 Pz Div - 7 ORs 189 ORs

71 Inf Div 10 ORs

Inden Units - 144 ORs

71 Inf Div (c)

I ENEMY ORG & STRS

26 Pz Div (1)

VI Vektor Regt (ii)

I Para Div (iii)

THE PW COUNT (2000 2 Sep to 2000 3 Sep)

26 Pz Div

I Para Div

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 11

(based on infm up to 2200 hrs 3 Sep 44) 4 Sep 44

PART ONE1 ENEMY SITUATION

The enemy after a rather rapid withdrawal from the CONCA R has est himself momentarily in RICCIONE and several high pts to the SOUTHWEST. But light contact was made during our crossings on the coast and in the MISANO area as the German had withdrawn to these posns, where he has impeded our further progress chiefly by the use of SPs, tks and on the coast rd with 8.8cm A tk guns. He has paid for his dogged tenacity to his posns today with a loss of much-needed armour and guns; on our div front we have accounted for at least four Mk IV SPECIALS, two HORNETS, and a 7.5 cm SP gun. No doubt our neighbours inflicted like cas; we know that he cannot stand for much of this type of treatment.

2 IDENTIFICATIONS

The most interesting pt of the day is the identification of 26 Pz Regt, whose arrival has been awaited since 67 PGR was found in the line on night 30/31 Aug. PW taken from this unit infm us that only II Bn is here and that I Bn is rumoured to exist, but has never been seen by themselves. 6 Sqn, the one we have encountered left PRATO on tracks a week ago with 12 Mk IV SPECIALS, but the journey eliminated 5. Of the seven which arrived on the CONCA, one was knocked out by arty and two by our own tks. 7 Sqn left PRATO two days earlier than 6 Sqn and presumably for this area but nothing was known of 5 and 8 Sqns. Total Bn str is estimated at 40-50, all are Mk IV SPECIALS with Mk IIIs as comd's tks.

26 Pz Recce Bn remains on our front and it is still 2 and 3 Sqns that we encounter although PW state that the remaining sqns are in the area. 2 Sqn has NO armd cars merely 6 armd half-track personnel carriers.

3 COMMON SENSE

The decline of the German Army has been in progress for some time, its fall is asgured very soon: an offr deserted yesterday! 2/Lt Heinzhirsch has long realised the stupidity of continuing the fight against overwhelming odds. His family has suffered greatly as a result of the war. He had discussed the possibilities of desertion previously with two offr friends, but both had felt that Germany still had a chance. Mr Heinzhirsch believes that many offr with their men would desert had they an inkling of the true situation in FRANCE and RUMANIA or could see our eqpt. (Please note, PW!) This offr volunteers to do anything for the Allies, in his eagerness to see the conclusion of this war.

4 ENEMY METHODS

A German gun crew dug in their 10.5cm gun between two haystacks. Cam was good, morale was high all that was needed was a target. It came but was slightly off to an angle from the gun so they traversed the weapon and engaged. The first rd set fire to the haystack, then the amm and blew up the gun!

FLASH: New identification: 10 PW from I/117 GR. PW state that they are from 115 Inf Div! Captured at R910865.

[Signature]
 (G R Whiston) Maj
 35 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS

Time of Signature: 11/5... B hrs

Distribution: as for I Sum 10

5 CDN ARMD DIV

23-2/Int
5 Sep 44INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 12

(based on infm up to 2359 hrs 4 Sep 44)

PART ONE1 ENEMY SITUATION

Today the enemy demonstrated his determination to contain us in the RIMINI bottle-neck. It is his intention to hold us at all costs in this area, in order that he may quickly build up a conc in the area RIMINI - S MARINO large enough to deal with any major Allied thrust. His purpose appears to be a desire to link up with RIMINI the GREEN Line in the mountains by means of the now chiefly overgrown PISA - RIMINI Line. This is his last hope in an attempt either to retain northern ITALY or to stay our advance sufficiently long to effect an orderly withdrawal to the NE. For the former it is forlorn, but with the latter he has a slight chance if our pressure should slacken. After the R MARRECHIO and RIMINI are passed the battle will assume a very fast and fluid nature, but until that time there will be several days of stiff fighting unless we are fortunate enough to catch him once again in the middle of regrouping and reorganizing for def. And certainly it would appear that this should take place judging from the conglomeration of bns, tps, regts and battle gps that are across our front.

Piecing together a somewhat jumbled jigsaw, the disposition of units across the ADRIATIC sector appears to be: EAST to WEST: III/1 Para, 303 GR Battle Gp, II/3 Para, I/117 GR, Para MG Bn, I/67 PGR CORIANO area, I/9 PGR, II/9 PGR, 191 GR Gp, 194 GR Gp to approx 82 Easting. Elements of II/26 Pz Regt, I/4 Pz Regt, 525 Hy A Tk Bty and 914 Assault Gun Bde are supplying the armour and SPs in sp.

The discovery of elements of 117 GR and 303 GR on our Corps front is rather surprising in that they do not seem to have relieved anyone, yet it should not be taken as indicative of the full regt gps appearing. It is obvious that he is fighting for time and is plugging holes with bns and battle gps in order to prevent us breaking through and upsetting an orderly withdrawal on to str already est in a hastily prepared def line. When the enemy retires across the MORANO R we can take it as a signal that either new fms or rfts to ones that have already withdrawn from the battle area have arrived.

The concern displayed by the German for our break through on the EAST coast is given by a PW from 26 Pz Regt who states that in the event of such an Allied move all German tps to the WEST risked encirclement.

[Signature]
for (G R Whiston) Maj
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

EIS
Time of Signature...0645...B hrs
Distribution : as for I Sum No 11.

PART TWO

I ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

- (1) 115 (98) Inf Div PW were taken from 2 and 4 Coys 117 GR at 910865 on 3 Sep
- (ii) 1 Para Div 3 Para Regt PW were taken from 5, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 Coys on 3 and 4 Sep
- 4 Para Regt PW were taken from 6 Coy at MISANO on 4 Sep
- 1 Para Regt 3 PW were taken from 7 Coy on 3 Sep at COMINCE
- Para A Tk Bn a PW was taken from 3 Coy on 4 Sep.
- (iii) 26 Pz Div 67 PGR PW were taken from 7 Coy on 31 Aug.
- (iv) 162 Turcoman 303 GR a PW (Russian) from 8 Coy was picked up near S GIOVANNI on 4 Sep

II ENEMY ORG & STR

(1) 115 (98) Inf Div - After its annihilation in the CRIMEA end 1943 and reform in CROATIA early 44, it was renumbered 115 Inf Div end Jul 44, shortly before the transfer of the div to the ADRIATIC coast. 282 GR was at the same time renumbered 117 GR; 289 and 290 GRs retained their numbers. From early Aug 44, 117 GR was engaged on CD and trg area RAVENNA. On 1 Sep 44, II Bn 117 GR was hurried down the coast as rfts, I Bn 117 GR came in to the line on 5 Div front early morning on 3 Sep, and occupied posns in rear of paratps who later withdrew through them.

117 GR - Consists of I and II Bns, 13 and 14 Coys.

I Bn

Bn str estimated approx 340
1 Coy - believed 70 strong
2 Coy - 40 to 45 men, 6 LMG 42s
3 Coy - approx 70 strong
4 (Hy) Coy - Combat str 140
one MMG Pl with 6 x MMG 42s
two mortar pls each 6 x 8.1 cm mortars.
Regt is ND. The proportion of non-Germans is estimated at 25%.

115 (98) Div Sign is a black cat on white background in form of 98.

- (ii) 26 Pz Regt A PW captured on 3 Sep makes the following statements -

8 Coy: PW heard that this coy left area PRATO 3 days before 6 Coy and lost all its Mk IV SPECIALS KO'd or damaged through DAF attacks on the way.

5 & 7 Coys: Believed each 12 - 13 tks. NTR on moves because Bn was always dispersed for fear of bombing.

6 Coy: Originally 12 tks at PRATO, 7 at RIMINI, now 4 runners.

PW was told that in the event of a fast Allied breakthrough on ADRIATIC coast, all German tps to the WEST risk encirclement.

1 Para A Tk Bn: PW makes the following statements;

1 Coy: absorbed by 2 Coy

(OVER)

- 2 Coy : A week ago - 1 x 8.8cm and 5 x 7.5 cm A tk guns, now believed 3 x 7.5cm PAK 40. Coy has recently been under comd 4 Para Regt.
- 3 Coy: A week ago in area PESARO had 7 - 8 x 7.5cm A tk guns.
- 4 Coy: Believed to exist though NOT in action here.
- 5 Coy: In FRANCE when last reported.
- 6 Coy: In Jun 44 was equipped with 7.5cm PAK 40 on Mk II chassis.

III PERSONALITIES

115 Inf Div GOC - Maj Gen Reinhardt
 OC 117 GR - Col Lindig
 OC I Bn - Maj Metz
 OC 2 Coy - Lt Wiedemann
 OC 4 Coy - Lt Wiessman

26 Pz Div 26 Pz Regt
 OC 6 Coy - Capt Schaft (wounded)

1 Para Div Lt Gen Heidrich and Col Heilmann reported recalled to Germany 10 days ago.

Para A Tk Bn

OC Bn - Maj Brueckner (away)
 A/OC & OC - Lt Urban
 2 Coy
 OC 3 Coy - Lt Feierabend

IV PW COUNT (from 2000 hrs 3 Sep until 2000 hrs 4 Sep)

(1) 1 Para Regt 15 (Engr Coy) 1
 7 Coy 3 4

3 Para Regt II Bn HQ 1
 5 Coy 5
1 Para Div 8 Coy 1
 9 Coy 2
 11 Coy 1
 10 Coy 2
 12 Coy 1 13

4 Para Regt 6 Coy 1
 12 Coy 2 3

Para A Tk Bn 3 Coy 1
 Total Para Div - 21

(11) 26 Pz Div 26 Pz Regt 6 Coy 1
67 PGR 7 Coy 1
 Total 26 Pz Div - 2

(111) 115 Inf Div 117 GR 2 Coy 5
 4 Coy 7
 Total 115 Inf Div - 12

(iv) 162 Turcoman

303 GR

8 Coy

1

1

Total PW from 2000 hrs 3 Sep to 2000 hrs 4 Sep - 36 ORs.

Previous Total - 9 offr 631 ORs

Grand Total - 9 offr 667 ORs

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 14
(based on infm up to 2359 hrs 6 Sep 44)

23-2/Int
7 Sep 44

PART ONE

I ENEMY SITUATION:

The enemy has succeeded momentarily in bringing to a halt the VIENNA bound Eighth Army. In what appeared to be a desperate attempt to reinforce his disorganized divs withdrawing from the crumbled GOTHIC Line, he committed, piecemeal, the bulk of his immediate reserve, risking for a few days the duties of coast watching along the vulnerable RIMINI - RAVENNA shore to but a handful of poor-class troops. This seemingly hopeless action, despite the Hun's hy cas in PW, killed and wounded, has effected its purpose in eliminating the momentum of our advance required to carry us through the RIMINI bottle-neck to the LOMBARDY plains. The success is not wholly due to the efforts of the WEHRMACHT, but equally to the advantageous lay of the ground. This factor the German has been quick to realize and has depended upon to the full.

The S SAVINO - PASSANO - CORIANO ridge is now the key to the ADRIATIC situation. The capture of this by our own tps will deny the enemy his present dominating and embarrassing posn on our left flank, and will enable us to cross the MARANO R on to the low ground SOUTH and SE of RIMINI. Even so when this obstacle is overcome and our advance is renewed, we will not have the speed essential to a quick bypass of RIMINI and will find that it is necessary to doggedly battle an est enemy from the well-positioned FORTUNATO feature SW of the city.

Answering a hurried call for help after the realization that a major op had developed on this coast, the signal being the Cdn crossing of the METAURO, rfts have arrived in the person of 29 PG and 5 Mtn Divs to add str and depth to the enemy's last ditch in ITALY. Elements of these divs were identified today and it is natural to assume that their parent fms are here in toto. This brings the enemy force to a total of, although low-est, six divs on a six-mile front!

The ever-changing disposition of enemy units across our front now reveals this temporary picture (subject to change without notice) from EAST to WEST, II/1 Para, III/1 Para, III/71 PGR, II/117, I/117 junc CORIANO ridge and MARANO R, possibly coy Para MG Bn, I/3 Para CORIANO, 14 and 15 coys 3 Para area CORIANO.

In the area S GIOVANNI as 2 Coy 3 Para Regt was effecting a withdrawal along BOAT route, they were assaulted from the rear by an unfriendly tk with an unfriendly MG. The paratps took smartly to the ditch, practice having made perfect, and an ace from 14 Coy 3 Para Regt coolly despatched the tk with a Faustpatrone. Alack for the Fatherland, on approaching triumphantly through the dust to take PW, the Faustpatrone wizard was confronted by a German tk lieutenant, who made it clear with a certain acerbity that he would now require another PANTHER!

ELS
Time of Signature 0643 8 hrs

Distribution: as for I sum No 13.

(G R Whiston) Maj
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

PART TWO

I ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

(i) 1 Para Div 4 Para Regt - A deserter from 8 Coy was captured at R97875 on 4 Sep.
3 Para Regt - 3 PW from 2 Coy were captured at R91865 on 5 Sep.
Para Recce Coy - A PW was taken at R9290 on 5 Sep.

(ii) 162 Turcoman Div

303 Gren Regt A PW was taken from 7 Coy at R911875 on 5 Sep.
236 Recce Bn A PW was taken at R925880 on 5 Sep.

II ENEMY ORG & STR

(i) 1 Para Div 4 Para Regt PW from 8 Coy says the coy was not operating with the bn, but in an independent role, Coy str 70-80, MMGs but no mortars.
3 Para Regt I Bn has suffered by losses. Present strs estimated at 1 and 3 Coys 40, 2 Coy 20, 4 (Hy) Coy 80. Elements of 14 Coy were in sp as A Tk protection. This coy is believed to be equipped solely with Ofenrohres and Faustpatronen.
II Bn 7 Coy 45, 8 Coy 50.
1 Para Regt According to PW II Bn str after battle were 9 Coy 40, 10 Coy 30, 11 Coy 50 to 60, 12 Coy 50 to 60.

(ii) 162 Turcoman Div

236 Recce Bn 3 Coy consists of Cav Gun Pl of 4 x 8.1 cm mortars, engr pl of 4 LMGs, A tk pl of 1 x 5 cm guns, armd pl of 2 armd cars. 1 and 2 Coys are mounted. Bn has 50% Turcomans, Coy str 80 to 100.

III PW COUNT (from 2000 hrs 4 Sep until 2000 hrs 6 Sep)

(i) <u>1 Para Div</u>	<u>4 Para Regt</u>	8 Coy	1
	<u>3 Para Regt</u>	2 Coy	<u>3</u>
		Total	<u>4</u> ORs
	Previous total		<u>9</u> offrs 667 ORs
	GRAND TOTAL		<u>9</u> offrs 671 ORs

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 15
 (based on info up to 2359 hrs 7 Sep 44)


23-2/Int
 8 Sep 44

PART ONE

1 From a point of view only of yardage gained, the past 24 hrs have been quiet. Further to his admirable advantage of ground, the German has found another ally in the weather. His play for time since our unexpected (by him) victory on the GOTHIC Line has been aided by these three factors, a commitment of his immediate res and a stiff fight, the PASSANO - CORIANO ridge and now the weather.

In his eagerness to stay our adv, the enemy has thrown in his bns, irregardless of regts or divs to which they belonged, into the threatened and hard-pressed sectors. The result of this has been an inconstant and disorganized picture across the front. However, with the valuable time that he has gained we shall find not only an organized str in depth, but also a coherent order of battle along the line with fixed responsibilities and more definite boundaries and comds. At present the line-up appears to be, from the coast to R8890; II/1 Para, III/1 Para, III/71 PCR, II/117 GR and I/117 GR; from 8890, elements Para MG Bn, 1/3 Para in CORIANO with 14 and 15 Coys in the near vicinity; then I/37 PCR, 198 Engr Bn and 98 Fus Bn stretching to and incl S SAVINO; II/289 GR and I/9 PCR are then responsible for the area between S SAVINO and the CONCA R; from the CONCA to the 78 Northing are, in order, II/290 GR, I/290 GR, II/100 Mtn and 171 Fus Bn; then follows I/100 Mtn, 85 Recce in the area PIANO DI CASTELLO and II/191 R8176. After his suggested reorganization to hazard a guess as to his eventual line-up, we might find from the sea to the CONCA R; 1 Para Div 29 PG Div and 5 Mtn Div, each with four bns in the line, assuming that 98 and 278 Inf Divs can look after the line from the CONCA to the mountains, we would have in res 26 Pz Div, and 71 Inf Div with 162 Turcoman on the pleasant coast-watching job.

News of the identification of 3 P G Div and 15 P G Div in FRANCE is not altogether surprising as the latter had been reported two weeks ago to be leaving the country. However, the knowledge that 3 P G Div is on another front, automatically forces us to enquire, "What of his mobile res in the Central PO Valley?". The only conclusion at which we can arrive, knowing that he has forsaken this force for commitment elsewhere, is that with the handfull of tps stretched from 5 Corps to the WEST coast, the German expects to have to defend only the narrow mountain passes through the GREEN Line. Apparently it is a risk that he is prepared to take until law and order are restored again on the ADRIATIC coast.


 (G R Whiston) Maj
 GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS
 Time of Signature... 0700... B hrs
 Distribution: As for I Sum No 14.

5 CDM ARMD DIV

23-2/Int
10 Sep 44INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 16

(based on infm up to 2359 hrs 9 Sep 44)

P A R T O N E


I Three deserters have today thrown a good deal of light on the rather obscure situation on the CORIANO ridge. One from III/15 PGR has obliged us with the solution to who's who between CORIANO and the MARANO R, while the other two have given us dispositions of 9 PGR in the PASSANO area.

III/15 PGR is well dug in along the rd running NORTH from CORIANO with 10 Coy on the outskirts of the town, then 11, 12 and 9 Coys, the latter reaching as far as the 892 Northing. 12 Coy, of which the PW was a member, has two pls just EAST of the rd at C DI MARANO 880887, and one pl with Coy HQ 8795 8875 to the WEST. There are four tks with the bn, presumably from 129 Tk Bn, two in vicinity 12 Coy HQ, and one each with 9 and 11 Coys. II/15 PGR is on the left of III Bn and to the MARANO R. PW knew nothing of the location of I Bn. II/9 PGR is conc in the area of PASSANO, 6 Coy left, 5 Coy centre and 7 right, with I/9 in res. PW from this regt believe 67 PGR is on their bn's left. This should leave 67 with the remaining ground between 9 PGR to and incl CORIANO. See att trace for locations.

These interesting identifications now give us a more definite picture of what is confronting us and indicate that the German is managing during this comparatively static stage to sort out his units and est definite div sectors of responsibility. The line up from EAST to WEST is as follows; II/1 Para, III/1 Para, elements of 4 Para, II/15 PGR, III/15 PGR, 67 PGR, 9 PGR (PASSANO), 289 GR, 98 Fus Bn, 198 Engr Bn, 290 GR, 129 Recce, II/100 Mtn Regt area GEMMANO, 71 Div Gp, I/100 Mtn Regt CASTELNUOVO area, 171 Fus Bn, PIAN DI CASTELLO, I/994 with I Bn in the GIOVANNI area; or in divs is 1 Para, 29 PG, 26 Pz, 98 Div, elements 5 Mtn, 71 Div, then follows toward the mtns, 278 Div. The first three of these are facing 1 Cdn Corps, and there are a total of 7 on an approx 17 mile front!

This str in the line suggests that the German is depending greatly on his ability to hold his present posns as it is obvious from this that he cannot have a large conc in the rear to man the next line of def (RIMINI - S MARINO), but has instead immediate div res.

These are decentralized and will be no good in case of a breakthrough, other than as a res to their own individual fmn. 162 Turcoman is the only complete div in res, and 50% of that is too well occupied keeping the other 50% from deserting. But then the enemy has used these same tactics before to advantage, and to test his consistency in this respect we can only wait and see.


(G R Whiston) Maj
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS

Time of Signature 10.08.00...b hrs

Distribution: As for I Sum No 15.

P A R T T W O

I ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

- (i) 29 PG Div 15 GR (Mot) A deserter from 12 Coy III (Jaeger) Bn, left coy posns at R881887 on 8 Sep.
- (ii) 26 Pz Div 9 P G R Two deserters from 5 Coy left their coy posns in PASSANO on 8 Sep.
- (iii) 1 Para Div 4 Para Regt Two deserters from B Ech 2 Coy were picked up on 9 Sep.
- (iv) 98 Inf Div 289 Gren Regt Two deserters from 5 Coy II Bn were taken on 9 Sep at 908862, having left the Bn three days ago.

II ENEMY ORG, DISPOSITIONS, & STR

- (i) 26 Pz Div 9 P G R The regt consists of two bns and a 14 Coy. 13 Coy believed dissolved. II Bn took up a posn area PASSANO night 4/5 Sep, I Bn believed WNW of II Bn in square 8685. According to PW, II Bn had 10 Mk IV SPECIALS under comd. Estimated str of 5 Coy 35.
- (ii) 29 P G Div 15 G R (Mot) 12 Coy str - 40, other coy's stronger. 12 Coy has a FAUSTPATRONE Det with Coy HQ, 2 rifle pls each 2 secs and one hy pl of one MMG sec and one mortar sec. (9 Coy is the hy coy in III Bn) 4 Mk IV SPECIALS are reported to be in sp of III Bn.

III PERSONALITIES

- (i) 26 Pz Div GOC - Lt Gen VON SENGER (according to document seen by PW)
OC 9 PGR - Col VON WITZLADEN
OC II Bn - Capt LANGER
- (ii) 29 P G Div GOC - no longer FRIES
OC 15 GR (Mot) - Lt Col WOLFERSDORF

IV TACTICAL SIGNS - (According to PW)

- I Bn 15 GR - inverted red triangle (Mot)
II Bn - two white concentric circles
III Bn - green triangle

V PW COUNT - From 2000 hrs 6 Sep to 2000 hrs 9 Sep.

- (i) 29 P G Div 15 PG (Mot)
12 Coy - 1
- (ii) 1 Para Div 4 Para Regt
B Ech 2 Coy - 2
- (iii) 98 Div 289 GR
5 Coy - 2
- (iv) 26 Pz Div 9 P G R
5 Coy - 2
- 7 ORs
Previous Total 9 Offrs 671 ORs
GRAND TOTAL 9 OFFRS 678 ORs

P A R T O N E

I ENEMY SITUATION

With the exception of two rather uninteresting deserters from 10 Coy III/15 PGR, we have had no further recruits from the opposition. These two whose activities were apparently confined to the prone and whose vision was obstructed by two sides of a slit trench could merely confirm their scanty reports with that given by our more informative Pole taken from the same bn yesterday.

On the whole it has been a very quiet day with no news of any more regrouping of enemy bns. The dispositions last published with the possible exceptions of one or two minor changes, can be taken as fairly definite; the permanency dependent upon our own efforts.

Conjecture as to the German intention regarding the posns he now holds is natural, knowing that he is not sitting on a prepared defense line. The only gains that have been made since the MELO R was reached are to the SW, and here the enemy can afford to withdraw because as he does so his line is shortened. Eventually it will run from the sea along the MELO to the CORIANO ridge and then WEST to the neutral territory of S MARINO, unless hy pressure is applied between CORIANO and the sea, and then only will he fall back. The only times that the Hun makes "a successful withdrawal to prepared posns in the rear" is when forced to do so.

II ENEMY DEFENCES

From a study of maps and air photos it can be seen that the policy in the RIMINI bottle-neck is not one of linear def but rather the strategical use of natural features made into strong pts and dominating the lines of approach which are intended as killing grounds. In the event, unlikely from the enemy point of view, of these focal points being overrun, a barrier is being prepared along the MARECCHIA R. These STÜTZPUNKTE are the NORTH and the NE sides of the RIMINI airfield, the SE tip of the S MARINO feature 8693, the hill from S FORTUNATO - Le GRAZIE 8394 - 8395, the outskirts of RIMINI from S MARIA 8696 to the sea, and pt 153 in square 7993.

III ENEMY METHODS

A recent PV reports that the following verey light sigs are at present in force:

- White --- We are here
- Green --- Increase range of arty fire
- Red --- Enemy attacking

(Source: 1 Brit Armd Div Int Sum 134)

R. H. Whiston, Capt.
for (C R Whiston) Maj
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS
Time of Signature... 11.08.00... B hrs
Distribution: As for I Sum No 16

PART TWO

I IDENTIFICATION

29 P G Div

15 G R (Mot) Two deserters from 10 Coy were captured at 893874 on 10 Sep.

II STRS DISPOSITIONS MORALE

29 P G Div

15 G R (Mot) (i) Deserters from 10 Coy claimed they deserted as their nerves were shattered by our arty fire. They were never able to leave their slit trenches.

(ii) 10 Coy has 2 rifle pls each 2 secs, coy str estimated at 60-70. 10 Coy has 4 LMG 42s, 1 MMG 42, 6 Faustpatrone, 1 x 8.1 cm mortars.

(iii) 10 Coy posns estimated 800 metres NORTH of CORIANO. HQ in houses WEST of rd along CORIANO ridge. Tks in sp of rd, but numbers and type unknown.

III PERSONALITIES

29 P G Div

GOC - Lt Gen Bollack
OC 9/15 GR (Mot) - 2/Lt Brockmeyer
OC 10/15 GR (Mot) - Lt Kramer

IV PW COUNT (2000 hrs 9 Sep to 2000 hrs 10 Sep)

29 P G Div

15 G R (Mot)

10 Coy

2

Previous Total

9 Offrs 678 ORs

GRAND TOTAL

9 Offrs 680 ORs

III ENEMY WE HOPE

are at present in force:

White
Green
Red

P A R T . T H R E E

EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF

PTE OTTO JAHN OF 117 GR

- 2 Sep 44 Covered 30 km on the march last night. The front comes nearer and nearer.
- 3 Sep 44 Already at 3 o'clock in the afternoon we march forward again and take up our posns. TOMMY has broken through near RIVINI and has surrounded a Para Division. Our regiment shall liberate them. The 289 Regt went into the line a day earlier and was mostly destroyed. Horrible things are happening. I hope we pull through all right. Now we depend on GOD.
- 4 Sep 44 We are in the midst of the battle. Nobody can think of sleep. Enemy tanks are in between our positions all the time. It is just horrible. One doesn't know any more if one is a human being. I had to go on patrol twice today.
- 5 Sep 44 Today, for the second day running the enemy attacks continuously. Through the whole night we received a heavy barrage on our positions and I had practically given up hope of pulling through alive. We face English and Canadian troops. The third day today that our food supply cannot get through. We live off grapes.

"NO ONE LOVES THE TURCOMAN"

A PW who operated a switch board at 162 Div Bn HQ claimed to have heard the following conversation between his adjt and Div HQ concerning the further movs of the div from ISTRIA.

"When Gen NIEDERMAYER, the late GOC, asked BERLIN where to take his fmn, he was told that they had FRANCE in mind, but ROMMEL protested strongly, saying that he wanted nothing to do with 162 Div. BERLIN then suggested ITALY, only to meet a like response from KESSELRING. Consequently it was decided that the Div would do least harm in the SPEZIA area, building fortifications."

(AFHQ Int Notes)

P A R T O N EI ENEMY SITUATION

The responsibilities of the MARANO crossings NORTH of the CORIANO ridge appears now to be shared by II/15 PGR and III/71 PGR, the former on the ridge and to the main crossing itself, while the latter is positioned to the SE near the junc of the MELO and BESANIGO. The dispositions of II/15 PGR are unknown to us not having been obliged with a rep of that fmn, however, the locations of III/71 coys show us that II/15 has no responsibility to the EAST of the BESANIGO. The brickworks at FORNI 890896 held by 9 Coy, the hy coy, is the centre of the bn frontage with 10 Coy EAST, 12 Coy WEST and 11 Coy in res at 885906. Each coy has a frontage of 200 - 250 metres and a str of 35 - 40 inf. The bn is immediately bounded on its left by 4 Para Regt, which by the way is believed to be organised into a regt battle gp, thus informing us that I and II bns of 71 PGR are available as a res. The finding of 71 PGR in this area shows us that 1 Para Div front is a comparatively short one with its right boundary approx running through the crossrds 893901. This gives the Paras a div res of its 3rd regt engr and recce bns, and regt res in the line of one bn for I Para Regt, and probably the same for 4 Para Regt. If the latter has not an inf bn in res, it is quite likely that one from the div res is fulfilling this task.

On our own div front we can be certain of I/15 PGR in the rear with possibly either one or both of I and II Bns 71 PGR in a posn to come to 15 or 67 PGR's aid.

The enemy disposed across the Corps front, with the exception of CORIANO and the area immediately SOUTH to PASSANO which is felt to be held by 67 PGR, are est definitely as follows from the sea; II/1 Para, III/1 Para, 4 Para Regt 8990 9090, III/71 PGR area FORNI on the MELO, II/15 PGR and III/15 PGR to NORTH end of CORIANO. The PW statement of 19 Mk IVs with III/71 is certain to be an exaggeration. However, civ reports of armour moving to the front should be heeded, as the Hun is vitally in need of rfts to bolster his depleted tk str. 15 PGR or 67 PGR were probably receiving their allotment at dusk yesterday when 5 tks were spotted in the rd to CORIANO.

Concern as to what the German would depend on to back up all these divs in the line other than their own immediate res, is likely to be answered by the arrival of 356 Inf Div and 90 PG Div. PW from the former taken in the FLORENCE area recently, have informed us of their intentions of attending bathing parades on this coast while infm from a reliable source points to the eastward mov of 90 PG traffic from NORTH Western ITALY. This further drainage of the Hun's forces in the APPENINES proves his willingness to depend largely on his natural defences there despite the lessons that he admits were learned from the CEF successes in the impassable hills bordering the LIRI Valley. Maybe he intends placing German tps in the well-defended mountain passes and the Italian Army of Liberation on the mountain tops. His thinned-out line, up from the WEST coast to the eastern foothills of the mountain chain is now 16 SS Reichsführer, 65 Inf, 362 Inf, 4 Para (FLORENCE - BOLOGNA rd) 715 Inf, 305 Inf, 334 Inf, 44 H & D, 114 Jaeger, the latter linking up with 278 Div which is the westerly fmn of the enemy's ADRIATIC mass. 42 Jaeger Div last reported near LE SPEZIA, and 19/20 GAF Div may forsake their present posns to conc on the CARRARA - BORGO sector of the line. Kesselring apparently is willing to risk his faith in the mountains the remaining few weeks sending the arrival of his long-awaited ally, the rains.

(OVER)

A most interesting fact that has come to light in the past 24 hrs that will no doubt receive due attention, is the knowledge of the German disregard for the much-publicized neutrality of S MARINO. PW and civ reports corroborated by the findings of Tac R and air photos infm us of the presence of German guns, tps and MP in that state. The first arty duel has already occurred.

[Handwritten Signature]
for (G R Winston) Maj
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS
Time of Signature..... 8 hrs
Distribution: As for I Sum No 17

Att as Appx 'A': Notes on 356 Inf Div.
" " Appx 'B': Photos of Enemy Eqpt on a limited distribution.

A P P X "A"

TO

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 18

NOTES ON 356 INF DIV

Morale

No new div could have made its debut to worse advantage than 356 Div, brought into the line SOUTH of BAGNOREGIO after several months of coast watching in the GENOA area, it was decisively broken through by our armour and lost a hundred odd PW, many dead and much eqpt in its first days' fighting. Hastily withdrawn behind a screen of parachutists, it left a trail of disgruntled stragglers to mark its axis of withdrawal to the TRASIMENE line. Since then it has been continuously in action, and gaining confidence and experience, it has emerged as one of our most formidable opponents, and as one of the best German inf divs in ITALY.

Much of this hardening of the div can be ascribed to a process of natural selection, the Volksdeutsche and other weaker elements having mostly found an opportunity to stay behind during the 100 miles withdrawal from BAGNOREGIO. Most of the Volksdeutsche who remained are reported to have been transferred to the arty regt where the opportunities of deserting are more limited. The men who are left behind in the rifle coys are mostly Nazis, full of confidence in themselves, their weapons and their leaders. They are not fanatics of the parachutists type and most talk freely when taken prisoner, but they include a sprinkling of fanatics, such as the man on M DOMINI who persisted in throwing incendiary bombs at one of our tks until he was flattened by its tracks, or those on pt 302 recently who continued to fire at our inf when our tks were only five yds away. The div contains a number of boys of 17 and 18; contrary to gen belief, however, this is no weakness, for these youths, mostly volunteers imbued with the Hitler legend, have not acquired the old soldiers' apathy and still see the heroic side of war, fight with the utmost determination. The older men of 35 and more, combed out from the rear areas, who are one of 715 Div's greatest weaknesses and problems, are noticeably absent from the front line tps of 356 Div. Their ofrs are capable and well liked.

The morale of the Div, in short, is high and they feel no marked depression in face of our superiority in eqpt. The Luftwaffe's absence has been an accepted fact for too long to excite comment. Our superiority in arty they are prepared to tolerate for the moment relying on the promise of arty-proof bunkers in the GOTHIC Line. They have even become accustomed to our superiority in armour, and a coy has been known to lie low and escape notice while

P A R T T W O

I ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

- (1) 29 P G Div 15 G R (Mot) PW were taken from 2,3,5,6,7,8, 14 Coys and II Bn HQ area CORIANO on 13 Sep.
- 29 Arty Regt 1 offr 2 ORs from 9 Tp were taken SOUTH of CORIANO.
- (ii) 26 Pz Div 67 P G R PW were taken from 3 Coy in CORIANO on 13 Sep.
- 93 Arty Regt PW were captured from 5 Tp in CORIANO on 13 Sep.
- 93 Ingr Bn PW from 1 Coy were captured SOUTH of CORIANO area 878868 on 13 Sep.
- 26 Pz Regt PW from 6 Coy were captured in CORIANO on 13 Sep.
- (iii) 450 Army Arty Bty
- A CSM from 1 Tp was taken PW in CORIANO

II ENEMY ORG & STR

- (i) 29 P G Div 15 G R (Mot) According to PW Coys in this regt have two rifle pls and a HMG sec. There is no hy coy in the bns. 14 Coy has all of its 9 x 7.5cm A tk guns. A PW from 7 Coy claims his coy did not suffer any cas from our arty fire. 2 Coy had 4 cas.
- 29 Arty Regt There appears to be three btys in the regt the fourth having been dissolved. Each tp in I and II Btys have 4 x 10.5cm guns. III Bty has 4 x 15cm SKR 18. PW states 9 Tp in sp of II/15 GR (Mot).
- (ii) 26 Pz Div 93 Arty Bty PW believe 2 guns from 5 Tp KO'd by shelling.
- 93 Engr Bn Were employed in demolitions in CORIANO
- 67 PGR Some PW from 3 Coy belonged to 'B' Ech and had only reached the regt two or three days ago.
- 26 Pz Regt PW from 6 Coy say all their tks (4!) were in CORIANO night 12/13 Sep but disappeared before the attack.
- (iii) 450 Army Arty Bty
- PW from 1 Tp states they were under comd 26 Pz Div with 4 x 15cm guns. Gun posns were 1 km due NORTH of MULAZZANO (8286).

III PERSONALITIES

- (1) 29 P G Div 15 G R (Mot)
- OC I Bn - Capt ZANDER
OC 2 Coy - Lt PRESTORIUS
OC 14 Coy - Lt GEBARDY

III PERSONALITIES (continued)

(ii) 26 Pz Div GOC - Maj Gen GRASEMANN
93 Arty Regt
 OC Bty - Lt-Col HEINE

(iii) 450 Army Arty Bty
 OC Bty - ? ROEHMER
 OC 1 Tp - Capt GRIMM
 OC 2 Tp - Capt ANSCHUETZ
 OC 3 Tp - Capt FRANCK

IV PW COUNT

Captured Offrs

Lt SIEGEL FOO 9 Tp 29 Arty Regt
 2/Lt ZOLLER OC 7 Coy 15 GR (Mot)

(i) 29 PG Div 15 GR (Mot)
 2 Coy - 9
 3 " - 8
 5 " - 2
 6 " - 3
 7 " - 1 offr 46 ORs
 8 " - 30
 14 " - 3
 HQ II Bn - 1
TOTAL 1 offr 102 ORs
15 GR (Mot)
29 Arty Regt 9 Tp - 1 offr 2 ORs
TOTAL - 2 offrs 104 ORs

(ii) 26 Pz Div 67 PGR
 3 Coy - 12
93 Arty Regt
 5 Tp - 1
93 Engr Bn
 1 Coy - 1
26 Pz Regt
 6 Coy - 1 15

(iii) 450 Army Arty Regt
 1 Tp - 1
2 offrs 120 ORs

Total PW from 13 Sep 0230 hrs until 13 Sep 2000 hrs:

2 offrs 120 ORs
 Previous
 Total 9 offrs 680 ORs
 GRAND TOTAL 11 offrs 800 ORs


23-2/Int
13 Sep 44INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 19
(based on infm up to 0600 hrs 13 Sep 44)PART ONEI ENEMY SITUATION:

Owing to the efforts of a well-known Canadian Infantry Brigade, the a/m is slightly disrupted. With the exception of II/15 GR (Mot) who we find have been responsible for the town of CORIANO instead of the MARANO crossing, the order of battle across the front was as we had been led to believe. On a deserter's statement from III/15, II Bn was thought to be NORTH of III Bn which holds (or at the time of reading held) the ridge from the 88 to 892 Northings. Apparently III/71 PGR links up with III/15 in the vicinity of MARANO 883894 thus indicating less possible str for the def of the approaches to the river and br 878903. 67 PGR not in the town as expected was positioned on the right of II/15 SOUTH of CORIANO, 3 Coy I/67 having been identified.

At present the German concern now with the loss of his key posn, CORIANO, is divided between the remainder of the ridge leading to the MELO R and the protection of the high ground pts 106 862897 and 113 862894. These latter dominate the rd running NORTH to OSPEDALEPTO 853891, a line of withdrawal which would be embarrassing to lose at this time. To ensure against our effecting this, his tks (Mk IV's from 129 Tk Bn) are covering the br 871877. The inf in sp of this task may be the regt res I/15 and the remnants of II/15, the unfortunate former owners of CORIANO. The appearance of II/71 PGR can be expected when III/15, and III/71 are dispossessed of their holdings on the Northern end of CORIANO ridge.

An estimate of enemy tk str between 87 and 91 Northings, that is in sp of the 4 bns in the line and 2 in res of 15 PG Regt and 71 P G Regt, is placed at 30 - 40 which includes, Mk IV SPECIALS Mk III's and possibly a number of assault guns.

An interesting report from our left flank which awaits further confirmation because of its seeming fantasy is that literally hundreds of the enemy are giving themselves up in the area 860840. Contrary to regulations regarding the marking of head and tail with blue and green flags, these are marching in in cols with white flags at front and rear! Let us hope that this presages a total collapse of the enemy on our front, or at least becomes infectious throughout his ADRIATIC forces.


(G R Whiston) Maj
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS/SDR

Time of Signature: 131305...B hrs

Distribution: As for I Sum No 18

Att: Appx 'A' - Translation of German captured documents.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 20
(based on infm up to 0600 hrs 14 Sep 44)

23-2/Int
14 Sep 44

P A R T O N E

I ENEMY SITUATION

It was a surprised German that was rudely awakened from his dugout very early yesterday morning to confront an enemy who had closed in on his FDLs without any word of warning. The defenders of CORIANO stubbornly contested a lost battle throughout the day as their friends along the ridge to the right and left met a like fate. Although not with quite the whole-hearted spirit demonstrated by 289 GR and other members of 98 Inf Div to the SOUTH who all but goose-stepped in with banners flying (white!), 29 PG Div still yielded a good representation to our PW Cage. II/15 GR (Mot) should be extinct by virtue of the fact that 1 offr and approx 100 ORs were taken PW from an original str of 175-200 and estimating that a maximum of cas were suffered. The loss of CORIANO and the ridge is a blow to the Hun who had no doubt imagined that on the halting of our original momentum we had reached another ARIELLI in the MELO - CORIANO line. His determination to remain in these posns is expressed by PW: a sgt from II/15 stated that, had the attack been in daylight it would have been disastrous for us, and a member of III/15 reported that their orders had been to hold at all costs. But alas, 15 GR (Mot) is now little more than material for the historian or at least a terrific headache to OC GBHD.

The hy cas suffered by the enemy in killed, wounded and especially PW will undoubtedly provide if not open gaps in the line, then certainly weak spots through which we should be able to adv with comparative speed and ease. As yet no strategical Corps res has arrived on this coast to counter a major breakthrough and unless the German is able to despatch divisional res with alacrity to the threatened sectors a disaster for him might easily occur. Contrary to recent reports of the approach of 90 PG and 356 Divs indications now are that the former still has at least a regt (200 PGR) engaged in SE FRANCE and the latter the same NORTH of FLORENCE. Consequently it is highly probable that we shall cross the MARECCHIA R before further help can arrive. Locally a rapid reshuffling will take place which may even eventually straighten out a rather bumpy line, but will lack the required str in bodies to compensate for the vulnerability caused by this disorg. The conquest of the FORTUNATO and S LORENZO features and the crossing of the MARECCHIA will be effected by constant pressure and gaining momentum against a tired, slightly confused and rather discouraged enemy.

At the moment 29 PG, 26 Pz and 98 Divs are falling back with but little res to stem our adv. 1 Para Div on a fairly narrow front has more depth in def than its neighbours but it is questionable whether it will jeopardize the important coastal strip by despatching elements of 3 Para R to assist in gap-plugging further inland.

It is hoped that the GS of 26 Pz Div are non-existent this morning, and that the GOC, if not deceased, is in no condition to administer, by some brilliant strategy, to the misfortunes of his hard-pressed div. Yesterday a PW supplied the incentive for a Spit-bomber foray on the HQ which is (was?) in the buildings lining the NORTH side of the rd between R761948, and R768950. The result was a direct hit on G Ops and several very near misses on the houses of the GOC and his staff offrs.

Yesterday was full of surprises for OC 7 Coy II/15 PG (Mot), Lt Zoller. It was bad enough when our inf waltzed in on his posn just fwd of CORIANO and later when he spent the day numbering off his coy as they dribbled into the PW Cage, but an awed respect was gained for Allied speed and efficiency when the Interrogation Offr handed him his latest letter from home, saying "Oh, the mail is in, here's one for you, Zoller!"

ELS
Time of Signature: 14.12.44..5 hrs
Distribution: See Appx "A".

(G. Whiston) Maj
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

I GENERAL

The necessity for the evacuation from ITALY of 10th and 14th Armies must now be evident to the German High Comd. FRANCE is a closed door with the key on its WEST side, the Russian and Tito's successes have destroyed any feeling of security there was in the EAST and Eighth and Fifth Armies are demonstrating their abilities to force the German from his last strong line of def. To effect a successful withdrawal from the country it must be done from WEST to EAST pivoting on the ADRIATIC coast. This action will even present a grave problem. At present the likelihood of a complete breakthrough in the RIMINI sector is apparent in which case the divs in the mtn GOTHIC defns will be in danger of being outflanked and cut off. On the other hand if the se tps retire down to the LOMBARDY plains while 76 Pz Corps contains our forces below the MARECCHIA R then this latter Corps will be in a like predicament. When the great advantage of mtn def is lost the thin line that now occupys the hills will be no match for Fifth Army after it has poured through the passes onto the plains, and a quick drive of the American Army through to BOLOGNA and FERRARA would spell finis to the eight divs countering our advs in this sector. To extricate his forces from NORTH ITALY Kesselring must retain an even line pivoting on this coast but the pivot pt must also move back at a proportionate speed in order that his divs may finally converge intact on the few narrow exits along the AUSTRIAN frontier.

II ENEMY SITUATION


The loss of the CORIANO ridge has determined whether the Hun should stay on the SOUTH side of the MARANO R: he has acted according to plan (ours) and withdrawn, but not without assistance, for 71 PGR was persuaded to do so by our tps in the area of 8790 and 8890. The result of this was large drafts from this regt to 1 Cdn Inf Div PW Cage including reps from II Bn which heretofore had not been identified. The salient we have created towards S LORENZO 8691 and S MARTINO 8693 will no doubt accelerate 1 Para's withdrawal towards the airport. Evidence has already been gained that this is beginning to take place. Likewise, further WEST our gains in the OSPEDALLETO area 8589 must certainly cause the enemy tps to the SOUTH and SW some concern. Contrary to the natural deduction that these forces would move to the NORTH and NW in order to eliminate the possibility of encirclement the enemy appears to be committing newly arrived rfts from 356 Inf Div to help plug the holes caused by the mass surrenders from 98 Div and to give further fight SOUTH of the MARANO in that sector. Even more surprising is the fact that this morning he is still being stubborn in the GEIMANO area 8490 and our tps have cut off his natural line of withdrawal from there by taking MONTESCUDO 2-3 miles to their NW! German strategy appears to be greatly at fault noting this rather foolish act. Also in sp of this statement elements of 356 Div have been identified showing his preference to continue a piecemeal commitment of new bns as they arrive rather than to retain a strong force as a strategic corps res.

It is difficult to pin pt the enemy bns in the line as their posns are subject to the demands of what is becoming a more fluid battle, however, on our Corps front this appears to be the order from EAST to WEST; II/1 Para, III/1 Para with I/1 Para in res, elements 4 Para R with a recce coy to div boundary which runs through S MARTINO, then I/71 PGR, III/71 and II/71 to area 8591, and III/15 PGR and I/15 NORTH and WEST of OSPEDALLETO with 67 PGR to the SOUTH. Backing up this line there is at present nothing other than 3 Para R which is still in rear of its own div on the coast.

Effect of Arty Barrage

Lt ZOELLER boasted that he smoked cigars in perfect tranquillity during the barrage, and that his coy on fwd slopes gen area 882869 suffered not a single cas. The latter claim is certainly borne out in that his coy marched unscratched through 5 Cdn Armd Div Cage, but in his Churchillian claim he was an exception. The barrage appears to have had a colossal demoralising effect, which certainly undermined the defenders' will to fight appreciably. In actual killing capacity the barrage was certainly NOT strikingly effective. One man and two man dugouts were 5 feet deep and covered with wooden beams from the houses. One P^{vt} stated with feeling that it was the most intensive barrage he had ever lived through. Many admitted they simply cringed in their holes and awaited death.

(Source: IO CSDIG 5 Cdn Armd Div)


(G. R. Whiston) Maj
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

EIS/SDR

Time of Signature.....15/11/42.....B hrs

Distribution: As per I Sum distribution

PART 6 TO N.E. AREA

ENEMY SITUATION

The Hun's strategy does not vary; we can be sure now that he is ever willing to risk the security of depth for maintenance of a line, no matter whether advantage will or will not be gained by holding a line which is undoubtedly doomed to draw back. The similarity of his reactions to our drives on this coast to the manner in which he answered our advances in May and June is indeed most evident in its duplication. Our renewed efforts have drawn further reinforcements to assist in a gap-plugging role. Three bns of 356 Inf Div and the recce bns of 44 and 114 Divs were thrown in on 98 Div sector whose members had been almost unanimous in their demonstrated preference for the comforts of our PW camp. And now elements of 162 Turcoman in the form of a 303 GR Battle Gp and 236 Recce Bn have appeared on the coastal sector to assist 1 Para Div, whose attention must now be given chiefly to the threat of a breakthrough in the S MARTINO area. The Boche must certainly appreciate the fact that a large and determined force is facing him in the RIMINI bottleneck and one which with its continuous pressure and resultant gains has demonstrated its ability to overcome whatever defence he can present. Therefore the conclusion to be drawn is that the enemy's doggedness is being displayed in a desperate play for time. He must contain us in this area until the weather changes and then whatever his intention may be, to hold or to withdraw, only with the coming of the rains will he have the opportunity to successfully attempt either.

Now that 356, although not in toto, has arrived and that probably all that can be spared from the coast-watching Turcomans have appeared in the line, it will be most interesting to find what the enemy will pull out of the hat to toss in piecemeal against our next threat.

A surprising fact was revealed to us on the taking of PW from 236 Recce Bn in that in a strength of some 300 fighting men there are but 60 Turcomans. This undoubtedly elevates the fighting quality of the bn to a higher degree than anticipated.

The enemy order of battle is fast reverting to the hodge-podge which appears to be the usual result of our major efforts. From EAST to WEST we now have facing us: 303 GR Battle Gp (with possibly elements of 1 Para Div), then 236 Recce, 3 Para Regt, 71 GR Battle Gp (including 93 Engr Bn fighting as inf), III/15 GR (Mot), I/15 GR (Mot), 26 Recce, remnants of I and II/67 P G R (to the area 8289).

[Signature]
 Lt-Col
 GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

RIS/SDR
 Time of Signature B hrs

Distribution: As per I Sum distribution

P A R T T W O

I IDENTIFICATIONS The following PW were taken in area of CORIANO on 13 Sep.

(i) 29 PG Div 15 G R (Mot) PW from 2,7,9,11,12,14, and 6 Coys, also from II Bn (HQ)

29 Artv Regt Two PW from 5 Tp (II Bty) on 14 Sep

(ii) 26 Pz Div 67 P G R PW from 1,2,3, Coys on 13 Sep in southern outskirts of CORIANO

(iii) 733 Army Arty Bty

A PW was taken from 3 Tp at 878882 on 14 Sep

2 ENEMY ORG AND STRS

(i) 29 P G Div 15 G R (Mot) I Bn received 40-50 rfts early Sep 44. II Bn has suffered heavily in PW alone, may now be considered no longer a fighting unit, although a small quantity of rfts arrived at Bn night 13/14 Sep. III Bn present estimated str 130 - 150, 15 G R (Mot) 300 - 350.

Personnel The physical quality of the tps in this regt is evidenced by the ages alone of the 22 PW taken from III Bn. Of this haul 10 were 33 and over and 7 were 21 and under. Their age gps varied from the 1926 to the 1906 classes.

14 Coy 15 GR (Mot) consists of three pls, according to PW only 3 x 7.5cm PAK 40 remain. 13 Coy appears to be equipped with 15cm SIG 33 "y inf guns on Pz Kw 38 (t) chassis.

29 Artv Regt II Bty is a fd bty, III a Med bty, 5 Tp 4 x 10.5 gun hows, no shortage of amm.

(ii) 26 Pz Div 67 P G R 1 and 2 Coys each 2 rifle pls, 1 by pl (MG) Rfts were received on 6 Sep, 30 for 1 Coy, 30 for 2 Coy. PW believe that 4 Coy does not exist. Many of the rfts received were from 'B' Ech and included all the clerks, bottlemashers and throwouts.

(iii) 733 Army Arty Bty

Bty is composed of 3 tns all equipped with 10.5cm LFH 18 gun hows as follows: 1 tp - 4 guns, 2 tp - 3 guns, 3 tp - 2 guns. 3 tp was believed in sp of III/15 GR.

3 PERSONALITIES

(i) 29 P G Div 15 G R (Mot)

OC I Bn - Capt MATTE (one arm amputated)
OC II Bn - Maj WEITZEL
OC III Bn - Maj BREITENBACH (believed replaced)
OC 14 Coy - 2/Lt VON GERHARDI

(ii) 733 Army Arty Bty

OC Bty - Capt WERNITZE
OC 1 Tp - Lt WINZEK
OC 3 Tp - 2/Lt SPAMER

(OVER)

4 PW COUNT - From 2000 hrs 13 Sep to date.

(i)	<u>29 PG Div</u>	<u>15 OR (Mot)</u>		
		2 Coy	-	3
		5 Coy	-	3
		6 Coy	-	8
		7 Coy	-	2
		9 Coy	-	6
		10 Coy	-	1
		11 Coy	-	9
		12 Coy	-	6
		14 Coy	-	1
		II Bn HQ	-	<u>1</u>
				42
		<u>29 Arty Regt</u>		
		1 Tp	-	1
				1
(ii)	<u>26 Pz Div</u>	<u>67 PGR</u>		
		1 Coy	-	5
		2 Coy	-	3
		3 Coy	-	<u>3</u>
				11
(iii)	<u>733 Army Arty Bty</u>			
		3 Tp	-	1
				1
		<u>TOTAL</u>	-	<u>55</u>

Previous total - 11 Offrs 800 ORs

GRAND TOTAL - 11 Offrs 855 ORs

PART ONEI ENEMY SITUATION

1 Para Regt, the strongest in the Div, has shown a reluctance to depart from the coastal strip for S MARTINO and ultimately the FORTI-MATO feature as originally expected on the creation of 1 Cdn Inf Div salient in the LORENZO - MARTINO sector. A sharp thrust up from the NW corner of the airfield was the deciding factor that persuaded 1 Para Regt to postpone the signing over of the immediate coastal strip to their questionable ally the Turcomans. However, 236 Recce Bn of the Turcoman Div, probably because of its high Aryan content, has been deemed reliable enough to remain in the line. And so 303 GR sitting just behind the line on the sea are finding consolation in their proximity to their beloved ADRIATIC, having had to put off again the opportunity to follow the example of their 3000 brothers who were captured and deserted from the Div during the Fifth Army thrust from ROMA to LIVORNO.

The result of our attacks in the S MARTINO area and our push towards the coast from NORTH of the airfield is a conglomeration of all three Para Regts and 236 Recce, possibly fighting as battle gps. To the WEST of our salient 29 PG Div has bolstered its thin and wavering line by throwing in 129 Engr and 129 Recce in that order from NORTH to SOUTH between the hard-pressed and badly-battered battle gps of 71 PGR and 15 PGR.

26 Pz Div still on the right of 29 PG Div, and in much the same physical condition is concerned with the bulge created by 4 Brit Div NW of OSPEDALETTO. Its units are disposed from 8590 around this newly-formed spur: from the EAST II/67 PGR and which very likely includes the remnants of I Bn, 26 Recce Bn and then II/9 PGR.

To the SOUTH of 26 Pz elements of 98 Inf Div may still be found intermingled with bns of 356, which, by the way, had been in the act of effecting a relief of the TRIESTE bound 98 at the time of our attack in that region. This, no doubt, partly contributed to the reasons for the mass desertion to our tps at that time. All three regts of this newly-arrived formation have now been identified and also its Recce Bn.


Owing to the reshuffling of enemy bns that occurs each time an advance is made, it is difficult to pinpoint their dispositions across the front, particularly when so many bns are organized as battle Gps. Boundaries, if they exist, must either often be ignored or indeed be very elastic. The following is the apparent order of battle at the moment starting from the coast:-

III/1 Para		
236 Recce Bn		
II/1 Para	-	NORTH of airfield
Elements of 3 and 4 Para Regts		
I/1 Para (believed Sp by TIGERS))	
I/71 PG (Mot))	- Area S MARTINO
II/71 PG)	Battle Gp ?
129 Engr Bn)	
129 Recce Bn)	- on left flank of
III/15 PG (Mot))	S MARTINO salient
I/15 PG (Mot))	Battle Gp?
67 PGR Battle Gp)	- 8591 to 8391 to NW
26 Recce Bn)	of CERASOLO 8288
9 PGR)	

(OVER)

356 Inf Div -	870 GR)	- CERASOLO area along
	871 GR)	S MARINO border to
	869 GR)	WEST of MONTESCUDO
	44 Recce Bn)	
	114 Recce Bn)	
	356 Recce Bn)	
Possibly plus elements	98 Div)	

Despite the enemy's continuous hole-plugging, there are still areas that could well afford reinforcing, in particular the 29 PG Div sector, consequently we should expect more candidates from further afield. The reported relief of 20 GAE Div by 42 Jaegar Div in the area of CARRARA on the west extremity of the GOTHIC Line might indicate a new recruit for the RIMINI - S MARINO front.

for 
 (W.C. Dick) Lt Col
 GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS
 Time of Signature *17/11/50*...A hrs

Distribution: As per I Sum distribution

Att: Appx "A", Experience with Tiger Tanks.

EXPERIENCE WITH TIGER TANKS

In the battle for FLORENCE contact was made by 2 NZ Div for the first time with Tiger tks in any number. The following are some preliminary pts which emerged during these encounters, regarding the characteristics and use of this enemy AFV. Several of them confirm views previously expressed in official papers.

(a) Employment

Tiger tks were employed, usually well sited and well camouflaged with foliage so as to be difficult to pick up, as follows:

- (i) In hull-down posns to delay inf and pick off our tks.
- (ii) From pre-selected posns which were reached via covered routes. From these posns the enemy would fire a few harassing rounds, withdraw, and occupy an alternative posn.
- (iii) As close support for enemy inf, to thicken up arty concs, and to engage buildings occupied by our tps.
- (iv) With, almost invariably, the support of at least one other tk or SP gun, which remained silent until or unless needed.
- (v) Sometimes with inf accompanying it. These tps, who might be only six to twelve in number, deployed on the flanks up to fifty yds from the tk.

(b) Vulnerability

- (i) The by front and rear armour of the tk make the likelihood of it being knocked out by hits on these parts remote. Frontal attack and flank attack together are therefore desirable. The side armour is definitely vulnerable to 17 pr fire. The back of the tk, over the engines, is also a weak spot, and a large exhaust hole just over the left of centre of the back provides another weak point. HE is considered by some to be most effective amm to use against these rear parts.
- (ii) The Tiger was usually well enough sited to make the deployment of a sniping A tk gun, M 10 or towed gun for stalking purposes, difficult. Unless very careful recce is carried out to site the gun to the best advantage, and to locate supporting tks or SP guns, the effort may be fruitless. The maximum time for recce, and the maximum infn, appear therefore essential for a tp cmd who is called upon to engage a Tiger.
- (iii) The gun and tk seem to be slow to manoeuvre and fire. It can also be effectively blinded by 7.5cm American smoke amm. On one occasion two smoke rounds, followed by AP, were enough to force a tiger to withdraw. This is a method of attack strongly recommended by our own tk comds.

(c) Tigers were sometimes used almost recklessly, their crews taking risks to a degree which indicates that they have the utmost confidence in the veh. This can render them vulnerable to A tk hunting squads armed with the PIAT or other close range A tk weapon. The Tiger when closed down and attacking on its own at some distance from its supporting gun is definitely vulnerable to such weapons.

- (d) (i) The conc of fd arty to counter Tigers is effective. Even if a "brev-up" does not result, the tk has invariably withdrawn. It appears obvious that tk crews do not like shellfire, as the possibility of damage to vital parts (tracks, suspension, bogies, wireless aerials, outside fixtures, electrical eqpt, etc) is always present.
- (ii) Medium arty has been incorporated in several of our arty concs. Medium arty is ideal if a sufficiently large conc is brought to bear, but owing to dispersion of rounds it is preferable to include a good conc of fd guns to thicken up.
- (iii) We have had no actual experience of by arty engaging Tigers, although it is known that they have done so.

(OVER)

It is hard for our tks to locate a well-camouflaged Tiger sited in a defensive role, and stationery. Arty OP's, if given a suspected area, can be used to advantage. A case did occur when a suspicious object was located in an area reported by our tks to contain a Tiger, and the OP commenced to range. A round falling in the vicinity of the suspect completely blasted away all camouflage and the Tiger beat a hasty retreat.

(e) The following are some experiences of A tk gunners in contact with Tigers:

(i) A Tiger was observed 3,000 yds away engaging three Shermans. It brewed-up one Sherman while the other two withdrew over a crest. A 17-pr was brought up to within 2,400 yds and engaged the Tiger side on. When the Tiger realised that it was being engaged by a HV gun it swung round 90 degrees so that its heavy frontal armour was towards the gun. In the ensuing duel one shot hit the turret, another the suspension, while two near misses probably ricocheted into the tk. The tk was not put out of action. The range was too long to expect a kill but our tactics were to make the Tiger expose its flank to the Shermans at a range of about 500 yds by swinging round on to the A tk gun. This he did, and on being engaged by the Shermans it withdrew. The inf protection of some 6-12 men was engaged by our MGs.

(ii) One Tiger just off the rd at a rd and a track junc engaging our fwd tps in buildings, another Tiger about 50 yds up the side rd supporting the firing tk. A fd arty conc which appeared to be from one bty was called for and although no hits were observed both tks withdrew.

(iii) A Tiger on a ridge was engaged by what appeared to be a bty of mediums. After the first rounds had fallen, the crew baled out (it is not known why) and shortly afterwards while still being shelled one man returned to the tk and drove it off. The remainder of the crew made off in the direction of their tk some ten minutes later.

(iv) A tk was located in the garage of a two-storey house, from which it was driven twenty yds, fired a few harassing rounds and returned to its hide-out. Many hits were recorded on the building by our 4.2 inch mortars, firing cap on, but little damage was visible. The tk was withdrawn from the area each night even although it was in an excellent concealed posn and protected by inf. The house was examined later and although it was considerably damaged and there were several dead Germans about, there was nothing to indicate that damage had been done to the tk.

(Source: 2 NZ Div IS No 334)

5 CDN ARMD DIV

23-2/Int
18 Sep 44INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 24

(based on information up to 0900 hrs 18 Sep 44)

P A R T O N E

1 An interesting observation is made in the fact that 1 Para Div has apparently decided to confine its activities to the approaches to RIMINI in the belief that our main effort will be directed that way. It now stretches from incl S MARTINO to the sea with a Turcoman element believed yet under comd and on the left flank. Oddly enough the enemy fought well near the beach yesterday, but no PW were taken to enable us to ascertain whether Paras had taken over that area entirely or whether the Turcomans had had a new lease on life.

The enemy is chancing the security of the RIMINI - RAVENNA beaches, as with the identification of II/314 GR in the area 8492 we find yet another representative of 162 Div. Evidently Obst Groccher is not being given the operational comd of his division as it is being committ ed a bn at a time in various parts of the line. This recent addition to the weakened 29 PG Div sector arrived about the same time as 20 Fus Bn (area 8592) which appears to be the vanguard for the expected 20 GAF Fd Division.

Another sector which is in dire need of reinforcement is the 26 Pz Div area. This fmn is thin on the ground and is slowly giving way to our continual pressure. Consequently the arrival of individual bns may be expected from either 162 Turcoman or 20 GAF Div. The latter is strong enough in numbers to relieve the very much depleted ranks of 26 Pz, but our persistent attacks will probably not allow a complete relief to be effected. A factor in support of the inadvisability of this latter is the definite embarrassment the German has suffered during recent reliefs, e.g. - 71 Div by 26 Pz in area MONTECCHIO and more recently 98 Div by 356 Div on our left flank.

The unfortunate 98 Div cannot now be classed as a division unless some miracle is performed. At its reinforcement depot to augment its moth-eaten ranks: 1800 PW were taken from the div and considerable casualties were inflicted. Its particular function and committ ment is rather hazy at the moment, but it is still within 356 Div boundaries, which latter now is totally on this front.

The order of German units in the line early this morning from the sea to S-MARINO was:-

303 GR) ?
236 Recce)

III/1 Para
II/1 Para
III/3 Para
II/3 Para
I/1 Para - S MARTINO
I/71 GR (Mot)
II/71 GR
20 GAF recce Bn - Area 849328
II/314 GR
III/15 GR (Mot)
I/15 GR
II/67 PGR Gp
26 Recce Bn
9 PGR
356 Div plus remnants 98 Div and NE S MARINO and along
with 114 Jaeger Recce and - general line of its
44 H & D Recce Bns. Eastern boundary.


(OVER)

The continual committment piecemeal of his bns as they arrive and his disregard for a healthy-sized reserve leaves us to draw but one conclusion in attempting to fathom the Hun's ultimate intention; he cannot at present allow us out of this passage on to the plains where, with our preponderance of armour, tracks, wheels, men and equipment we might easily turn a withdrawal into a rout. In a very few weeks the weather will double his strength and even if then he has forsaken the idea of trying to hang on in ITALY he will at least be in a far more admirable position to evacuate his forces from it

The rain will bog down in many parts our tanks and vehicles, guns will be difficult to haul, the rivers will become obstacles and large areas near the sea may be inundated. His own tpt will be subject to the rains but of course the bridges are never blown until his tail is across, and he will have more freedom of movement while the weather keeps the bulk of our planes on the ground.

ELS/SDR

Time of Signature... 4.15... A hrs


W.C. Dick) Lt Col

Distribution: As per I sum distribution.

for GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

1. 20 GAF FD DIV

Since it was first committed in ITALY on 3 Jun this div has suffered fairly heavily. It was formed in DENMARK at the end of 1942 and remained there under direct comd of the German GOC. All PW agree that the majority of the men have had little or no combat experience. Most of the NCOs and offfrs, however, have had experience on the Russian front.

Org

PW infm on the org of the regts is confined to 40 GAF Jaeger Regt but is believed to apply also to 39 GAF Jaeger Regt. A captured sigs plan dated 1 Aug 43 shows 39 and 40 Jaeger Regts each of three Bns but III Bn in each case deleted. Unless a third Regt was formed or projected it seems that the Div has only four Bns. This is offset to some extent by a five coy org.

39 GAF Jaeger Regt

Little infm is available on the two bns, but they are probably similar to those in 40 Regt. The numbering of the regt coys may be different. PW give the following infm.

- | | | |
|----------------------|---|--|
| <u>12 (A Tk) Coy</u> | - | Armament includes 3 x 7.5cm and 4 x 5cm A tk guns. |
| <u>13 (AA) Coy</u> | - | Armed with 2 cm AA/A tk guns. |

40 GAF Jaeger Regt

The Regt is organised on a two bn/five coy basis, with 2 or 3 regt coys.

The lt coys have three pls each of four (NOT three) secs armed as shown below:

(See Appx "A")

The two hy coys in each bn are now confirmed as follows:

- | | | |
|------------------------|---|--|
| <u>4 and 9 Coys</u> | - | Mortar coys (12 x 8.1cm mortars) |
| <u>5 and 10 Coys</u> | - | HMG Coys (12 HMG) |
| <u>I Bn - 1-3 Coys</u> | - | 3 Pls each of 4 secs. The str varies between 110-130 men. 1 "T" set "B" in Coy HQ.
Secs: 1 LMG 34 or 42,
1 MP,
1 Rifle with Telescopic sights,
1 Discharger cup. |
| <u>4 Coy</u> | - | HMG Coy, of 2 pls of 3 secs, with 2 HMG 34 or 42 per sec for a total of 12 HMG. |
| <u>5 Coy</u> | - | Mortar Coy of 2 pls of 3 secs with 2 x 8.1 cm mortars per sec for a total of 12 per coy. |

II Bn - identical with I Bn.

11 Coy It is not known whether this is only a contemplated org or actually in operation. The tentative org is given as a Regt HQ Coy composed of:

(OVER)

11 Coy (continued)

Sigs Pl - 6 "B" W/T, 4 L/T sets
Engr Pl
WG Pl
Inf Gun Pl

12 Coy - This is presumed to be an AA Coy armed with an unspecified number of 20mm and 37mm single barrel AA guns.

13 Coy - This is presumed to be an A tk coy, organised on a 2 lt and 1 hy pl basis. The lt pls carry an unspecified number of 50 mm A tk guns and the hy pl 75 mm A tk guns.

According to some PV, 4 Coy is the mortar coy. 5 Coy the HMG coy, 12 Coy the A tk coy, and 13 Coy, the AA coy.

20 GAF Arty Regt

In the recent fighting this was very badly mauled and lost almost all of its eqpt. I Bn furnished some 200 men to 40 GAF Regt as inf replacements in Jun, and later gave up its tpt and guns to II-III Bns.

II Bn PVs say they were expecting 10.5 cm gun-hors.

Due to lack of amm for the Russian guns, III Bn suffered additional losses after the cannibalization of I Bn.

The armament of this regt when it is again encountered may, therefore differ quite drastically from the specifications given below.

I Bn

<u>Armament</u>	-	Three tps of 4 x 7.62 cm Russian lt fd guns.
<u>Personnel</u>	-	120 men per tp, of which 10% were Volksdeutsche, 10% 18-19 yrs old replacements and the remainder GAF Army personnel in their 25s.
<u>Tot</u>	-	Guns towed by RSOs, Trianon and Italian trucks. There were 15 gun vehs in the bn and 2 x 4 ton amm trucks.
<u>Amn</u>	-	PV say that 250 rds HE, 120 rds AP per gun were carried in each tp.

II Bn

Org and eqpt would appear to be the same. No detailed infm available.

III Bn

PV credit this bn with three tps of 4 x 12.2 cm Russian guns.

20 Engr Bn


Consists of two coys: 1 Coy (Mot) has 140 men, 3 pls of 3 secs each, 9-12 LMGs, 3 flamethrowers 42.
2 Coy (bicycle) - details unknown

20 A tk Bn

Organised on a 2 Coy basis with 75mm A tk guns in 1 Coy and Assault guns of undetermined calibre in 2 Coy.

20 GAF FD DIVISION

APPX "A" to Part Two of I Sum
No 24, 18 Sep 44



(xx) 4 & 9 Coys are the mortar coys
5 & 10 Coys HMGs

5 CDN ARMD DIV

23-2/Int
19 Sep 44INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 25
(based on information up to 0900 hrs 19 Sep 44)PART ONEI ENEMY SITUATION

After several days heavy fighting the enemy has decided to evacuate the flat ground NORTH of the airfield and along the AUSA river NORTH and WEST of S MARTINO. Evidently the persistency of our attacks against 1 Para and 29 P G Divs persuaded the German to realize the gravity of a situation resulting from a penetration of his not too-thick line, while fighting well forward of his main defences. Consequently he has retired in time to prevent this being effected.

Yesterday no prisoners were taken from 29 PG Div and knowing that 20 GAF Div had begun to strengthen that sector it is possible that this latter formation may be carrying out a relief of the worn-down panzer grenadiers. If 29 Div has repaired to a rear area we must commend the Boche for at last realizing the necessity of building up a mobile reserve behind his last strongly prepared defence line, i.e., RIMINI-FORTUNATO-S MARINO. Definitely some force is required to counter a penetration of this chain of strongpoints otherwise the results of an Allied drive flowing out unchallenged into the plains would indeed be disastrous.

The enemy's ability in holding our progress down to a comparative, although steady, rate is largely due to the heavy concentration of arty that he has in this sector. This does not mean that he has stepped up the strength of his divisional arty, it is merely the result of having on such a narrow sector so many enemy divisions. The bulk of our forces on a two corps front are within range of practically all the arty of ten divisions. However this is partly and fortunately modified by an ever-present ammunition problem.

It might be well to know here that in speaking of a "last defence line" that a line of strongly-prepared positions is referred to. We are bound to find numerous defences from RIMINI on with some prepared positions which take advantage of what natural obstacles there are. However, these will be more difficult to stand on because of their ever-increasing length or of their lack of continuity, and thus consequent danger of being out-flanked or penetrated.

W C Dick
for (W C Dick) Lt-Col
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS

Time of Signature.....1200..A hrs

Distribution: As per I Sum distribution

Att: Appx "A", Results of our arty fire.

RESULTS OF OUR ARTY FIRE

The following is a summary of interrogation of PW in respect to our arty fire. Med personnel has been especially questioned as to percentages of cas resulting from shelling:

The general consensus of opinion was that it was, an unbelievable Hell and they thought they would never come out of it alive. However, a very great number of the tps in the front line nowadays are seeing the front line for the first time as they have been withdrawn from all sorts of Echelon units to fill gaps in combat units. Some of the more seasoned tps, which are happily becoming very rare, state that if they have properly prepared posns they do not worry about barrages. This, however, is the exception rather than the rule. Two PW from 67 PGR had been in a 5 ft deep bunker covered over with poles and dirt, which received a direct hit and both were unscathed. While they could not say for certain, they thought that it was a 25 pr shell. It is not even necessary to interrogate PW to see the demoralizing effect the shelling had on many of them. Med orderlies from 1 Para and 26 Pz Div report cas from 25 to 50% within their units. However, when they are dug in in well prepared posns the cas are usually very light. The general claim is that houses are normally shell-proof.

While obviously gunners are not too frequent visitors and those available are usually signallers or FOOs, a reasonably representative number have been available during present ops to get a fair picture. One FOO (Sgt) criticized our fire as often falling too short, stating that he was shelled by our arty after being taken PW and that he had often observed our rounds falling short. However, the general consensus was high in the praise or rather respect for our accuracy and a certain amount of astonishment was evinced at the amount of amm we were able to expend, some claiming that we used far more than was necessary. Not only has our CR fire been effective in reducing the pers in the fire posns but during the last week direct hits have been scored on guns, notably in 236 Arty Regt (162 Div Arty which has been in sp of 1 Para Div) and 93 Arty Regt (26 Pz Div). Morale effect on gun crews generally has been excellent (from our point of view).

(Source - 1 Cdn Corps Int Sun
No 117)

23-2/Int
20 Sep 44

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 26

(based on information up to 0900 hrs 20 Sep 44)

1 ENEMY SITUATION PART ONE

The success of yesterdays and last nights operations is, of course, due to the quick pursuit of the Hun in his withdrawal to FORTUNATO and the skilful infiltration during the hours of darkness. However, one factor contributing to this quick victory is the German belief that our main effort would be against the flat ground between RINI and FORTUNATO and as a consequence had his best troops, namely the Parabcoys, covering that sector. He has paid the price of his error in leaving the defence of this dominating and key feature to a conglomeration of comparatively poor class troops, bns from 20 GAF, 162 Turcoman and the battle-weary 29 Panzer-grenadiers. These latter apparently were forestalled in the act of moving in to reserve while being replaced by 20 GAF, but our determined and surprising attack on the feature forced them to join battle in a vain attempt to deny us that vital piece of ground.

The resultant confusion is borne out in the identifications of the many PW taken in that area, representative of three divisions, I and II Bns of 314 GR of 162 Turcoman Div, 71 GR (Mot) of 29 PG Div and 20 Fus Bn of 20 GAF Div.

Further WEST we find that 15 PG (Mot) has also been denied an expected rest with the arrival of units from 20 GAF Div. The order of battle in this sector is no more easy to define than it is between there and the sea. In one area yesterday, 812913, the following were identified by PW, I/40 GAR Regt, 3 Tp 93 AR, 13 Coy 871 GR, HQ Coys of II/870 GR and II/371 GR, 1 Coy 20 A Tk Bn and 6 Coy 9 PGR. 356 Div seems to be following the lead of its predecessor, 98 Div, in its loss in PW.

All bns of 20 GAF have been identified and its western boundary appears to be approx 8093. This with the apparent NORTHWARD shuffle of 356 Div would indicate that as the enemy right flank drew back through S MARTINO, thus causing a shortening of the line, eventually a three divisional front would be organized from the NORTHEASTERN sector of S MARTINO to the sea, viz, 356 Div, 20 GAF Div and 1 Para Div. This operation if it was intended, has been destroyed in its infancy, and instead of the release of 26 Pz and 29 PG Divs for rest, re-equipment and use as an immediate Corps reserve, we have forced the Hun to retain his total strength in the line.

The question is now, and one which must provide a headache for the High Command, what further formations can be released from else where to bring in as a reserve or to bolster this fast-disintegrating line? One answer could be that an evacuation of the Balkans may take place, urged by the Russian advances and the constant pressure of the Partisans, thus releasing some 20 Divisions for duty in Hungary, Austria and North Italy. However, if the German wishes to contain us SOUTH of the PO, he must work fast for it is now apparent that his ally, the weather, will not arrive in time to hold us below the MARECCHIA.

2 ENEMY METHODS

(a) Traps (Booby) On several occasions recently, TELLERMINES have been found lying on the roadside, as if they had been lifted by our own tps. In fact, they had been carefully placed there by retreating Germans and were booby-trapped.


(OVER)

2 ENEMY METHODS (continued)

(b) Traps (Pony) The following is a literal translation of a document found today on 4 Div front. It is addressed by HQ 26 Recce Unit to its companies 2, 3 and 5, dated 30 Aug 1944:-

- "1 Wef today all ranks will cease using motor transport.
- 2 All coys will contact the nearest town major and attempt to obtain bicycles or horse-drawn vehicles either on payment or on loan. Coy commanders are instructed to make their journeys by bicycle, on horse-back, or by "DOGCART".

(Source: 4 Brit Div Int Sum No 61)


for (W. G. Dick) Lt-Col
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS

Time of Signature: 20.12.00.8 hrs

Distribution: As per I Sum distribution

5 CDN ARMD DIV

23-2/Int
21 Sep 44INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 27

(based on information up to 0900 hrs 21 Sep 44)

P A R T O N EI ENEMY SITUATION

Yesterday our troops exploited to the full their gains of the night before in the S FORTUNATO area. Throughout the day mopping up resulted in a record 24-hr bag of PW for this Corps, some 500 odd being taken. Although 29 PG Div and 20 GAF Div were well represented, 162 Turcoman, running true to form, held an unchallenged lead. Almost the whole of 314 GR has now been checked off by our interrogation officers and the bulk of 162 Turcoman's infantry could be accounted for in this manner were 1 Para Div to allow the elusive 303 GR a decent opportunity to follow the example of 314.

The enemy has definitely been discouraged from any intention he might have had of staying on this side of the MARECCHIA River. Whether he will attempt to deny us a crossing by establishing himself along its NORTH bank is doubtful, as the ground here does not lend too kindly to such a situation. To prevent our crossing of this river-bed which, despite last night's deluge, is not an obstacle he would require a maximum of infantry. This he has not got at the moment and there is no evidence of a rescue party arriving. Consequently, and taking into consideration that patrols into RIMINI have made no contact and that his heavy arty fire to which we have been subjected these past few weeks has momentarily ceased, it is reasonable to conclude that he is moving back to a more favourable line of defence. Captured maps taken by 1 Cdn Inf Div show two lines running generally SOUTH - NORTH and anchored in the foothills WEST of RIMINI. The first starts at SANTARCANGELO (R7598) runs to the EAST of S MAURO (M7303) to NW of S ANGELO (M7005) and thence to 1 km SW of LE CIAVICHE (M6109), and would appear to be more of a MLR countering a sea-borne landing on the RIMINI - CESTNATICO shore than one which is determined to prevent our entrance to the PO Valley. However, it may be intended for this latter purpose in that it could be designed to supply depth to the No 9 Highway sector of the second pencilled line which is shown to run from RONCO FREDDO (R6596)-MONTIANO (M6400) to outskirts of CESENA (M5907), along the SAVIO River to MENSA (M5917), and thence along the BEVANO River. If this is the enemy plan, certainly his movements are conforming to it, for his eastern flank seems to be withdrawing more rapidly than in the centre of our front, and both pivoting on the hills just WEST of S MARINO.

Weighing the pros and cons of this suggested action it is found to be fairly well-balanced. A move away from the sea creates for him an advantage, in that it eliminates that vulnerable coastal flank, but it also necessitates that a longer front be properly manned. Even though this bad weather may give the Boche the opportunity to extricate, comparatively unhampered, his divisions from S MARINO to the sea and afford him a brief lull in which he can reorganize his order of battle, he will still find that the infantry he has on this coast will not be sufficiently strong in number to man effectively a front as long as the one indicated between RONCO FREDDO and the BEVANO River. The answer, of course, will be the arrival of other formations. We know now the great importance that the enemy attaches to his eastern flank, and his willingness to depend on his natural mountain defences further WEST to the extent of sacrificing any possible reserve for that area. Consequently we may expect the arrival of 16 SS PG Reichsführer Div which has just been relieved on the Tyrrhenian coast (presumably by 42 Jaeger Div in the CARRARA Area). Also

(OVER)

the possibility of the ultimate arrival of elements of 90 PG, although partially committed in SE FRANCE, should not be disregarded. 71 Inf Div has at last been withdrawn after months in the line and may now be having an all too short breather prior to re-entering the battle.

[Handwritten Signature]
for (" C Dick) Lt-Col
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS
Time of Signature 21.12.00 A hrs

Distribution: As per I Sum distribution.

A P P X "A"

Concrete "Wheelguard" Mine

The above new type of explosive charge or mine has recently been encountered in ITALY. It consists of a concrete block in the shape of a wheelguard as commonly found on road berms or curves, 24 ins high and 6 ins thick, in the centre of which is approx 3 lbs of explosive. Access to the explosive is given through a rectangular hole in the front. At the rear, there is a small hole for the insertion of an anti-lifting pull igniter.

A tread detonating mechanism is made up of 3 pieces of wood 1 1/2 ins x 1 1/2 ins x 3 ins strapped together so that the two outside pieces are rigid and the inside one is free to move on a wooden pivot. A small wooden shear pin is inserted between the two outer members so that when the inner board is resting on it the inner member is 1 in proud of the outer boards.

The concrete wheelguard is set on the verge and a small trench is then dug from the concrete at right angles to the road edge. The tread mechanism is laid and covered and concrete is buried up to the main hole. The anti-lifting igniter at the rear is attached to a peg by string or wire. The tread mechanism could be used with either a DZ 35 or ZZ 42 igniter connected by instantaneous fuze to the mine.

These wheelguards are thought to be of local manufacture.

(Source: AFHQ Int Notes No 73)

Tailpiece

IT IS REPORTED BY DAF THAT A GREATER WEIGHT OF BOMBS WAS DROPPED ON THE FORTUNATO AREA IN SUPPORT OF I CDN CORPS ATTACK THAN ON ANY OTHER COMPARABLE TARGET IN THE WAR WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE BREAK-OUT AT CAEN IN FRANCE.

(Source: 1 Cdn Corps Int Sum No 119)

file

S E C R E T

5 CDN ARMD DIV

23-2/Int
22 Sep 44

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 28

(based on information up to 0900 hrs 22 Sep 44)

P A R T O N E

1 ENEMY SITUATION

Opposition to our bridgehead operations across the MARECCHIA yesterday consisted of no more than sporadic MG fire. Enemy arty was silent throughout the day until late afternoon, when light harassing fire was encountered. A withdrawal has taken place, but to where is not yet known, and until the enemy is contacted again in strength we can only speculate as to his intentions and dispositions.

Our most definite clue is from a deserter from I/1 Para Regt who states that 1 Para Div had withdrawn to a river line 5 kms NORTH of RIMINI and that it runs from the sea to the MARECCHIA and thence to the foothills SOUTH of that river. He mentioned that his division's responsibility went right up to the hills. The stream which answers most closely this description is the CANALE DI MOLINI (M826013). The encountering last night by patrols from 4 Brit Inf Div of MG and DF fire and what seemed to be an A tk gun (SP?) could add confirmation to this PW statement as the points reached were near the MARECCHIA at 779963 and 794968.

However, a number of reasons point to this being no more than a delaying line: outposts are not sufficiently strong for a defence line screen; arty fire is almost negligible; and if, according to PW, his div which has always bordered the coast, is now stretched out right to the hills, it certainly could not be carrying out anything more than a rearguard role.

We are more likely to find that a more considerable withdrawal has been made because entrance to the plains has been gained, where while the weather holds good we have the advantage. Another factor in support of this is the threat of a complete breakthrough by Fifth Army whose position on the crest of the Appenines must cause a great deal of discomfort to the German in the Adriatic sector.

2 ENEMY DEFENCES

Recent sorties flown along the line of the river ADIGE NORTH of the PO show that a new defence line is under construction in that area. Work on this has been begun since July and as yet no evidence is given of concrete defences. Nature's contributions to this new "last ditch" are dyked canals and islands of high ground in the northern Italian plain. Attached as appx "A" is a trace showing the position of this newly found chain of defences.

3 AIR

The following is a brief report by PW of the fighter-bomber attack on 26 Pz Div HQ on the 13 Sep, the location of which at that time was gained from PW.

" 7 killed, 8 or 9 wounded.

The General was in the house at the time, but unfortunately got away in his MERCEDES the moment the first bomb fell, which, however, did not hit the house he had been in."


ELS

Time of Signature: 22/2000 hrs

[Signature]
for (C Dick) Lt-Col
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div


Distribution: As per I Sum distribution


~ APPENDIX "A" to 5 CDN ARMS INT SUMMARY #28 ~
 ~ (SOURCE: 1 CDN CORPS INT SUM No. 120) ~
21 SEP. 44 ~



DEFENCES NORTH of
ADIGE

SCALE ~ 1/500,000

 ENEMY DEFENCES
UNDER CONSTRUCTION

 ROADS

Supper

23-2/Int
24 Sep 44

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 29

(based on information up to 2359 hrs 23 Sep 44)

PART ONE1 ENEMY SITUATION

The Hun has shown a decided reluctance to vacate his positions today on our front and has renewed the fight which had temporarily degenerated into a retreat. His mortar and arty fire regained the intensity that it had in the battles SOUTH of the MARECCHIA. Undoubtedly his determination to stand on this side of the USO rather than carry on with the inevitable withdrawal is to prevent a rapid advance on our part which would certainly endanger his forces that have not yet been extricated from the APPENINES to the southwest.


The paratroops, who had given ground and PW to our right neighbour yesterday, demonstrated the intention as told by one of their numbers that they were "to hold at all costs". Even their Turcoman flank with the assistance of a canalized river followed suit.

On our left, around SANTARCANGELO and just EAST of it, elements of 20 GAF Div fought surprisingly well to deny us entrance to the town and crossings of the USO.

That the enemy has taken new heart and decided to hold on a new line is not so. He is simply carrying out the tactics that he will employ from time to time in a withdrawal from this country, or at least as far as the ADIGE LINE, in order to allow his flanks to conform or to gain precious time for reorganization. 13 Corps and 2 US Corps on the IMOLA and BOLOGNA rds through the APPENINES are well through the GOTHIC Line and their progress is now directing the movements of this German ADRIATIC Corps. Their unexpected successes through the mountains have given the enemy more than a little concern. As a result 16 SS Reichsführer Div, thought to be destined for this front, is now believed to be thickening up the thin line countering Fifth Army. 44 H & D Div and 114 Jaeger Div who must now vacate the Eastern Appenine sector are also believed to be shuffling WEST to meet this Allied avalanche.

2 ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

PW taken on the coastal flank show that 1 Para Div still has the responsibility of No 16 Highway with 303 Turcoman Regt under command and on its left. The Paras are disposed along the RIO FONTANACCIA to approx the 78 Easting and with three to four bns forward. On our div front according to 4 PW from 7 Coy HQ 71 PGR who were cut off yesterday as their bn withdrew, III/71 links up with 1 Para right flank, and II/71 held a sector from 777998 to 782003 until it moved back towards S VITO 764007. II/40 GAF was identified by our left neighbour in the area 7698 leaving a gap between them and 71 PGR to be filled either by a bn of 39 GAF, I/40 GAF or further elements of 29 PG Div, possibly 15 PGR. To the SW of SANTARCANGELO, 361 PGR of 90 PG Div has been identified along the USO river with 100 Btn Regt on its right in the general area forward of POGGIO BERNI. The morning should give us further identifications allowing us to eliminate speculation as to 'who's who' on our Div front.


W G Dick) Lt-Col
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS/SDR

Time of Signature 24.0615 A hrs

Distribution: As per I Sum Distribution

Att: Appx 'A', Table of Sunrise Sunset and Moonrise Moonset for Oct on a limited distribution.

5 CDN ARMD DIV

23-2/Int
25 Sep 44INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 30

(Based on information up to 2359 hrs 24 Sep 44)

PART ONE1 ENEMY SITUATION

But comparatively small gains were made today against an enemy who fought bitterly in order that his right flank in the mountains could withdraw. Little contact was made with his infantry as he employed his armour, A tk guns, arty and mortars to the fullest. On our right the RIO FONTANNACIA proved a barrier during the day, but tonight it is reported that considerable progress is being made against the Paras. Our left neighbours fared much the same as ourselves, meeting heavy resistance forward of and along the line of the River USO. However, the town of SANTARCANGELO was captured after heavy fighting.

29 PG Div, fighting on a narrow front, has apparently thickened up its infantry with the introduction of 15 PGR to the line. Two bns of 71 PGR and 20 Fus Bn, possibly then in reserve, had defended the area from just WEST of CASALE to the Para right flank near C SEMPRINI (788007), but when forced back the former two took up a MIR along the road from 766004 to 770015. 15 PGR, according to an operation order dated 2100 hrs 23 Sep, was on the right of 71 PGR. Whether 20 Fus Bn has moved into reserve across the USO, or shuffled over to the left flank of its own division is not yet known.

The morale of 29 PG Div appears to be fairly high, which is somewhat surprising when reviewing the hard knocks it has taken in the past few weeks. However, it may be in part attributed to the fact that they are now fighting on the verge of a natural obstacle with heavy arty, mortar and armour support. Possibly the prospects of being home for Christmas may have something to do with it.

The German is taking full advantage again of the loss of momentum across our front and will no doubt defend the USO River until the formations still in the Appenines to the SW and WEST have completed an organized withdrawal towards No 9 Highway. However, the progress of 13 Corps and 2 US Corps in their advances on IMOLA and BOLOGNA continues, and with it the danger of 76 Corps and the Mountain Corps being denied a line of retreat increases. Consequently, a withdrawal from this area must be effected very soon: our troops are less than 14 miles from IMOLA.

2 ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

From the coast, 303 GR with 236 Recce Bn, I/1 Para (Highway 16) II/1 Para, III/1 Para in reserve, 3 Para Regt, Schmueker Battle Gp (4 Para Regt) to approx 7702, III/71, II/71, 15 PGR, 20 Fus Bn area rly just EAST of USO River, I/40, 39 GAF (?) WEST of SANTARCANGELO, II/361, I/361, 200 PGR area NE LO STRADONE, 100 Mtn Regt, 278 Div on the mountains flank.

3 SOCIAL NOTES

Although the day's fighting was bitter, there was still time for courtesy between "Gerald" and ourselves. It seems an offr and CR of the Westmr R, with a Sgt Maj of the 11 Fd Regt, paid a blindfolded visit to the HQ of Capt Baron von Malapert, OC III Bn 15 PGR, near S VITO. They thought he wanted to surrender. He thought they wanted to surrender. The mis-

(OVER)

understanding caused general amusement, so after briefly discussing the European situation, they shook hands all around and our parlementaires departed; the officer bringing a note for his CO from the Hauptmann Baron. The message translates: "Come over here, nothing will happen to you; there were three of your soldiers with us - signed Malapert".

It is hoped that His Excellency will be able to pay us a return visit soon, and perhaps spend the weekend (or longer) with us.


W. C. Dick, Lt-Col
GS 5 Cdn Arm'd Div

ELS/SDR

Time of Signature: 20.07.00 A hrs

Distribution: As per I Sum Distribution

SPECIAL NOTE

1 The following enemy equipment (CW) is urgently required for technical research:

- (a) Anti - white phosphorous capes
- (b) Satzgaserkennungsgerat, (gas determining apparatus)
- (c) Gasanzeiger (Gas identification set) and Prufrohrchen
- (d) "Vomiting tubes" Yellow liquid
- (e) Riechmittel or Brechampulle (smelling pots?)
- (f) Smoke Hand Grenade Nb Hgr 41 or 41B
- (g) LOUSETA or impregnated clothing

2 The following is a list of the eqpt which are required for trials:-

- (a) MG 34
- (b) Light Mounting for MG 42
- (c) Parachutists machine rifle (PG 42) with mags and amn
- (d) Chromed barrels or breech blocks in MGs.
Note: These are stamped "C.R."
- (e) MP 43 Weapon, mags and amn required
- (f) 12 cm mortar and supply of amn
- (g) Gross Gewehr Panzer Granaten.
(3 unopened boxes required)

Specimens found should be evacuated immediately through GSI channels.

PART TWO

1 IDENTIFICATIONS

<u>29 PG Div</u>	<u>71 PGR</u>	4 PW from 7 Coy were captured at 781001 on 23 Sep
<u>20 GAF Div</u>	<u>39 GAF</u>	Straggler from 6 Coy picked up EAST of SANTARCANGELO
<u>356 Div</u>		Long range deserter taken from 7 Tp 356 Arty Regt

2 ENEMY DISPOSITIONS AND STR

<u>29 PG Div</u>	<u>71 PGR</u>	7 Coy str 30 - 4 LMGs no A tk weapons. 6 Coy WEST, 8 Coy sub-allotted, 5 Coy in res.
<u>20 GAF Div</u>	<u>39 GAF</u>	PW claim II Bn took up posn near SANTA-ARCANGELO. 8 Coy str 10, 7 Coy WEST, PW states it has been rumoured 90 PG Div in area.

3 PW COUNT (from 2000 hrs 23 Sep to 2000 hrs 24 Sep)

<u>29 PG Div</u>	<u>71 PGR</u>	7 Coy - 4
<u>20 GAF Div</u>	<u>39 GAF</u>	8 Coy - 1
<u>356 Inf Div</u>	<u>356 Arty Regt</u>	
		7 Tp - 1
<u>Unidentified</u>		12
<u>Previous total</u>		11 Offrs 855 ORs
<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>		11 Offrs 873 ORs

23-2/Int
26 Sep 44INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 31
(based on information up to 2359 hrs 25 Sep 44)PART ONE1 ENEMY SITUATION

The enemy apparently aware of the inadvisability of remaining on our side of the USO in the general S VITO (7600) area for another 12 to 13 hours of daylight withdrew the bulk of his forces before dawn. Our troops were able to push on to the river and establish small bridge-heads in the areas 758017 and 758005. These operations were covered by heavy enemy arty mortar and SP fire, and disputed by infantry on the opposite bank. Further NORTH the German hotly contested our approaches to the crossing at 762034 with infantry and SPs. He showed a good deal of interest in our movement NORTH here and revealed his anxiety by concentrating a number of tanks in the general area of the woods (7403).

Our moderate gains today were proportionate to the slowing down of the right flank and speeding up of the left. Our right neighbours, after a considerable advance of the night before creating a salient in the centre of their front, during the day managed to bring up their flanks. On the left crossings of the USO were exploited and good progress was made against, at first, little contact and then gradually stiffening opposition.

Identifications throughout the day have provided us with a fairly clearly defined order of battle across our div front, and have also evidenced the concern the enemy has attached to our progress by revealing an increase in the number of bns that were originally opposed to us.

It appears that 71 PGR has moved NORTH coinciding with our own advance towards the river crossing at 762033. 20 Fus Bn, which has now but two coys 60 - 80 strong, has proven the reliability of a captured map by yielding an intelligent deserter. 15 PGR, still consisting of three bns, has about a four-coy front on the right of 20 Fus Bn, while 39 GAF Regt borders it to the SOUTH.

An interesting statement made by a deserter from 1 Coy 20 Fus Bn adds proof to the already suspected longer-range intention of the Boche on this front. He states that he noticed on the night 24/25 that all bridges on No 9 Highway between CESENA and SANTARCANGELO are being prepared for demolition.

Believing that it is our intention to make a breakthrough between No 9 Highway and the sea in order to cut off his forces still in the mountains to the SOUTHWEST, the German is fighting hard to contain this Corps along the general line of the USO in order that he may pivot on it while he brings these formations out on to the comparative safety of the plains. While he can allow our right neighbour to advance yet as far as the line of this river, he cannot permit any further progress on the part of our own divisional right flank. Consequently he appears to have created a strong pt around and WEST of (wood 7403) the crossing at 762034. He will attempt to hold back the centre and left flank of the div to the degree only where it will conform with his withdrawal in face of the formations further SOUTH, probably allowing us to proceed no further than the RIO SALTO. However, time is precious to him, and if he does not effect this plan within a few days and providing the weather doesn't turn completely National Socialist in its political leaning, he will be in very grave danger of having tarried too long in ROMANIA.

2 ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

The Paras with their Turcoman element remain fairly consistent with 303 GR both bns, and 236 Recce Bn from excl Highway 16 to the sea, then II/1 Para on the road with I/1 on its right. Elements of 3 Para and the Schmoeker Battle Gp (4 Para) complete that div whose boundary with 29 PG Div is most likely in the area of C MARINI 7603. Bordering this we shall probably find III/71, although not yet identified, with II/71 known to be on the right. 20 Fus Bn is next in order, then III/15 which consists only of 9 and 10 Coys and seems to be astride the road 754009. 30 GAF Regt with II Bn left and I Bn right is SOUTH of III/15 and reaches probably to the vicinity of the rly crossing of the USO. Following that are I/40 NW SANTARCANGELO, an unidentified unit, 361 PGR, 200 PGR approx area 7096 and 100 Mtn Regt.

(Handwritten Signature)
 (W C Dick) Lt-Col
 GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS
 Time of Signature *16.07.50*A hrs

Distribution: As per I Sum distribution

Att: Appx 'A' 504 Hy Tk Bn.

P A R T . T W O

1 IDENTIFICATIONS

29 PG Div 15 GR (Mot) PW were taken from 10 Coy at 768009 and from 6 Coy in S VITO

20 GAF Div 20 GAF Fus Bn PW from 1 Coy captured at 769011

1 39 GAF Regt A straggler from 1 Coy was picked up in S VITO

1 Para Div Para A Tk Bn Identified by paybook found at 769006

2 ENEMY ORG AND STR

29 PG Div 15 GR (Mot) I and III Bns only. Remnants of II Bn were absorbed by I Bn between 15 - 18 Sep. In III Bn only 9 and 10 Coys exist. Estimated str III Bn 80. PW states rfts are expected to arrive shortly. He also claims 3 TIGERS were in sp of III Bn in S VITO.

20 GAF Div 20 GAF Fus Bn Consists of 2 Coys only, 1 Coy str 60 - 70, total str bn 120 - 150, no rfts received since 25 Aug. Bn is under comd 71 GR (Mot) and flanked by 6 Coy 71 GR (Mot) to the NORTH, and by 10 Coy 15 GR (Mot) to the SOUTH. This PW travelled from CESENA to SAVIGNANO on 24 Sep and noticed engrg preparing all hrs for demolition.

1 Para Div Para A Tk Bn Elements appear to have come under comd 29 PG Div as 129 A Tk Bn has not yet been identified and regt A tk guns alone insufficient to deal with an armd thrust on 29 PG Div front.

3 PERSONALITIES

29 PG Div 15 GR (Mot)
OC III Bn -- Capt BARON V MALAPERT
OC 10 Coy -- 2/Lt HEINZE

20 GAF Div 20 GAF Fus Bn
OC -- Capt SCHNEIDER
OC 1 Coy -- Lt SCHERZINGER
OC 2 Coy -- Sgt TIETZE

4 PV COUNT (from 2000 hrs 24 Sep to 2000 hrs 25 Sep)

29 PG Div 15 GR (Mot)
8 Coy (now I Bn) -- 8
6 Coy (now I Bn) -- 1
10 Coy -- 1

20 GAF Div 20 GAF Fus Bn
1 Coy -- 1
39 GAF Regt
1 Coy -- 1
Total -- 12 ORs
Previous Total -- 11 Offrs 873 ORs
GRAND TOTAL -- 11 Offrs 885 ORs

(OVER)

Numerous reports of TIGERS have been received. A tactical sign on a KO'd MK VI on FORTUNA TO feature identified 3 Coy 504 Hy Tk Bn. Details of the org of this GHQ unit are as follows:-

The Bn was reforming during Mar 44 near ZWOLLE (HOLLAND) and in Apr moved to PORTIERS. On 5 Jun the bn left for ITALY and on arrival was put under comd of 19 GAF Div. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the bn is under comd 20 GAF Div which absorbed 19 GAF Div.

Org - PT have given the following details:

1. HQ Coy - Bn HQ - 4 - 5 TIGERS
2. 1 - 3 Tk Coys - Each coy consists of Coy HQ, with two TIGERS (one comd tk, one spare) and three pls of two secs, each of which has two TIGERS.

There are thus 14 tks in the coy and a total of 46 - 47 TIGERS in the bn.

PT stated that the combat str of 3 Coy was about 90 men, with another 40 in second line.

Comment

It is believed that the bn is not up to WB in tks and losses are difficult to replace, spare parts for TIGERS are also in short sup.

II TIGER TK (See also 5 Cdn Armd Div)
(Int Sum No 23)

(a) Methods of Firing

Always done stationary. Targets engaged:

- 1) Hy A tk guns at 1800 metres (maximum)
- 2) Sherman tks at 2000 metres (maximum)
- 3) HE targets (inf conc) at 600 - 1000 metres.
Then used as arty, direct fire, gun sufficient up to four kms.

(b) Cam

Always top priority in new area. Nets never used. Tks put in barns, sheds or under trees if possible.

(c) Armament

The latest 8.8 cm gun (8.8cm Kw K 43) is mounted in the TIGER. This gun has a MV of 3280 fs and an estimated penetration of 140 mm (5.4 in) at 1000 yds.

Amns: 120 Rds per gun - 90 HE, 30 AP.

The following extracts from German official documents may excite interest, if not encouragement.

TIGER

When TIGERS first appeared on the battlefield, they were in every respect proof against enemy weapons. They quickly won for themselves the title of "unbeatable" and "undamageable".

(OVER)

"But in the meantime, the enemy has not been asleep. A tk guns, tks and mines, have been developed which can hit the TIGER hard, and even knock it out. Now the TIGER, for a long time regarded as a "Life Insurance Policy", is relegated to the ranks of simply "a heavy tank". No longer can the TIGER prance around oblivious of the laws of tank tactics. They must obey these laws, just as every other German tank must.

"So remember, you men who fight in TIGER tanks. Dont demand the impossible from your TIGER. Do just what your commanding officer orders. He knows the limitations of his vehicles and guns, and he knows the best use to which they should be put--
-----."

(Source: AFHQ Notes and GS (I)
Eighth Army)

5 CDN ARMD DIV

23-2/Int
27 Sep 44INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 32

(based on information up to 2359 hrs 26 Sep 44)

P A R T O N E1 ENEMY SITUATION

The enemy drew back on the right flank today pivoting from the NORTH along the USO to its junction with RIO SALTO. Considerable gains were made SOUTH of No 9 Highway and our advances to the NORTH of the road were governed in accordance with the swing of our far left flank. To effect this the German employed armour, infantry and supporting fire to the full, and in particular in the area of the wood at 748036.

The enemy it appears, wishes to retire on our div front to RIO SALTO behind which he has a fair string of recently dug positions, and from these he probably intends to hold us for 24 - 48 hrs. However, the advances across the USO of the NZ Div this evening will no doubt determine whether or not the enemy will stand temporarily on the RIO ALTO linking it up with another canal. If he realizes the possible consequences of standing here, he will move back slowly to the SCOLA RIGOSSA, which according to a recently flown sortie is the barrier in front of another light line of dug-in positions. These are too scattered to present a picture of anything other than defences prepared for a delaying role, and, of course, all hope of establishing anything permanent must surely be destroyed if the Adriatic army is aware of the proximity of 13 Corps and 2 US Corps to IMOLA and BOLOGNA.

Last night and this morning a definite movement to the NORTH across our front took place in order to thicken up in the USO - RIO SALTO apex. The result of it is the arrival of I and II Bns 39 GAF Regt, and I/40 GAF Regt on our left flank, and consequently a fair number of PW in our cage, most of whom were deserters. Some cause for speculation was given when PW stated that 39 GAF Regt was to be relieved by some unknown formation on the night 25/26, and then it was to move to the rear for reinforcements, etc, prior to joining the ranks of 26 Pz Div. Perhaps this experienced and battle-hardened div is being prepared for a rear-guard role when the speed of our advance increases.

Apart from 20 Fus Bn which has yielded us no identifications today and could easily have been pinched out by the crowding northward of the enemy bns, the dispositions remain much the same, viz: from NORTH to SOUTH, III/71, II/71, 20 Fus Bn?, III/15, II/15, II/39, I/39 and I/40.

(W.C. Dick) Lt Col
58th Cdn Armd Div

ELS

Time of Signature... 270730 hrs

Distribution: As per I Sum distribution

PART TWO

1 IDENTIFICATIONS

29 PG Div 15 GR (Mot) PW from 4 Coy were captured at 759016 on 26 Sep. 11 Coy was also identified.

20 GAF Div 39 GAF Regt PW identified 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, Coys area 759001 on 26 Sep. On 25 Sep PW were taken from 3, 4 and 10 Coys.

40 GAF Regt A straggler who left his unit on 23 Sep was taken on 26 Sep.

162 Turcoman 303 GR 2 long range deserters from 13 Coy crossed our lines on 26 Sep.

2 ENEMY ORG AND STR

29 PG Div 15 GR (Mot) III Bn consists of 9, 10 and 11 Coys not 9 and 10 Coys as previously reported. 12 Coy does not appear to exist. 10 and 11 Coys str 30 each, III Bn str estimated at 80 - 100.

PW from 4 Coy states that I Bn was absorbed by II Bn after debacle at CORIANO. Major MEITZEL OC II Bn appears to comd the relics of both bns. (Major Meitzel is reported to have KO'd 2 Shermans with Faustpatronen at CORIANO and seems unwaveringly enthusiastic to die for his Vaterland.

71 GR (Mot) From PW statements I Bn is estimated at 100 - 125, II Bn 75 - 100.

20 GAF Div 39 GAF Regt I Bn: 1 Coy now includes 2 Coy, 3 Coy includes 4 Coy, 5 Coy is the mortar coy believed to have 8 x 8.1 cm mortars. Bn str estimated 150 - 175. II Bn: 6 Coy employed as rearguard for the withdrawal of II Bn, estimated str 200. PW claim the bn had been in res for 48 hrs NORTH of I/39 and moved 1500 metres NORTH on the WEST bank of the River USO night 25/26 Sep.

Comment Although approx 30 PW were questioned today, their statements regarding dispositions were conflicting and due to the confusion existing in certain units of 15 PG Div and 20 GAF Div, over 50% of the PW were non-German.

3 PERSONALITIES

29 PG Div 15 GR (Mot)

OC III Bn - Capt Von Malapert
OC 10 Coy - 2/Lt Heilmann

20 GAF Div 39 GAF Regt

OC I Bn - Major Wolfin (away)
OC 1 Coy - 2/Lt Jansen
OC 3 Coy - 2/Lt Stuetzel
OC 5 Coy - 2/Lt Hartmann

II Bn:
OC 6 Coy - 2/Lt Hamann

(OVER)

4 PV COUNT (from 2000 hrs 25 Sep until 2000 hrs 26 Sep)

<u>29 PG Div</u>	<u>15 GR (Hot)</u>	
	4 Coy	- 3
	11 Coy	- 3
<u>20 GAF Div</u>	<u>39 GAF Regt</u>	
	1 Coy	- 3
	2 Coy	- 4
	3 Coy	- 3
	4 Coy	- 2
	6 Coy	- 4
	10 Coy	- 1
	<u>40 GAF Regt</u>	
	5 Coy	- 4
<u>162 Turcoman</u>	<u>303 GR</u>	
	13 Coy	- $\frac{2}{34}$
<u>Previous Total</u>		- 11 Offrs 885 ORs
<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>		- 11 Offrs 919 ORs

5 MISCELLANY

(1) German Organisation "Neue Art"

A PW who deserted from 1217 Stomach Bn (Magen Bn) reports that this extraordinary unit consists of four coys, of 140 men each, all suffering from chronic gastric disorders. The same PW states that there is also an Ear Bn (Ohren Bn) in DENMARK, composed exclusively of deaf soldiers.

The example of Gefr Hans MUELLER, who was medically exempted from saluting because of total blindness in one eye and poor vision in the other, might indicate the existence of a Blind Bn; confirmation is also desired of the rumoured existence of a Eunuch Bn (Kastraten Bn) made up of another category of incapacitates.

(11) SS: Methods of Recruiting

These two examples are reported by PW taken in Northern FRANCE.

A Viennese boy under 18 was caught on the street after the curfew for his age group (2200 hrs). The police took his Wehrpass. It was returned two weeks later with the marginal notation: "Accepted for service in the Waffen SS".

A 16 year old lad who had stolen apples was taken to the police and given the choice of going to jail for a week or joining the SS. He joined the SS.

(Source: AFHQ Notes No 74)

EXTRACTS FROM A TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTS BELONGING TO LT ZOLLER

OC 7 COY II/15 PGR

II BN/15 GR (MOP)

BN HQ 9 SEP 44

ORDERS FOR DEF OF CORIANO SECTOR

II - II Bn 15 GR with (right - 3 Coy 67 PGR
(left - 10 Coy 15 PGR
will defend the sector between CASA GHIGI - CASA SALVONI
and hold same.

III - Dispositions

7 Coy - NORTH of right boundary to 100 metres SOUTH of
PISI,
5 Coy - thence NORTH to CASA RENZI (excl)
8 Coy - thence NORTH to left boundary NORTH of CASA
SALVONI,
6 Coy - as bn res on rd front on EAST edge of CORIANO.
Med Mortar Pl - (CRIGADEA) - firing from posns NORTH of
church in CORIANO.

IV - MLR - 300 metres WEST of BESANIGO river.

V - In Sp of Bn

3 Coy/129 Tk Bn
5 Tp/29 Arty Regt
9 Tp/29 Arty Regt
One hy inf gun pl/13 Coy/15 GR.

VI - Under Comd of Bn

2 Pl (7.5cm A tk)/14 Coy/15 GR
One Sec (inf r)/15 Coy/15 GR

Signal for def fire (i.e. German) - red, then Green.

Nobody to move from his posn in daylight

VII - Arm State

Per Coy - 10 Faustpatronen
" MMG - 3,000 rounds
" LMG - 2,000 rounds
" Rifle - 200 rounds
" Dis-
charger cap- 100 rounds
" Med
mortar - 250 rounds

VIII- Bn HQ - Same location.

Signed (MEITZEL)

(Comment: - Maj, OC II/15 PGR)

BN HQ 11 SEP 44

PATROL ORDERS FOR NIGHT 11/12 SEP

Intensive air recce, unceasing air attacks on arty posns
and sup routes, and Int Reports indicate with certainty that very
hy enemy attacks are due to recommence.....

.....If at all possible a PW is to be brought in. I will send the fortunate "captor" immediately on 10 days special leave.

11/15 PG 1

BN HQ

12 SEP 44

PATROL ORDERS FOR NIGHT 12/13 SEP

The bloody losses of last night, however greatly they are to be deplored, must in no way deter us.

The lesson can be learnt from it, that one cannot be too vigilant and ready for action every single second.

It also proves, that we are opposed by good tps.

For tonight I order:-

6 Coy: - to send out same patrol with same task as yesterday, but on another route.

7 & 8 Coy - protection in str with 2 PGs & 12 men, etc.

Signed (MFEZEL)

A P P X "A"

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four tks passed through the middle of its posn. The div has contrived almost invariably to keep one of its six bns out of the line, and all have shared the hard fighting equally; the tps are therefore not tired beyond endurance and the more intelligent accept the fact that the div will not be relieved when it reaches the GOETTEN line philosophically. Finally, the chief reaction to the attempt on Hitler's life has been one of relief at his escape and an increased determination to carry on with the war.

Tactically 356 Div has shown all the usual German skill. In the past it has suffered from a shortage of A tk weapons. Now that it has a generous allotment of 88s, tks and SP guns, tk approaches to its posns are covered by a thorough fire plan and some well sited minefids. However, a co-ordinated attack by tks and inf has always succeeded in driving them from their posns with heavy losses and PW have admitted the impossibility of def against this type of attack. Though liberally equipped with OFFENROHRS and FAUSTPATRONEN these weapons are apparently considered suicidal and few cases of their use have been reported. 356 Fus Bn has perhaps made the worst showing when attacked by tks and inf. Surprised on 25 Jun before having finished digging in on pt 697, they were driven off the feature in considerable confusion leaving behind many PW and dead. The div in fact is not uniformly good and is subject to all sorts of disasters, as for instance when it lost two PW to an offr who had lost himself on a recce.

(Source: 1 Cdn Corps Int Sum No 86)

(5)
SP 147

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT ON OPERATIONS
GOthic LINE 27 Aug to 14 Sep 44

11 CDN INF BDE SP GP (P L FUS)

27 Aug 44

Unit moved to Bde conc area MR 156536, Sheet 109.
Conc completed by 1600 hrs.

28 Aug 44

0800 hrs "O" Gp held by Comd 11 C.I.B. Intention to move across Metaura to relieve 2 C.I.B. Recce parties consisting of all Comds moved to area 077661 preparatory to recce posns.

1700 Hrs "O" Gp held by Comd 11 C.I.B. Gping:-

- # 1 Mortar Coy plus two pls MMG u/c Perth R.
- # 1 Pl MMG u/c C.B.H.

Comd 11 C.I.B. SP GP moved fwd with TAC 11 C.I.B. to TAC 2 C.I.B.

29 Aug 44

Relief 2 C.I.B. completed - C.B.H. pushed fwd to San Angelo-Irish to Apsella, Perth to Ginstrato.

1200 hrs Mortar Coy in posn area 056703.
Comd P L Fus moved with HQ 11 C.I.B. to MR 064694. Plans laid for recce of Foglia and outposts of Gothic Line.

2200 hrs Arrangements completed to place # 2 Mortar Coy u/c 11 CIB SP GP.

30 Aug 44

0900 hrs Comd 11 CIB SP GP and Coy Comd to San Angelo made recce of ground from O.P. Instructions issued for recce of pl areas fwd of San Angelo.

Mortar dump arranged for at Monastery.

1300 hrs Pl Comd proceeded on recce of fwd areas.

1515 hrs Orders from 11 C.I.B., attack at 1700 hrs. Frantic calls sent over wireless. Had all Comd grouped at Monastery for orders. Orders - attack going in at 1700 hrs, be prepared to occupy recce posns on call of Comd, 11 CIB SP GP. Comd 11 CIB SP GP went to San Angelo. Appreciated fact that haze in valley would permit occupation of posns by day. Issued instructions to that effect.

1700 hrs All pls in posn. H-hour for attack set back to 1730 hrs.

1 Pl Mortar at MR 020724
2 Pl " " " 022723

1 Pl MMG at MR 019737
2 " " " 022727
3 " " " 019737

30 Aug 44 (Cont'd)

1730 hrs Attack went in. Perth R, right - Objectives - features, 111, 115 & 129. C.B.H. left, objective feature 120. Attack very sticky on left. Perth success on first objective by last light.

31 Aug 44

0045 hrs 10 min shoot all pls on 120. Call from C.B.H. Attack by C.B.H. unsuccessful.

1000 hrs Capt Blair reported both pls # 2 Mortar Coy in posn at
#3 Pl at MR 029741
#4 Pl at MR 027741

1100 hrs Irish with u/c one Sqn 8 NBH to outflank and secure feature 120.

1200 hrs Feature 120 stanked by all four Mortar Pls, 300 bombs in seven minutes. Irish walked onto objective.

1600 hrs Threat of counter attack by tanks from NW. Failed to materialize.

1800 hrs # 2 Pl Mortar moved across Foglia to MR 012742.

1 Sep 44

0330 hrs C.B.H. reported two coys firm on Monte Maroni. Ba firm by first light.

0900 hrs Perth R exploited northwards to Volpin pt. 204. Pls across Foglia to posns as under:-

Mortar # 1 Pl 016756
2 Pl 015758
3 Pl 002768
4 Pl Did not cross Foglia

MMG # 1 Pl 010756
2 Pl 014764
3 Pl 014745

1125 hrs Irish to exploit fwd through C.B.H. - PLDG to secure pt 253 and advance on Tombe de Pesaro.

1930 hrs Stank on road to Pesaro-four pls mortar and 1 Pl MMG. 400 bombs in 10 mins. 1 & 2 Pls MMG moved across country to area 253 to support advance on Tombe de Pesaro.

2040 hrs Irish secure in Tombe de Pesaro, little if any resistance.

2 Sep 44

12 C.I.B passed through. # 1 and 2 Coys mortar placed u/c 12 C.I.B. Sp Gp. Intention: to establish bridgehead over Conca. TAC 11 C.I.B. Sp Gp moved to 003794.

3 Sep 44

0400 hrs "O" Gp comd 11 C.I.B. One pl Mortars, one Pl MMG u/c Irish. Intention to follow up 5 C.A.B.

3 Sep 44 (Cont'd)

Remainder 11 C.I.B. SP GP moved to MR 968824 by 1200 hrs.

4 Sep 44

2000 hrs

"O" Gp by Comd 11 C.I.B. at O.P. overlooking Coriano. Intention: Irish to relieve Westmr R, C.B.H. to pass through and secure feature to right of Irish. Reliefs completed by first light.

- # 1 Pl Mortar in posn at MR 013862
- # 2 Pl " " " " " 015861

5 Sep 44

Situation very sticky - hy cas inflicted on inf in Coriano "bowl". Recce made to get mortars and MMGs up to ridge.

6 Sep 44

Situation unchanged - pls in posn as follows:

- # 1 Pl Mortar at MR 013862
- # 2 " " " " 015861
- # 2 Pl MMG 910860

7 Sep 44

Situation unchanged. Plans laid for seizing Lorenzo feature by 11 C.I.B. Recce by night by coy and pl comd to posn mortars and MMGs fwd to sp advance. Pls in posns at:

- | | | |
|---------|------|--------|
| MMG | 1 Pl | 901867 |
| | 3 Pl | 899868 |
| | 2 Pl | 910860 |
| Mortars | 1 Pl | 013862 |
| | 2 Pl | 015861 |

8 Sep 44

Situation unchanged - posns heavily shelled and mortared.

9 Sep 44

Situation unchanged - posns heavily shelled and mortared.

10 Sep 44

"O" Gp held by Comd 11 C.I.B. Plan: 11 C.I.B. to take Coriano ridge on night 13/14 Sep 44. Right-C.B.H., Left Perth, Irish take town.

11 Sep 44

Final disposition:- MMG - 1 Pl 905881
2 Pl 906866
3 Pl 898864

Mortars- 1 Pl 898868
2 Pl 902870
3 Pl 904857
4 Pl 901852

12 Sep 44

1400 hrs

Co-ordinating conference held by Comd 11 C.I.B.
Fire plan for mortars and MMCs laid on.

Mortars - Counter Mortar
MMC Coy - rd 880884 to 122897 - Coy from H plus 30 to
first light.

13 Sep 44

0100 hrs

H hour fire plan carried out. Perth and C.B.H. firm by
first light - Irish entered town in morning - mopping up
all day.

14 Sep 44

Pls moved out to conc area San Giovanni. Conc completed by
2330 hrs.

WP

by
Brigadier I.S. Johnston
on a possible attack
by 11 Cdn Inf Bde Gp
on MONTECCHIO posns
on the GOTHIC LINE.

7

APPRECIATION

- (a) This appreciation is based on the assumption that
The enemy will be able to man the GOTHIC LINE and force Cdn Corps to maintain a set piece attack
- (b) The 11 Cdn Inf Bde has at least forty eight hours in which to tee up the attack after reaching the SOUTH bank of the F FOGLIA.
- (c) The fwd slopes of the 120 feature 005750 offer a reasonable approach for inf.
- (d) The 11 Cdn Inf Bde Gp will consist of four bns of inf, 1 Regt ~~OBJECTS~~ of tks under comd and the Engr resources of 5 Cdn Arm'd Div.
To breach the GOTHIC LINE in the MONTECCHIO area.

FACTORS

Relative Strengths

3 PARA Regt are known to be resting in TOMBA DI PESARO and are the most likely troops to be holding the line. They will be relatively thin on the ground, but equipped with a large number of automatic weapons. Morale on both sides will be high initially, but the enemy is likely to wear out under our shelling. Even paratroops do not fight well at night; therefore night attack should be considered. In daylight, paratroops will fight to the last, therefore, we cannot count on posns falling because dominated, and mopping up must be thorough.

Ground

The ground on the SOUTH bank of the river is higher than on the NORTH, and is closer to the river. Therefore preparations for crossing can commence before D Day. The river is fordable, but will need decking at the crossing place for vehs. Therefore inf must precede vehs by sufficient time to allow decking to be laid. The SOUTH bank dominates the valley floor therefore little resistance, other than patrols should be met this side of the minefd. The enemy also commands the valley floor, so our patrols will not be able to dominate the valley in daylight, therefore, the S.L. must be SOUTH of the river. There are at least two reasonable tracks across the valley for wheels and the floor would appear to be good tk going cross-country.

The 120 feature cannot be approached frontally by tks. The approach from the left is in 5 Corps area and would mean extending our front to a considerable width from Bdy with 1 Cdn Div who will be attacking at same time. On right of 120 feature a tk obstacle (F del TACCONE) runs perpendicular to our front. There is a track leading to 120 feature from MONTECCHIO village, but it is precipitous and cannot be counted on. Therefore, the only tk approach to 120 is from NORTH or north east where the F del TACCONE peters out.

The 111 feature at 009756 is bald with reasonable tk approach and a possible track for wheels from rd junc 009753.

The 115 feature at 017760 is bald with reasonable tk approaches, and a possible track for wheels from village OSTERIA NUOVA 021759.

The 120 feature is dominated from Pt. 129 988756, therefore exploitation must go that deep by first light. Beyond Pt. 129 the ground slopes away; the next dominating feature being the ridge Pt. 149 984763 to Pt. 182 988771 - this is 5,000 yds from S.L., which is too far to go at night, and must be accepted.

FACTORS

Ground (continued)

The 111 feature is dominated by Pt. 147 012759, therefore exploitation must go that deep by first light. Beyond Pt 147 the ground rises gently to Pt. 174 014776 which is 4200 yds from S.L. and must be accepted.

The 115 feature is dominated by the same pts as the 111 feature.

The 120 feature enfilades the approaches to and the fwd slopes of the 111 and 115 features, therefore, it must be neutralized by first-light.

Pt. 147 commands the rear of the 120 feature. Therefore, a daylight attack from Pt. 147 on the rear of the 120 feature is possible.

Enemy Defences

There is no report of A.P. mines; such as exist will probably be shot mines which cannot be located at night, therefore the inf will have to accept them. The river and the tracks across the valley will probably be mined, and there is a known minefd across the front. Therefore the inf will have to precede the sappers who will clear for tks who will move in line ahead through narrow gaps. Therefore, a night operation is preferable.

The minefd probably contains wood/en mines, therefore, gaps can only be cleared by snake, scorpion or prodding. The latter is most certain, and can commence at the same time the route clearing parties commence, and is therefore preferable.

The Atk ditch is not rivetted, therefore sides can be blown and crossings prepared with fascines without much difficulty.

There are various demolished houses in the minefd, probably containing enemy, and the villages of MONTECCHIO and STERBIA NUOVA have been partially demolished, therefore a large mopping-up force will be necessary.

The known defences incl many MG posns, some of them in pill boxes. These can only fire on fixed lines at night and therefore can best be dealt with at night.

Beyond Pt. 147 the known defences do not appear to be hy, therefore bold action and swift exploitation in daylight are required. Consideration must be given the numerous demolitions which might be manned, and tks and inf must work together, at least as far as C. VOLPINO 0178.

Weather

Probabilities hot dry weather, but possibility of hy showers, therefore a road across valley necessary. A moon setting sometime after midnight will favour ZERO early at night.

Time and Space

In order to allow for time passage of sp arms such as Atk guns onto the objective before first light, the clearing of routes and gapping of minefds must be begun as early as possible.

H Hour should therefore be as soon after last-light as possible.

COURSES OPEN Own tps

(a) To attack two bns up on 111 and 115 features at night and attack 120 feature from rear at night. This would require a long advance and change of direction; both of which are difficult at night. Tks might not be available until first light, and their passage across F del TACCONE would be difficult at night. Tks would be of little use to inf at night. The comd of 120 by Pt. 147 would be wasted.

COURSES OPEN

Own Tps

(b) To attack two bns up on 111 and 115 features at night and attack 120 feature from rear in daylight. If initial phase was sticky sp arms might not be up before daylight and could not get up in daylight until 120 feature was neutralized. Smoke is dependent on weather and arty might not neutralize steel emplacements.

(c) Attack two bns up at night on 120 and 111 features. One sqn tks to cover counter attack approaches to 120 from Pt. 147 and another sqn to cross from Pt. 147 to 120 at first light. This best plan.

Enemy

(a) To patrol in valley after dark. Therefore, S.L. must be SOUTH of river.

(b) To counter attack 120 or 111 in dark without tks - this unlikely, and must be accepted.

(c) To counter attack 120 with tks at first light - can get protection from tks at Pt. 147 and must try to get Atk guns up track from village.

(d) To counter attack 111 feature with Tks at first light. Own tks and Atk guns must be up and dug in.

PLAN

Night Attack - PERTH right to 111 feature and exploit to 115 feature and pt 147 before first light. CBH left to 120 feature and exploit to Pt. 129 before first light. PLDG to mop up demolitions in valley and villages of OSTERIA NUOVA and MONTECCHIO at night. IRC in res prepared to exploit to -
- at first light

Sappers to prepare two crossings of F FOGLIA. Sweep both tracks between MONTECCHIO and OSTERIA NUOVA and main road between villages. Make two cross-country gaps in minefd for tks. Breach Atk ditch in two places for tks and wheels. Covering parties from PLDG.

Tks to move when called by Sappers. One Sqn u/c PERTH on 111 feature. One Sqn u/c CBH to 111 feature and cross to 120 at first light. One Sqn res.

Arty Depending on enemy intention, Corps plan and amount available.

Crossing and approach across valley floor silent. Pause at line of minefd, then barrage to and beyond initial objectives. one Regt tks indir et fire in addition. FOOs each Bn. 4.2" Mor depending on enemy infm. Prepared to move on call to far side valley to sp adv on TOMBA DI PESARO. Probable initial task reverse slope 120 feature.

MMG. Depending on enemy infm. Prepared to move on call to initial objectives to sp further adv. Probable initial task fwd face 120 feature.

Priority vehs. 2 Sqn Tks - 2 Bn Atk guns - 2 Bn 3" Mor - 2 Bn Carriers (for use in sp tks if opportunity to exploit and to protect flanks - 2 Bn wireless and SAP vehs. IRC vehs. Res Sqn tks. SP Atk guns.

Sec Pro to come under comd soonest.

Forecast - IRC exploit to M MARRONE 9977. PLDG relieve PERTH and CBH on 111 and 120. PERTH exploit to C. VOLPINA 0178. CBH relieve IRC, M MARRONE. IRC exploit to Pt. 225 0079 and patrol to TOMBA di PESARO.

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

Serial No. (Repeat at Part D)

11C18 MG Coy

Unit

For week ending

9 Sep 44

To be made up to mid-day on Saturday in each week by all units of Foot Guards, Infantry of the Line, Reconnaissance Corps, R.A.V.C., A.E.C., R.A.P.C., C.M.P., Pioneer Corps, Intelligence Corps, A.C.C. and Non-Combatant Corps, and 1 copy rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon, and 1 copy to Reinforcement Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon (until instructed by G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon to discontinue rendering).

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

Table with 5 columns: Rank or Appointment, W.E. less 1st Rfts., Strength counting against W.E. less 1st Rfts., Surplus to W.E. less 1st Rfts., Reinforcements required. Rows include W.Os. Class I, W.Os. Class II, Company Quartermaster-Serjeants, Staff Serjeants, Serjeants, Corporals, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, etc., Buglers, Trumpeters, etc., and a TOTALS row.

* These Totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2.

Part B. Other ranks attached in excess of W.E. less 1st Rfts.

Table with 4 columns: Rank or Appointment, Unit and Corps to which they belong, Rank or Appointment, Unit and Corps to which they belong.

Unit Week ending 19 A.F.W.3009E. (Ft. Gds., Inf., etc.)

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Table with 5 columns: Army No., Rank, Name and Initials, Regiment or Corps, Remarks. Includes entries for Meddy, Parker, Long, and Patsko.

11C18 MG Coy Unit

For week ending

9 Sep 44

Serial No.

Part D. Detail of trades and duties of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A.

Large table with columns for SURPLUS TO ESTABLISHMENT and REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED, categorized by trade (e.g., Blacksmiths, Boot Repairers, Bricklayers, etc.) and rank classes (W.Os. Class I, W.Os. Class II, etc.). Includes a TOTALS row at the bottom.

Date of Despatch 8 Sep 44

Signature of Commander

Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

TO BE MADE UP TO MIDDAY ON SATURDAY IN EACH WEEK.

Army Form W. 3008 (Revised)

Serial No. (Repeat at Part D.)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

11 CIB MG Coy (Unit) For Week Ending 9 Sep 44

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED

1	2	3	4	5
Ranks.	W.E. less 1st Rfts.	Strength counting against W.E. less 1st Rfts.	Surplus to W.E. less 1st Rfts.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on W.E. less 1st Rfts.)
				No. Any Specific Qualifications.
*				
*				
*				
Lieut.-Colonels ..				
Majors ..	1	1		
Captains ..	5	3		1
Lieutenants ..	6	7		
2nd Lieutenants ..				
Quartermasters ..	1	1		
District Officers ..				
TOTALS ..	13	12		1

*Insert details of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

(i) Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Regt. or Corps.	Date.	Unit from which joined.

(ii) Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Regt. or Corps.	Date.	Cause or Unit to which proceeded.
A/Capt	JX Allen	PLF	4 Sep 44	SOS to X
			144	3 Sep

(UNIT) week-ending A.F.W. 3008 (Revised)

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Regt. or Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).

Serial No.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

Unit 11 CIB MG Coy (PLF)

For Week Ending 9 Sep 44

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS.

(i) OFFICERS ON STRENGTH COUNTING AGAINST W.E. LESS 1st RFTS. (Total to agree with column 3 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Personal Number.	Substantive Rank.	Higher Acting or Temporary Rank if held.	Name and Initials.	Parent Corps or Regiment.	Date taken on Strength.	Whether present with Unit.	Appointment held.	Date Assumed present Appointment.	Remarks including how employed if absent from unit.	
1	Majors		P.B. Kennedy	11 CIB MG Coy	6 Apr 42	11	CO	14 Feb 44		
2	Capt		Y.S. Rauld	"	17 Mar 42	11	OC Coy	21 Dec 44		
3	Capt		K.L. Simmonds	"	1 Jun 44	11	OC Coy	1 Jun 44		
4	Lieut	A/Capt	K.C. Tracy	"	2 Sep 39	11	PLF	12 Aug 43		
5	Lieut		H. Boshard	"	24 Mar 44	11	2IC PI	24 Mar 44		
6	"		W.H. Christoph	"	27 May 44	11	PLF	27 May 44		
7	"		J.L. Cochrane	"	6 Jul 44	11	PLF	6 Jul 44		
8	"		J.S. Hamilton	"	21 Jul 44	11	Adm	21 Jul 44		
9	"		L.W. Henderson	"	30 Aug 44	11	Sigs	30 Aug 44		
10	"		F.A. Neal	"	10 Sep 42	11	PLF	12 Aug 43		
11	"		D.W. Smith	"	22 Sep 44	11	PLF	22 Sep 44		
12	Capt		E. Thomas	"	6 Oct 40	11	Q.M.	12 Aug 43		
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(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED IN EXCESS OF W.E. LESS 1st RFTS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher Acting or Temporary Rank if held.	Name and Initials.	Regt. or Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
Lieut		A.O. Pilon	PLF	14 Sep 44	By 3e

8 Sept 44 (Date of Despatch)

J.S. Hamilton
(Signature of Commander.)
J.C.A.D.
(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

TO BE MADE UP TO MIDDAY ON SATURDAY IN EACH WEEK.

Army Form W. 3008 (Revised)

Serial No. (Repeat at Part D.)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

11 Cdn Tank Coy (Unit) For Week Ending 30 Sep 44

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED

1 Ranks.	2 W.E. less 1st Rfts.	3 Strength counting against W.E. less 1st Rfts.	4 Surplus to W.E. less 1st Rfts.	5 Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on W.E. less 1st Rfts.)	
				No.	Any Specific Qualifications.
*					
*					
*					
*					
Lieut.-Colonels ..					
Majors ..	1	1			
Captains ..	5	3			
Lieutenants ..	6	7			
2nd Lieutenants ..					
Quartermasters ..	1	1			
District Officers ..					
TOTALS ..	13	12			

*Insert details of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

(i) Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Regt. or Corps.	Date.	Unit from which joined.
Lieut	L.A. Kelly	PLF	29 Sep 44	X4 Coy 4 Bn

(ii) Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Regt. or Corps.	Date.	Cause or Unit to which proceeded.
Capt	R.L. Simmonds	PLF	27 Sep 44	X3 Coy
Lieut	A.D. Pilon	"	26 Sep 44	X9 Coy

(UNIT) week-ending..... A.F.W. 3008 (Revised)

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Regt. or Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).

Army Form W. 3008 (Revised)

Serial No.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

Unit 11 Cdn Tank Coy

For Week Ending 30 Sep 44

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS.

(i) OFFICERS ON STRENGTH COUNTING AGAINST W.E. LESS 1st RFTS. (Total to agree with column 3 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Personal Number.	Substantive Rank.	Higher Acting or Temporary Rank if held.	Name and Initials.	Parent Corps or Regiment.	Date taken on Strength.	Whether present with Unit.	Appointment held.	Date Assumed present Appointment.	Remarks including how employed if absent from unit.	
1			P.B. Kennedy	PLF	6 Oct 42	YPO	C.O.	14 Feb 44		
2			H.J. Baulch	"	25 Mar 42	"	OC Coy	24 Aug 44		
3			E. James	"	6 Oct 40	"	Q.M.	12 Oct 43		
4			F.H. Neal	"	10 Sep 42	"	Pl. CM	12 Oct 43		
5			H.C. Tracy	"	23 Sep 39	"	Pl. CM	12 Oct 43		
6			H. Boothby	"	24 Mar 44	"	Pl. CM	24 Mar 44		
7			W.M. Chickelaw	"	27 May 44	"	Pl. CM	27 May 44		
8			S.R. Chastaine	"	6 Oct 44	"	Pl. CM	6 Oct 44		
9			H. Hamilton	"	21 Oct 44	"	Pl. CM	21 Oct 44		
10			L.W. Hendraon	"	30 Aug 44	"	Sup D	30 Aug 44		
11			L.A. Kelly	"	29 Sep 44	"	2nd Pl	29 Sep 44		
12			D.M. Smith	"	22 Oct 44	"	2nd Pl	22 Oct 44		
13										
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(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED IN EXCESS OF W.E. LESS 1st RFTS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher Acting or Temporary Rank if held.	Name and Initials.	Regt. or Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.

29 Sep 44
(Date of Despatch)

H. Hamilton
(Signature of Commander.)
5 Cdn Div
(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

FIELD RETURN OTHER RANKS.

Serial No. (Repeat at Part D)

11 Cdn Indep MG Coy Unit. For week ending 23 Sep 44

To be made up to mid-day on Saturday in each week by all units of Foot Guards, Infantry of the Line, Reconnaissance Corps, R.A.V.C., A.E.C., R.A.P.C., C.M.P., Pioneer Corps, Intelligence Corps, A.C.C. and Non-Combatant Corps, and 1 copy rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon, and 1 copy to Reinforcement Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon (until instructed by G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon to discontinue rendering).

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

Table with 5 columns: Rank or Appointment, W.E. less 1st Rfts., Strength counting against W.E. less 1st Rfts., Surplus to W.E. less 1st Rfts., Reinforcements required (f.e., deficits on W.E., less 1st Rfts.).

* These Totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2.

Part B. Other ranks attached in excess of W.E. less 1st Rfts.

Table with 4 columns: Rank or Appointment, Unit and Corps to which they belong, Rank or Appointment, Unit and Corps to which they belong.

11 Cdn Indep MG Coy Unit Week ending 23 Sep 44 19 A.F.W.3009E. (Ft. Gds., Inf., etc.)

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Table with 5 columns: Army No., Rank, Name and Initials, Regiment or Corps, Remarks, (e.g. present whereabouts if known).

For week ending 23 Sep 44 Serial No.

Part D. Detail of trades and duties of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A.

Large table with columns for SPECIALISTS AND TRADESMEN, SURPLUS TO ESTABLISHMENT, REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED, and REMARKS. Includes rows for various trades like Blacksmiths, Boot Repairers, Bricklayers, etc.

Date of Despatch 22 Sep 44

Signature of Commander: J Hamilton, 5 Cdn And Sqn Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

11 Cdn Indps MG Coy (Unit) For Week Ending 16 Sep 44

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED

1 Ranks.	2 W.E. less 1st Rfts.	3 Strength counting against W.E. less 1st Rfts.	4 Surplus to W.E. less 1st Rfts.	5 Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on W.E. less 1st Rfts.).	
				No.	Any Specific Qualifications.
*					
*					
*					
Lieut.-Colonels					
Majors	1	1			
Captains	5	3			
Lieutenants	6	8			
2nd Lieutenants					
Quartermasters	1	1			
District Officers					
TOTALS	13	13			

*Insert details of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

(i) Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Regt. or Corps.	Date.	Unit from which joined.
Lieut	A.O. Pilon	CIC	10 Sep	219 Inc

(ii) Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Regt. or Corps.	Date.	Cause or Unit to which proceeded.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Regt. or Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

Unit 11 Cdn Indps MG Coy For Week Ending 16 Sep 44

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS.

(i) OFFICERS ON STRENGTH COUNTING AGAINST W.E. LESS 1st RFTS. (Total to agree with column 3 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Personal Number.	Substantive Rank.	Higher Acting or Temporary Rank if held.	Name and Initials.	Parent Corps or Regiment.	Date taken on Strength.	Whether present with Unit.	Appointment held.	Date Assumed present Appointment	Remarks including how employed if absent from unit.	
1	Majors		P.B. Kennedy	P.L. Fus	6 Apr 42	yes	C.O	14 Feb 44		
2	Capt		J.S. Bauld	"	25 Mar 42	"	O.C. Coy	21 Aug 44		
3	Capt		R.L. Simmonds	"	10 Jun 44	"	O.C. Coy	1 Jun 44		
4	Capt		P. Jones	"	6 Oct 40	"	O.C. Coy	12 Aug 43		
5	Lieut	Alt Capt	R.C. Hays	"	2 Sep 39	"	P.I.C.M.	12 Aug 43		
6	Lieut		H. Beckford	"	24 Mar 44	"	P.I.C.M.	24 Mar 44		
7	Lieut		W.H. Chisholm	"	27 May 44	"	P.I.C.M.	27 May 44		
8	Lieut		J.L. Crockett	"	6 Jul 44	"	P.I.C.M.	6 Jul 44		
9	Lieut		J. Hamilton	"	21 Oct 44	"	Adm O	21 Oct 44		
10	Lieut		L.W. Henderson	"	3 Aug 44	"	Adm O	8 Aug 44		
11	Lieut		A.O. Pilon	"	10 Sep 44	"	218 PI	10 Sep 44		
12	Lieut		F.A. Neal	"	10 Sep 42	"	P.I.C.M.	12 Aug 43		
13	Lieut		D.M. Smith	"	22 Jul 44	"	P.I.C.M.	22 Jul 44		
14										
15										
16										
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35										
36										
37										
38										

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED IN EXCESS OF W.E. LESS 1st RFTS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher Acting or Temporary Rank if held.	Name and Initials.	Regt. or Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.

16 Sep 44
(Date of Despatch)

J. Hamilton
(Signature of Commander.)
5 Cdn Indps MG Coy
(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

Serial No. (Repeat at Part D)

11 Cdn Indep MG Coy Unit.

For week ending 16 Sep 44

To be made up to mid-day on Saturday in each week by all units of Foot Guards, Infantry of the Line, Reconnaissance Corps, R.A.V.C., A.E.C., R.A.P.C., C.M.P., Pioneer Corps, Intelligence Corps, A.C.C. and Non-Combatant Corps, and 1 copy rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon, and 1 copy to Reinforcement Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon (until instructed by G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon to discontinue rendering).

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

Table with 5 columns: Rank or Appointment, W.E. less 1st Rfts., Strength counting against W.E. less 1st Rfts., Surplus to W.E. less 1st Rfts., Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on W.E., less 1st Rfts.). Rows include W.Os. Class I, W.Os. Class II, Company Quartermaster-Serjeants OR Colour-Serjeants, Staff Serjeants, Serjeants, Corporals, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, etc., Buglers, Trumpeters, etc., and TOTALS.

* These Totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2.

Part B. Other ranks attached in excess of W.E. less 1st Rfts.

Table with 4 columns: Rank or Appointment, Unit and Corps to which they belong, Rank or Appointment, Unit and Corps to which they belong.

Unit Week ending 19 A.F.W.3009E. (Ft. Gds., Inf., etc.)

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Table with 5 columns: Army No., Rank, Name and Initials, Regiment or Corps, Remarks, (e.g. present whereabouts if known).

11 Cdn Indep MG Coy Unit

For week ending 16 Sep 44

Serial No.

Part D. Detail of trades and duties of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A.

Table with columns for SURPLUS TO ESTABLISHMENT and REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED, and a REMARKS column. Rows list various trades like Blacksmiths, Boot Repairers, Bricklayers, etc., with counts for each category.

Date of Despatch 15 Sep 44

Signature of Commander

Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

Serial No. (Repeat at Part D)

11 CIB MH Coy Unit. For week ending 2 Sep 44

To be made up to mid-day on Saturday in each week by all units of Foot Guards, Infantry of the Line, Reconnaissance Corps, R.A.V.C., A.E.C., R.A.P.C., C.M.P., Pioneer Corps, Intelligence Corps, A.C.C. and Non-Combatant Corps, and 1 copy rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon, and 1 copy to Reinforcement Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon (until instructed by G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon to discontinue rendering).

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

Table with 5 columns: Rank or Appointment, W.E. less 1st Rfts., Strength counting against W.E. less 1st Rfts., Surplus to W.E. less 1st Rfts., Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on W.E. less 1st Rfts.). Rows include W.Os. Class I, W.Os. Class II, Company Quartermaster-Serjeants OR Colour-Serjeants, Staff Serjeants, Serjeants, Corporals, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, etc., Buglers, Trumpeters, etc., and a TOTALS row.

* These Totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2.

Part B. Other ranks attached in excess of W.E. less 1st Rfts.

Table with 4 columns: Rank or Appointment, Unit and Corps to which they belong, Rank or Appointment, Unit and Corps to which they belong.

Unit Week ending 19 A.F.W.3009E. (Ft. Gds., Inf., etc.)

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Table with 5 columns: Army No., Rank, Name and Initials, Regiment or Corps, Remarks. (e.g. present whereabouts if known). Entry: Pte E Wells, C.I.C., at Present #9 Coy 2Bn CIBRD (Sack L.I.).

For week ending 2 Sep 44 Serial No.

Part D. Detail of trades and duties of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A.

Large table with columns for SPECIALISTS AND TRADESMEN, SURPLUS TO ESTABLISHMENT, REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED, and REMARKS. Rows list various trades like Blacksmiths, Boot Repairers, Bricklayers, etc., with counts for surplus and reinforcements.

Date of Despatch 1 Sep 44

Signature of Commander: J Hamilton, 5 CAD, Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

MESSAGE

FROM: A REAR 5 CDN ARMED DIV

TO: LIST 'A' TO UNITS PLUS SERIALS 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
AND 5 CDN ARMED DIV TRG SCHOOL
AND 5 CDN ARMED DIV TRANSIT CAMP

appx 6

AG 36 . SECRET . following msg received from prime minister of CANADA now at united nations conference at SAN FRANCISCO transmitted for infm all ranks first cdn army . quote . on occasion of the surrender of the german armies in northern ITALY I desire on behalf of the government and people of CANADA most warmly to congratulate you as well as the officers non commissioned officers and men of the 1 cdn corps and att units whose courageous action and skilful fighting did so much to bring about the great victory in ITALY the final chapter of which has been triumphantly achieved today . CANADA will ever remember with pride that the cdn forces contributed their due share of the effort required to bring about the enemy's defeat in the italian theatre in the invasion of SICILY by the 1 cdn div by its fine advance up the italian peninsula by the brilliant break through of the HITLER LINE by the corps as a whole by the hard fought battles of GORTONA and the valley of the PO the cdn forces most worthily maintained and have added to the lustre of CANADA's mil tradition . we earnestly pray that the news of today's great success will speedily be followed by word of the final defeat of all german forces which the gallant action in northwest EUROPE of the first cdn army is doing so much to achieve . W L MACKENZIE KING . unquote . the above msg will be published in all unit orders . all infm

IN CIPHER

Handwritten signature

PRIORITY

T H I

T O R

SECRET

MESSAGE FROM THE
COMMANDER, 1ST CANADIAN CORPS

1ST CANADIAN CORPS, AFTER A LONG REST, IS AGAIN GOING INTO ACTION. HERETOFORE, WE HAVE DEFEATED THE ENEMY EACH TIME WE HAVE MET HIM. NOW WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE HIM A BLOW THAT, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER ALLIED OFFENSIVES, CAN FINISH THE WAR.

THE ENEMY HAS NO EFFECTIVE AIR FORCE, IS SHORT OF MEN, SHORT OF WEAPONS AND SHORT OF MUNITIONS, BUT HIS SOLDIERS STILL FIGHT BRAVELY AND SKILFULLY. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO UNTIL THE FINAL SURRENDER.

THE ONLY WAY TO COMPEL THAT SURRENDER IS TO ATTACK HIM RELENTLESSLY WITH ALL OUR STRENGTH, RUTHLESSLY USING OUR SUPERIORITY IN WEAPONS, UNTIL HIS RESISTANCE COLLAPSES.

LET EVERYONE OF US GO INTO THIS BATTLE WITH THE DETERMINATION TO PRESS FORWARD UNTIL THE ENEMY IS DESTROYED; TO STRIKE AND PURSUE UNTIL HE CAN FIGHT NO LONGER. THEN, AND ONLY THEN, SHALL WE HAVE WON WHAT WE, AS CANADIANS, HAVE BEEN FIGHTING FOR - SECURITY, PEACE AND HONOUR FOR OUR COUNTRY.

E. L. M. Burns

(E.L.M. Burns) Lt-Gen.
Commander, 1 Cdn Corps.

TO BE GIVEN OUT TO
ALL RANKS ON D-1

AUG 44.

MESSAGE FROM THE
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Commander, 1 Cdn Corps.

TO BE GIVEN OUT TO
ALL RANKS ON D-1

AUG 44.

TOP SECRET

5-3/A

HQ 5 Cdn Armd Div.

29 Jul 44.

APPX. 'B'

AMENDMENT No 1

MOV TABLN TRACKED VMS

ISSUED IN CONJUNCTION WITH 5 Cdn ARMD DIV ADM INSTR No JB

- 1 Under "SP HEAD", for all serials and all dates, delete "1530" and substitute "1700".
- 2 Delete coin headings "BUONCONVENTO" and "SIENA" and all detail thereunder, and add insert new heading "Dis P".
"Arrivo". Under new heading, for all serials and dates insert time "2300".
- 3 At end of Note 1 in last coin, add "Dis P W 346812".

P27

TOP SECRET
5-3/A

HQ 5 Cdn Armd Div 30 Jul 44

AMDT NO 5 TO MOV TABLE TRACKED VEHS ISSUED IN CONJUNCTION WITH 5 CDN ARMD DIV ADM
INSTR NO 18 DATED 27 JUL 44

1 For Convey Number 07/W/039 Serial 1 cancel all detail and substitute the following:

Convoy Number	Ser	No of Vehs	SP HEAD	DATE - TIME of head of convoy												
				MELFA		FERENTINO		F9165		CAMPAGNANO		BOISENA				
				Arrive	Depart	Arrive	Depart	Arrive	Depart	Arrive	Depart	Arrive	Depart			
07/W/039 A	1	(X) Perth R Carriers	20	31			1 Aug	1 Aug	1 Aug	2 Aug	2 Aug	3 Aug	3 Aug	4 Aug		
		C B Highrs Carriers	22	Jul			0030	1900	2330	1700	2100	1700	2330	1700		
		Ir RC Carriers	20	1700												
		11 Cdn Inf Bde MG Coy Carriers	40				ARRIVE DIS P - 4 Aug 2359									
		4 Cdn A Tk Regt	3													
		Total	105													
07/W/039 B		(X) HQ 5 Cdn Armd Bde	5	31	31 Jul	1 Aug	1 Aug	2 Aug	2 Aug	4 Aug	4 Aug	5 Aug	5 Aug	6 Aug		
		5 Cdn Armd Regt (8NBH)	64	Jul	2200	1700	2100	1900	2330	1700	2100	1700	2330	1700		
		17 Cdn Pd Regt	6	1800												
		5 Cdn Assault Tp	4													
		Total	79				ARRIVE DIS P - 6 Aug 2359									

2 5 Cdn Armd Div Report Centre now open at W502902.

3 All tracked veh convoys halt 20 mins every 2 hrs off roadway. Convoy lookouts will be posted to signal other passing vehs.

4 ACK.

Time of Signature 2:00 B hrs

Method of Issue 311

[Signature]
(C H Drury) Lt-col
AA & QMG 5 Cdn Armd Div

DISTRIBUTION: List 'A' Down to Units plus Comd,
Ser 24, APM (5 copies),
TC 5 Cdn IAA Regt (3 copies)

Convoy No	Serial No	Unit	Vehs		Date-time Dep SP	Arr. F9163	Dep F9163	Arr BOLSENA	Dep BOLSENA	Arr SIENA.	REMARKS	
08/W/027	7(x)	HQ 12 Cdn Inf Bde	56	H	060515	061300	070700	071300	080600	081100		
		12 Cdn Inf Bde M Coy	21	T	060745	061530	070930	071530	080830	081330		
		4 Bn PLDG	126									
		Westar R (M)	122									
		89/109 Bn	100									
		8 Cdn FDS RCANG	20									
		12 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp	52									
		TOTAL	497									
	8(x)	DNA (incl 5 Fd Cash, Edmo Offr, 8 Coy CDC, 5 Div Pos- tal, QM 5 Cdn Armd Div Sigs 5 Div Sec Rft Camp)	40		7 Jul						TIMINGS TO BE NOTIFIED	
		5 Cdn Armd Div Tps Coy RCASC	170									
		12 Cdn Inf Bde Coy RCASC	80									
		5 Cdn Armd Tps Wksp	80									
		5 Cdn Armd Div OFF	46									
		5 Cdn Mob Laundry & BU	14									
		13 Cdn FDS RCANG (incl 11 Cdn Fd Hyg Sec)	18									
		TOTAL	448									

H - denotes Head of Column to pass at.
T - denotes Tail of Column to be clear by.
X - denotes responsibility for record of
convoy staging area recon parties,
sub-allocation of timings etc.

DISTRIBUTION: List 'A' down to units plus Comd, 24, 30, 31, 32
plus 5 Cdn Armd Bde } 2 each for
CRA } Staging Area
11 Cdn Inf Bde } Offrs.
12 Cdn Inf Bde)
AFM - 3 copies
TC(5 Cdn IAA
Regt - 3 copies

C H Drury
(C H Drury) Lt Col
AARQNG 5 Cdn Armd Div

Convoy No	Serial No	Unit	Vehs	Date-time Dep	SP	Arr. F9163 Valmontou	Dep F9163	Arr BOLSENA 3352	Dep BOLSENA	Arr. SIENA DIS P	REMARKS
07/W/037	1(x)	RCE 5 Cdn Armd Div 5 Cdn Assault Tp Par Pls 12 Cdn Inf Bde 5 Cdn Armd Regt (SMBH) TOTAL	167 13 15 65 280	H 310515 T 310715		311300 311500	010700 010900	011300 011400	020600 020800	021100 021300	1. Speed - Density. 15mih 20 vmi SP N2199 Dis P SIENA 99318 2 Convoy Comds will hold usual slips showing total vehs in convoy, cas etc., for handing in at TPs.
08/W/001	2(x)	HQ 5 Cdn Armd Bde 2 Cdn Armd Regt (LASH) 9 Cdn Armd Regt (BCD) H Sqn Sigs 7 Cdn Lt Fd Amb RCAMC 5 Cdn Armd Bde Coy RCASO 5 Cdn Armd Bde Whsp TOTAL	51 77 90 22 41 94 85 450	H 010515 T 010745 L 010600 010800		011300 011530	020700 020930	021300 021530	030600 030830 030609 030945	031300 031530 031030 031415	3 Lights - full lights. 4 Convoy Serial numbers to be marked clearly on front each veh.
08/W/006	3(x)	3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt (GGHG) 5 Cdn IAA Regt RCA TOTAL	140 197 337	H 020515 T 020715		021300 021500	030700 030900	031300 031500	040600 040800	041100 041300	5 Flags and/or convoy lights at head and tail of complete days convoy only.
08/W/012	4(x)	8 Cdn Fd Regt (SP) RCA (with under comd for move) 17 Cdn Fd Regt RCA 4 Cdn A Tk Regt RCA TOTAL	124 146 149 419	H 030515 T 030715		031300 031500	040700 040900	041300 041500	050600 050800	051100 051300	6 Rops from each unit plus Pro will report to convoy comd 1600 hrs day previous to mov to coord timings and any last minute changes.
08/W/018	5(x)	HQ 5 Cdn Armd Div (Main & Rear) 11 Cdn Fd Regt RCA Perth Regt TOTAL	243 150 108 501	H 040515 T 040745		041300 041530	050700 050930	051300 051530	060600 060830 070600 071000	061100 061330 071030 071430	7 Veh Strs may vary to some extent.
08/W/023	6(x)	HQ 11 Cdn Inf Bde Tr R C 11 Cdn Inf Bde HQ Coy C B Highrs 24 Cdn Fd Amb RCAMC 11 Cdn Inf Bde Whsp 11 Cdn Inf Bde Coy RCASO TOTAL	70 105 26 107 39 66 105 528	H 050515 T 050745 H 050600 T 050800		051300 051530	060700 060930	061300 061530	070600 070830	071100 071330	

SpGp

TOP SECRET
5-3/A

HQ 5 Cdn Armd Div 30 Jul 44


AMDT NO 4
MOV TABLE TRACKED VEHs ISSUED IN
CONJUNCTION WITH 5 CDN ARMD DIV
ADM INSTR NO 18 DATED 27 JUL 44

1 For all Convoy Numbers and Serials (1 to 4 incl) cancel order of march and substitute the following:

<u>Convoy Number</u>	<u>Serial Number</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>No of Vehs</u>
07/W 039	1	(X) HQ 5 Cdn Armd Bde	5
		5 Cdn Armd Regt (SNBH)	64
		17 Cdn Fd Regt	6
		4 Cdn A Tk Regt	3
		5 Cdn Assault Tp	4
		Perth R - Carriers	20
		0 B Highrs - "	22
		Ir RC - "	20
		11 Cdn Inf Bde MG Coy -Carriers	40
08/W 003	2	(X) 9 Cdn Armd Regt (BCD)	66
		2 Cdn Armd Regt (LdSH)	66
		4 Cdn A Tk Regt	18
		4 Cdn A Tk Regt - half tracks	3
			<u>153</u>
08/W 009	3	(X) 3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt (GGHG)	76
		8 Cdn Fd Regt (SP)	37
		8 Cdn Fd Regt - carriers and half tracks	26
			<u>139</u>
08/W 014	4	HQ 5 Cdn Armd Div	9
		4 Bn PLDG Carriers	28
		(X) Westar R (M) Carriers	60
		89/109 Inf Bn Carriers	27
		12 Cdn Inf Bde MG Coy Carriers	30
		12 Cdn Inf Bde Surplus Carriers	17
			<u>171</u>

2 ACK

Time of signature 1810B hrs.
Method of Issue - SDR.


(C.H. Drury) Lt-col
IA & QMG 5 Cdn Armd Div

DISTRIBUTION:

- List 'A' down to units plus Comd, 24.
- APM - 5 copies
- TC 5 Cdn LAA Regt - 3 copies

AMENDMENT NO. 3 TO
5 CDN ARMD DIV /DM INSTR NO 18
DATED 27 JUL 44

Under Routes

Delete para 2 (a) and substitute new

2 (a) Routes and timings to BOLSENA staging area remain same. Route from BOLSENA to Dis P now route 2 to SQUIRICO W0538 - PIENZA W1191 - MONTEPELICIANO - ACQUAVIVA - Dis P 346812. Vehs depart BOLSENA A3352 at 0600 hrs each day at 10 mph. Head to arrive Dis P 1330 hrs. Amend move table accordingly.

Delete para 2 (b) (1) and insert new para:

2 (b) (1) Route for track vehs same as for wh vehs to BOLSENA A3352 thence route 2 to rd junc routes 2 and 74 S LORENZO A2855 - route 74 to rd junc A3854 thence route 71 through ORVIETO - PICULLE to Dis P 346812. Tracked vehs depart BOLSENA A3352 at 1700 hrs each day arrive Dis P 2359 hrs. Amend move table accordingly.

DR

[Signature]
(C H Drury) Lt-Col
AA&QMG 5 Cdn Armd Div

Time of Signature 1400 ,8 hrs

DISTRIBUTION:

List 'A' down to units plus Comd, Sers 24, 30, 31, plus

5 Cdn Armd Bde } 2 each for Staging
11 Cdn Inf Bde } area offrs
CRA

APM - 5 copies
TC 5 Cdn LAA Regt - 3 copies

P.L. Fin.

COPY NO. 11


TOP SECRET
5-37A

HQ 5 Cdn Armd Div
30 Jul 44

AMENDMENT NO 2
MOV TABLE WH VEHS ISSUED IN CONJUNCTION WITH
5 CDN ARMD DIV ADM INSTR NO 18

For all Convoy Numbers and Serials 2(X) to 6(X) incl
cancel order of march and substitute the following:

08/W/001	2(X)	HQ 11 Cdn Inf Bde	70
		Perth R	108
		11 Cdn Inf Bde MG Coy	26
		17 Cdn Fd Regt	146
		24 Cdn Fd Amb	39
		11 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp	68
		11 Cdn Inf Bde Coy	105
		Total	560
08/W/006	3(X)	3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt (GGHG)	140
		C B Highrs	107
		1 Bty 4 Cdn A Tk Regt	25
		Ir R C	105
		Total	377
08/W/012	4(X)	8 Cdn Fd Regt (SP)	124
		5 Cdn LAA Regt	197
		Total	323
08/W/018	5(X)	HQ 5 Cdn Armd Bde	51
		2 Cdn Armd Regt (LASH)	77
		9 Cdn Armd Regt (3GD)	90
		H Sqn Sigs	22
		7 Cdn Lt Fd Amb	41
		5 Cdn Armd Bde Coy	94
		5 Cdn Armd Bde Wksp	85
		Total	450
08/W/023	6(X)	HQ 5 Cdn Armd Div (Main and Rear)	243
		11 Cdn Fd Regt	150
		4 Cdn A Tk Regt less 1 Bty	124
		Total	517


C H Drury Lt-Col
AA&QMG 5 Cdn Armd Div

SDR

Time of Signature... 12.10... B hrs

DISTRIBUTION:

List 'A' down to units plus Comd, Sers 24, 30, 31 plus

5 Cdn Armd Bde } 2 each for
11 Cdn Inf Bde } Staging area offrs
CRA }

APM - 5 copies
TC 5 Cdn LAA Regt - 3 copies

ROME

- 11. (a) CREME will est AWDs 30 Jul as follows:-
 - (1) F9163
 - (2) BOLSENA
- (b) All cas will be rec fwd to the nearest AWD.
- (c) Any cas will be reported to nearest AWD.
- (d) Tk speeds over 15 mph will burn bogies to an alarming extent. All tk, Carrier, SF dvrs etc, will be made fully aware of the maximum speed and the fact that it will not be exceeded under any circumstances.

(e)

LEAVE

- 12. Units will ensure that all personnel have returned from leave before mov of unit.

STRAGGLERS

- 13. Any stragglers requiring tpt will report to DMA who will arrange tpt.

TC

- 14. (a) Present loans to ROME, AAI and 8 ARMY.
Passing through ROME, DEM ROME Area.
Highway 2 under arrangements 8 ARMY.
- (b) Because of length of route available, Pro are very limited and majority of TC will be a unit responsibility.
- (c) There will be no route marking until leaving main highways when "C" will be used. Dvrs will be instructed to follow Highway 6 to ROME and Highway 2 NORTH of ROME.
- (d) TPs en route: B and Dis P only, to be provided by 5 Cdn LAA Regt.

INTERCONN

- 15. All units will report loan and completion of mov to Div Report Centre soonest after arrival.

- 16. ACK.

17 DRESS Battle dress blouses

maybe worn at night in new area.

ELS/HAND

*(C. Drury) Lt-Col,
AA & SIG,
5 Cdn Armd Div.*

Time of signature: *1635* 3 hrs.

DISTRIBUTION

List "A" down to units plus Comd, 24, 30, 31, 32.

SUPS

- 5. (a) To save units tpt, Rations for consumption say following arrival will be drawn by adv parties from Sup P to be notified. Indents for these rations will be delivered to 5 Cdn Armd Bde Coy Sup Offr three days before rations are to be drawn.
- (b) In case of emergency, Sups may be drawn at 87 DTD. FRASINETTO, R251209.

POL

- 6. (a) Each B veh excl carriers will carry sufficient pet in jerricans to complete journey and top up on arrival. This pet will not be used en route.

Pet Ps F9163 - All Vehs.
 BOLSENA, A3352 - Tks and Carriers only.
 SIENA (not yet known) - All vehs.

- (b) To overcome dangers of pet overheating carried in drums on tks, SPs, etc, drums will be placed on blocks of wood and pressure released at every 20 min halt. This will only be done when engine's stopped and all naked flames or cigarettes are extinguished.

- (c) All vehs will carry sufficient lubricants for entire journey.

- (d) Attn is again drawn to serious shortage of jerricans and necessary action to return all empties to S & T.

WATER

- 7. There are no official water pts en route but many streams are available. Water vehs should be checked to ensure correct op and ample sup of chlorinating materials.

TCVs

- 8. TCVs are allotted on basis one pl per inf bn and will report day previous to move by 1600 hrs.

STEEL TRACKS

- 9. Steel tracks now removed from tks, SPs, etc, will be broken down into 10 link portions and tot'd under fm and unit arrangements to RH SPARANISE N0886. Tracks will be piled by types and each pile clearly labelled. ROO will be contacted to ascertain where they are to be piled.

MED

- 10. (a) Gas posts are being est at,

(1) MELFA	(4) BOLSENA
(2) F9163	(5) FRASINETTO
(3) CANTASO	(6) New area at locn med units
- (b) ADMS will arrange for att amb cars to all maj units.
- (c) Patients admitted after 29 Jul will be SOS unit strength.

(Handwritten note: Summary)

5 CDN ARMD DIV ADM INSTR NO 18
(Further to 5 Cdn Armd Div Adm)
(Instr No 16 dated 24 Jul 44)

Ref Maps: ITALY RD MAP 1/200,000, Sheets 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19.

MOV TABLES

1. To be issued separately

Appendix

ROUTES

2. (a) Wheeled Vehs
SP N2199 PIERA MELARA, Highway 6 to ROME, Highway 2 to
Disp P SIENA Q9318.

1. Appendix

(b) Tracked Vehs - As for wheeled vehs except any tks with
steel tracks and carriers will use tk tracks alongside
highway. Tracked vehs with rubber tracks may remain on
highway for entire journey.

AREAS

*II 30 min halt at Frosone (wh. con) T.C. there
no other halts. 20 min halts every 2 hrs
off road. no veh on roads*

3. (a) Comp - Div Comp area is not yet finalized. - See Trace

(b) Staging - (i) B Vehs - F9163, BOLSENA A3352.
(ii) Tracked Vehs & Carriers - MELFA G7027,
FERENTINO G3743, Area F9163, CAMPAGNANO F6394; BOLSENA
A3352, BUONCONVENTO V 526

RECCE

4. (a) AM and S & T reps will recce and mark areas "Reserved
40 C" as follows.

All Staging Areas, space for 150 tks and in addition.
F9163, space for 700 vehs and PP,
BOLSENA " " " " " "

(b) Fms will sup a holding party of at least one offr and
one NCO in staging areas as under, to leave for locns
1400 hrs 30 Jul.

**
maybe
washed
out.*

MELFA, G7027	-	5 Cdn Armd Bde
FERENTINO, G3743	-	5 Cdn Armd Bde
F9163	-	CRA
CAMPAGNO	-	CRA
F6394	-	11 Cdn Inf Bde
BOLSENA, A3352	-	11 Cdn Inf Bde
BUONCONVENTO, V 526	-	12 Cdn Inf Bde

These holding parties will ensure that space is allotted
for incoming vehs and is not occupied by any fmn until mov
of div is completed, and will make themselves familiar with
nearest locn to draw water, nearest comms, med installations,
etc.

(c) Units moving will send guides ahead to each staging area
to ascertain acen allotted by holding party offr.

(d) Recce parties for comp area on 6 hrs notice from receipt
this order.

(e) Div Report Centre in new area will be est under arrange-
ments GS 5 Cdn Armd Div, locn to be notified.

40
97


CONC AREA
"C" DIV

TRACE "A"

ISSUED WITH 50th ARMD DIV

ADM INSTR NO 18 27 JULY 44

MAP 1:100,000 SHEET 122



AMENDMENT NO 1
MOV TABLE WH VEHs ISSUED IN CONJUNCTION WITH
5 CDN ARMD DIV ADM INSTR NO 18

- 1 Under "Date - Time", delete all detail and substitute;
 "Dep - SP "

<u>Serial</u>	
1(X)	H 310600 T 310800
2(X)	H 010600 T 010800 ✓
3(X)	H 020600 T 020800
4(X)	H 030600 T 030800
5(X)	H 040600 T 040800
6(X)	H 050600 T 050800
7(X)	H 060600 T 060800
8(X)	H 070600 T 070800

- 2 Under "Convoy Number", opposite serial 8(X), insert "08/W/042".
- 3 Delete coln heading "Arr SIENA" and substitute "Arr Dis P"
- 4 Under coln headings "Dep BOLSENA" and "Arr Dis P", delete all detail and substitute:

1(X)	H 020600	021030
	T 020815	021245
2(X)	H 030600	031030
	T 030945	031415
3(X)	H 040600	041030
	T 040830	041300
4(X)	H 050600	051030
	T 050900	051330
5(X)	H 050600	061030
	T 050945	061415
6(X)	H 070600	071030
	T 071000	071430
7(X)	H 080600	081030
	T 080945	081415
8(X)	H 090600	091030
	T 091030	091500

- 5 Under "Remarks", delete note 1 and substitute new note:

1	<u>Speed</u>	-	<u>Density</u>
	15 mph		20 vtm - to BOLSENA
	10 mph		20 vtm - BOLSENA to Dis P

SP rd junc Route 6 and MUMDORFF br lateral rd N103990

Dis P 346812

CREME (cont'd)

based on this inspection, to cover total journey, will be submitted to the OC AWD at staging area F9163, by 1200 hrs day following the inspection by each unit affected.


Add new heading:

DRESS

17.

"Battle dress blouses with slacks may be worn at nights in new area."

ACK


(H Drury) Lt Col
M&QNG 5 Cdn Armd Div

SDR

Time of signature 0242 hrs

DISTRIBUTION:

List "A" down to units plus Comd, Sers 24, 30, 31
plus 5 Cdn Armd Bde)
CRA) 2 each for
11 Cdn Inf Bde) Staging area offrs
)

APM - 5 copies
TC 5 Cdn IAA Regt 3 copies

SECRET

5-3/A
Rear HQ 5 Cdn Armd Div
30 Jul 44

AMENDMENT NO 1

To 5 CDN ARMD DIV ADM INSTR NO 18 dated 27 Jul 44

MOV TABLES

Delete para 1. all detail.

- Insert 1. (a) "Wheeled Vehs" (see appx 'A' att.)
- (b) "Tracked Vehs" will move from BOLSENA A3352 at 1700 hrs each day; arrive Dis P 2300 hrs. Tracked veh colns now arrive at destination one day earlier. (See appx 'B' att.)

ROUTES

Under para 2. delete sub para (a) all detail.

Insert (a)1 "Routes and timings remain the same to stage area BOLSENA A3352. Route thence by RADICOFANI, A1879. SARTEANO, A2689. CHIUSI, W3183 to Dis P.

Under para 2(a)

Insert new sub para (11) "There will be a 30 minute halt at FROSINONE each day for all wheeled veh convoys only. OC 75 Coy CMP (TC) will arrange for parking area and TC pointsmen will direct all convoys into this area."

Insert new sub para (111) "No vehs will remain on the rd during this halt."

Insert new sub para (1v) "Except in emergency no other halts will be observed on route."

Under para 2(b)

Insert new sub para (11) "20 minute halts every two hrs will be made under convoy cond's arrangements. Vehs MUST move off highways during halts."

AREAS

Under para 3 delete sub para (a) all detail.

Insert - "Conc - Div Cons Area - see trace appx 'C'."

Delete under sub para (b) (11) BUONCONVENTO V9596.

RECCE

Under para 4. Delete under sub para (b) BUONCONVENTO, V9596 12 Cdn Inf Bde

FOI

Under para 6 delete sub para (a) - all detail

Insert - "Each "E" Veh excl carriers will carry sufficient pet in jerricans to complete journey and top up on arrival. (250 miles) Units will refuel from 1st line then collect 45 gal drums from PP to refill 1st line. Drums MUST be returned to PP before leaving staging area. This will be done with 1st line tpt as no second line tpt will be available. Units must NOT attempt to refill 1st line at PP.

- PPs F9163 - All vehs
- BOLSENA - A3352 - All vehs

CREME

Under para 11 insert new sub para (e)

"An inspection under the direction of unit LAD offrs or Tech Adjnt will be made of all tks by units during the one day maint period scheduled at staging area MR F9163.

insert new sub para (f)

"Estimated requirements of tracks, bogie wheels, idler wheels, track support rollers, engines, sprockets and bolts, drums, clutches, and any other parts which may be urgently required.

11 CIB MG Coy (PLF)

TOP SECRET

DISPOSITION OF REG VEHs FOR RD SWEEP

Date Of Move	Carrier Move	B Veh Move	Rec Veh Allocated
31 Jul		10 Fd Sqn RCB 1 Fd Sqn RCB 4 Fd Tk Sqn RCB	1 Scammell 77 LAD 1 Matador)
	(a) Perth Regt C B Highrs Ir RC 11 Cdn Inf Bde MG Coy (PLF) 4 A.Tk Regt RCA		1 Scammell & 7-ton trlr 11 CIB Wksp 1 Mack & 7-ton trlr No.1 By Rec Coy.
	(b) 17 Fd Regt RCA (Tks)		1 Scammell--5 CAB Wksp
1 Aug		Perth Regt 11 CIB M C Coy (PLF) HQ 11 Cdn Inf Bde 11 CIB Coy RCAMB 17 Fd Regt RCA 24 Cdn Fd Amb RCAMB 11 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp	1 Dodge--58 LAD 1 Mack) 11 Cdn Inf 1 Dodge) Bde Wksp
2 Aug	4 A.Tk Regt (RCA) (Half-tracks)		1 Scammell--5 CAB Wksp
		C B Highrs 1 Sty 4 A.Tk Regt RCA Ir RC	1 Mack-No.1 By Rec Coy but 1/c 73 LAD

RM/5-2
31 Jul 44

John A. Harding
(John A. Harding) Maj
Comd 11 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp

1. Speed - Density
15 MPH 20VTH to BOLSENA
10 MPH 20VTH BOLSENA to DP

SP rd junc Route 6 and Mundorff
by lateral rd N103990

DP P346812

2. Convoy Comds will hold usual slips showing total vehs in convoy, cas etc., for handing in at TPs.
3. Lights - full lights.
4. Convoy Serial numbers to be marked clearly on front each veh.
5. Flags and/or convoy lights at head and tail of complete days convoy only.
6. Veh strs may vary to some extent.
7. Units will liaise with serials ahead in order to feed into coln on time.
8. Wheeled vehs will halt for thirty mins when convoy reaches FROSINONE.

Appx 'A'

Convoy No	Bde Gp Ser No	Unit Ser No	Unit	Vehs	Date-time		Arr / Dep		Arr / Dep		Arr Dis P	REMARKS
					Dep SP	F9264	F9264	BOLSENA	BOLSENA			
				103990								
08/W/001	2X	-----	Unit adv parties Perth R	108	010530 010600	011300	020630 020700	-----	to conc area	021300 030600	031100	Est time to SF 1 hr.
		1	PL Pus	34	0630							Not to move on to main rd before ser 1 clear
		2	HQ 11 Cdn Inf Bde	70						289927		Not to pass rd junc before ser 2 clear.
		3	11 Cdn Inf Bde Coy RCASC	105								Not to pass rd junc 253971 before ser 3 clear
		4	17 Cdn Fd Regt	146								Not to pass rd junc 253971 before ser 4 clear
		5	24 Cdn Fd Amb	39								Not to pass rd junc 282937 before ser 5 clear
		6	11 Cdn Inf 3de Wksp	66								Not to come on main rd until ser 6 clear

NOTE: ADDITIONAL INSTRS OVERLEAFBde H.Q. at San Martino

TC

13. (a) Present locns to ROME, AAI and 8 ARMY.
 Passing through ROMA, DFM ROME area.
 Highway 2 under arrangements 8 ARMY.
- (b) Because of length of route, Pros are very limited and majority of TC will be a unit responsibility.
- (c) There will be no route marking until leaving main highways when "C" will be used. Dvrs will be instructed to follow Highway 6 to ROME and Highway 2 NORTH of ROME.
- (d) TPs en route: SP and Dis P only, to be provided by 5 Cdn LAA Regt.

INTERCOMN

14. (a) Wireless silence from 311700 until permission granted by HQ 11 Cdn Inf Bde.
- (b) All units will report locn on completion of move to 5 Cdn Armd Div Report Centre W502902, soonest after arrival.
15. ACK.

Time of signature: 311400 B hrs

J.H. Gowan
 (J.H. Gowan) Major
 B M 11 Cdn Inf Bde

DISTRIBUTION:

- Perth R
 C E Highrs
 Ir R C
 S. Gp (PLF) ✓
 24 Cdn Pz Asst
 11 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp
 11 Cdn Inf Bde Coy RCASC
 RCA (5 copies)
 3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt (GGHG)
 BM
 DAARMC
 BRASCO
 T O
 Camp
 File (3)
 War Diary (2)

SUPS

7. (a) At times notified by BRASCO all units, less C B Highrs and Ir RC will draw rations as follows:
- For consumption 1,2,3, Aug. - 3 days hard rations.
- C B Highrs) For consumption 1 Aug - fresh rations.
Ir RC) For consumption 2,3,4 Aug - 3 days hard rations.
- (b) Rations for consumption on day after arrival in new area will be drawn by adv parties from 5 Cdn Armd Bde Coy RCASC.
- (c) In cases of emergency, sups may be drawn at 87 DID FRASINETTO R251209.

P.O.L.

8. (a) Wheeled vehs, will carry petrol as follows:
- 3-ton vehs or equivalent - 6 Jerricans.
- 15cwt or equivalent vehs - 6 Jerricans.
- Pet P - F9264 VALMONTONE.
- Tracked vehs incl carriers will carry 5 Jerricans
Pet P F F9264 VALMONTONE and BOLSENA A3352.
- (b) All vehs will carry sufficient lubrication for entire journey. Attn is again drawn to the serious shortage of Jerricans and necessary action to return all empties to S&T.

WATER

9. (a) There are no official water pts en route. Many streams are available. Water vehs should be checked to ensure correct op and ample sup of chlorinating material.

T.C.Vs.

10. TCVs are allotted on basis one pl per inf bn and will report to Perth R by 1600 hrs 31 Jul, and to C B Highrs and Ir RC by 1200 hrs 1 Aug.

MED

11. (a) Cas posts are being est at (i) MALFA. (ii) F9264 VALMONTONE. (iii) BOLSENA. (iv) New area at locn Med units.
- (b) Att amb cars will move with all major units.
- (c) 13 FDS remains open present area until completion of move.

REC

12. (See Appx 'B' att).

~~TOP SECRET~~

5-7-0 (A/Q)
HQ 11 Cdn Inf Bde
31 AUG 44

9

11 CDN INF BDE ADM INSTR NO. 5

Copy No 4

(Issued in conjunction with 5 Cdn
Armd Div Adm Instr No.18 and
Amendments 1,2,3,4,5.)

Ref Maps - Italy: 1/200,000, sheets 13,15,16,17,18,19.
1/100,000, sheet 122.

MOVE TABLES

1. (a) Tracked vehs incl carriers - see amendment No.5 to
5 Cdn Armd Div Adm Instr No.18.
- (b) Wheeled vehs - see Appendix 'B' att.

ORDER OF MARCH

2. Unit advance parties
Perth R
P L Fus.
HQ 11 Cdn Inf Bde
11 Cdn Inf Bde Coy RCASC
17 Cdn Fd Regt.
24 Cdn Fd Amb.
11 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp.

C B Highrs) will move 2 AUG 44 under orders 3 Cdn
Ir R C) Armd Recce Regt (GGHG).

16 Bty 4 Cdn Lk Regt

ROUTES

3. (a) Wheeled vehs - ~~to~~ N2199 PIETRA MELARA - Highway 6
to ROME, Highway 2 to Disp P ~~SIENA~~ ~~Q2213~~. *W 346812*
- (b) Tracked vehs - As for wheeled vehs except any tks with
steel tracks and carriers, which will use tk tracks
alongside highway. Tracked vehs with rubber tracks may
remain on highway for entire journey.

AREAS

4. (a) Conc in new area: Bde conc area as shown on Trace 'A'
issued with 5 Cdn Armd Div Adm Instr No.18.
- (b) Staging: (i) B vehs F9264 VALMONTONE and BOLSENA A3352.
(ii) Tracked vehs & Carriers: - MELFA 07027,
PERENTINO G3743, Area F9103,
CAMPAGNANO F6394, BOLSENA A3352,
BUONCONVENTO V9596.

RECCE

5. (a) Recce parties-consisting of one offr per unit will proceed
to conc area 31 Jul 44 under SC.
- (b) Adv parties- Units will provide one 3-ton lorry and
sufficient personnel to recce staging areas, and sub-
allot conc areas. Adv parties move under orders of HQ
11 Cdn Inf Bde ahead of main body. (See movement table
Appx 'A' att.

(OVER)

*Report
By
05/12*

REGIMENTAL ORDERS
BY
MAJOR P. B. KENNEDY
COMD
THE PRINCESS LOUISE FUSILIERS (11 CDN INDEP MG COY)
PART I ORDER

Last Order
No 2
15 Sep 44

No.....3
16 Sep 44

.....
1. POSTINGS
1-A

Posted to MMG Coy w.o.f. 16 Sep 44.

F-35442	FUS	KEDDY,	M.G.
F-35552	FUS	MANTHORNE,	M.S.
F-35597	FUS	THOMPSON,	S.F.
L-1743	FUS	O'DONOVAN,	T.

Posted to Mortar Coy w.o.f. 16 Sep 44.

F-36587	FUS	D'EON,	D.J.
H-19702	CPL	WATCHAM,	A.J.

2. LOOTING
2-A

1. Looting is defined as follows:

- (a) Theft of any article from premises which have been:-
- (i) Damaged by war operations.
 - (ii) Vacated by reason of attack by the enemy
or
 - (iii) Vacated in consequence of authorized direction.
- (b) Theft of any article which has been left exposed or unprotected as a result of war operations.

2. Several instances of alleged looting have recently been reported. Civilian premises vacated by reason of ops have been entered and furniture and other articles, which could not be regarded in any way as materials of war, unlawfully removed by mil personnel.

It will be clearly impressed on all ranks that looting is a most serious offence and that in the UK under the Defence Regulations it is punishable by death or penal servitude for life. In future severe disciplinary action will be taken against all offenders. The charge will be laid under AA Sec 41(Theft) and will be submitted to mil legal offrs for approval prior to trial.

(1 Cdn Corps RO 395/44)

overleaf

3. COURT OF INQUIRY
3-A

1. A Court of Inquiry composed as under will assemble at the call of the President to inquire into and record the absence without leave and deficiencies if any, in the Arms, Ammunition Regimental Necessaries, or clothing of the u/m, absent without leave from 1330 hrs 8 Aug 44. 38 days.

L-13578	Fus	Hunter,	C.E.	MMG Coy
L-2179	Fus	Jubinville,	T.H	" "

President

A/CAPT K.C. TRACEY

MEMBERS

LIEUT W.M. CHISHOLM
LIEUT J.L. CROCHETIERE

J. Hamilton
(I.S. HAMILTON) LIEUT
ADM OFFR - P L FUS

NOTICES

REGULATORY MESSAGES

The following message has been received by the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Corps from the GOC-in-C, First Cdn Army:

"All ranks First Cdn Army very proud of fine fighting and great achievements 1 Cdn Corps in their break through and into Hitler's Gothic Line. The reunion we all look forward to should not be much longer delayed."

2. The following message has been received by the GOC 1 Cdn Corps from the GOC 2 Polish Corps:

"To the magnificent Cdn Corps under your comd. their comrades in arms in Two Polcorps wish to express their great admiration and to offer their heartfelt congratulations on the historic decisive breaking of the Gothic Line.

The elan, courage and skill of your corps are unparalleled and we greet the victors of the last defence line in ITALY".

REGIMENTAL ORDERS

BY
MAJOR F. J. KENNEDY

COMD

PRINCESS LOUISE FUSILIERS(11 CDN INDEP MG COY)
part I Order

Last Order

No.....3

16 Sepm44

No.....4

22 Sep 44

1. POSTINGS

1-A

1. Posted to coys as shown w.e.f. 22 Sep 44

L27784	Fus	Abstoaway,	J.V.	HQ
F-79784	Fus	Almon,	J.B.	MMG
F-35014	Fus	BRANSON,	H.E.	MMG
F-65240	Fus	Gordon,	A.V.	MORTAR
F-35174	Fus	Griffithsq	J.C.	HQ
G-51238	Fus	Hicks,	R.C.	HQ
F-36242	Fus	Reid,	H.E.	MORTAR
F-33462	Fus	Roper,	B.H.	MORTAR
F-45636	Fus	Silliker,	L.J.	MORTAR
K-923	Cpl	Vincent	V.B.	MMG
102611	Fus	WOLOSZYN,	W	HQ
H-70458	Pte	Brewer,	W.A.D.	MMG
B-79271	Pte	Pascoe,	R.S.	MMG
F-65186	Fus	Burns,	G.S.	MORTAR

2. DRESS

2-A

1. Eff this date Battle dress will be taken into wear by all ranks. Dress on moves will be full marching order with denims or coveralls. Personnel who have neither denims or coveralls will carry KD slacks.

I. S. Hamilton
I.S. Hamilton) Lieut
ADM OFFR - P L FUS

NOTICE

The following message has been received from Lt Gen A.G.L. McNaughton CB CMG DSO and is published for the infm of all ranks:

"To all ranks Cdn Army Overseas. Tomorrow with the deepest and most heartfelt regrets I leave the comd of the First Cdn Army and in consequence this is the last occasion when I have the privilege of addressing myself to you. I do so to thank you for the support you have given in overflowing measure in building the First Cdn Army into the complete, well-balanced, effective, battle worthy organisation it is today. I do so now to thank you for the confidence and for the cheerfulness with which you have accepted all tasks as they arose; for the energy and determination you have given to their discharge, and for the patience and discipline with which you have borne the many changes and disappointments of the last four years.

"I thank you for the service you have given to CANADA and to the great cause for which we took to arms, and for your gallantry on the field of battle wherever it has come. You in the army here in the UK, in ITALY, and elsewhere; and you who stand in the rear and in support; you are well-trained, well-organised, well-equipped. Our leaders in all grades are proved. Your staffs are skilled and devoted to the service of the troops, and so I have confidence you will succeed in all you undertake.

"I pray there will come an early and triumphant end to this present strife, and that soon you may return once more to CANADA and your kith and kin.

May divine Providence bless you, one and all.

(Signed) A G L McNaughton"

In reply to the above, G.O.C. in C 1 Cdn Corps has despatched the following message:

"Your message GS3238 of 26 Dec to all ranks Cdn Army Central Mediterranean Forces is now being circulated and will be read with deep emotion. The Cdn Army Overseas is your product and you have given to its development all your giftless mind and boundless energies. You can be assured that the military organisation which you created, wherever and whatever the service it may be called upon to perform, will fully measure up to your expectations and to the responsibilities placed upon it."

PL7ca

WD

19 Sep 44

MESSAGE

The Corps Commander wishes the following message brought to attention of all ranks engaged in the recent operations:

FROM: TAC EIGHTH ARMY 181030
TO : 1 CDN CORPS

SECRET (.) PERSONAL FOR LT GEN BURNS FROM LEESE (.) THE FOLLOWING EXTRACT FROM A MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS RECEIVED FROM THE PRIME MINISTER (WINSTON CHURCHILL) IS SENT TO YOU FOR PUBLICATION IN ANY FORM YOU MAY WISH (.) QUOTE (.) MANY CONGRATULATIONS UPON STORMING OF THE CORLINO RIDGE AND PASSAGE OF THE MARANO (.) I CAN SEE THAT THIS HAS BEEN A GRAND FEAT OF ARMS UPON THE PART OF THE TROOPS INVOLVED (.) UNQUOTE

IMMEDIATE

File

W.P. Gilbride
(W.P. Gilbride) Brigadier
DA & QMG, 1 Cdn Corps

DISTRIBUTION:

As for CRO's

(based on infm up to 2359 hrs 10 Sep 44)

PART ONEI ENEMY SITUATION

With the exception of two rather uninteresting deserters from 10 Coy III/15 PGR, we have had no further recruits from the opposition. These two whose activities were apparently confined to the prone and whose vision was obstructed by two sides of a slit trench could merely confirm their scanty reports with that given by our more informative Pole taken from the same bn yesterday.

On the whole it has been a very quiet day with no news of any more regrouping of enemy bns. The dispositions last published with the possible exceptions of one or two minor changes, can be taken as fairly definite; the permanency dependent upon our own efforts.

Conjecture as to the German intention regarding the posns he now holds is natural, knowing that he is not sitting on a prepared defense line. The only gains that have been made since the MELO R was reached are to the SW, and here the enemy can afford to withdraw because as he does so his line is shortened. Eventually it will run from the sea along the MELO to the CORIANO ridge and then WEST to the neutral territory of S MARINO, unless by pressure is applied between CORIANO and the sea, and then only will he fall back. The only times that the Hun makes "a successful withdrawal to prepared posns in the rear" is when forced to do so.

II ENEMY DEFENCES

From a study of maps and air photos it can be seen that the policy in the RIMINI bottle-neck is not one of linear def but rather the strategical use of natural features made into strong pts and dominating the lines of approach which are intended as killing grounds. In the event, unlikely from the enemy point of view, of these focal points being overrun, a barrier is being prepared along the MARECCHIA R. These STÜTZPUNKTE are the NORTH and the NE sides of the RIMINI airfield, the SE tip of the S MARTINO feature 8693, the hill from S FORTUNATO - Le GRAZIE 8394 - 8395, the outskirts of RIMINI from S MARIA 8696 to the sea, and pt 153 in square 7993.

III ENEMY METHODS

A recent PV reports that the following verrey light sigs are at present in force:

White	--	We are here
Green	--	Increase range of arty fire
Red	--	Enemy attacking

(Source: 1 Brit Armd Div Int Sum 134)

R. Gray, Capt.
for (G R Whiston) Maj
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

ELS

Time of Signature: 11.08.00 B hrs
Distribution: As for I Sum No 16

PART TWO

I IDENTIFICATION

29 P G Div

15 G R (Mot) Two deserters from 10 Coy were captured at 893874 on 10 Sep.

II STRS DISPOSITIONS MORALE

29 P G Div

15 G R (Mot) (i) Deserters from 10 Coy claimed they deserted as their nerves were shattered by our arty fire. They were never able to leave their slit trenches.

(ii) 10 Coy has 2 rifle pls each 2 secs, coy str estimated at 60-70. 10 Coy has 4 LMG 42s, 1 MMG 42, 6 Faustpatrone, 1 x 8.1 cm mortars.

(iii) 10 Coy posns estimated 800 metres NORTH of CORIANO. HQ in houses WEST of rd along CORIANO ridge. Tks in sp of bn, but numbers and type unknown.

III PERSONALITIES

29 P G Div

GOC - Lt Gen Bollack
OC 9/15 GR (Mot) - 2/Lt Brockmeyer
OC 10/15 GR (Mot) - Lt Kramer

IV PW COUNT (2000 hrs 9 Sep to 2000 hrs 10 Sep)

29 P G Div

15 G R (Mot)

10 Coy 2

Previous Total 9 Offrs 678 ORs

GRAND TOTAL 9 Offrs 680 ORs

PART THREE
EXCERPT FROM DIARY OF
PTE OTTO JAHN OF 117 GR

- 2 Sep 44 Covered 30 km on the march last night. The front comes nearer and nearer.
- 3 Sep 44 Already at 3 o'clock in the afternoon we march forward again and take up our posns. TOMMY has broken through near RIVINI and has surrounded a Para Division. Our regiment shall liberate them. The 289 Regt went into the line a day earlier and was mostly destroyed. Horrible things are happening. I hope we pull through all right. Now we depend on GOD.
- 4 Sep 44 We are in the midst of the battle. Nobody can think of sleep. Enemy tanks are in between our positions all the time. It is just horrible. One doesn't know any more if one is a human being. I had to go on patrol twice today.
- 5 Sep 44 Today, for the second day running the enemy attacks continuously. Through the whole night we received a heavy barrage on our positions and I had practically given up hope of pulling through alive. We face English and Canadian troops. The third day today that our food supply cannot get through. We live off grapes.

"NO ONE LOVES THE TURCOMAN"

A PW who operated a switch board at 162 Div Bn HQ claimed to have heard the following conversation between his adjt and Div HQ concerning the further movs of the div from ISTRIA.

"When Gen NIEDERMAYER, the late GOC, asked BERLIN where to take his fmn, he was told that they had FRANCE in mind, but ROMMEL protested strongly, saying that he wanted nothing to do with 162 Div. BERLIN then suggested ITALY, only to meet a like response from KESSELRING. Consequently it was decided that the Div would do least harm in the SPEZIA area, building fortifications."

(AFHQ Int Notes)