

D
M.F.M. 11A
200M-5-40 (5185)
(H.Q. 1772-39-1658)
Out

SECRET

ORIGINAL
~~DUPLICATE~~
~~TRIPPLICATE~~

(Strike out where not applicable)

War Diaries
Appxs Checked
Date - 3 June 1947

WAR DIARY

OF

THE PRINCESS LOUISE FUSILIERS

FROM L April TO 30 April 45

0762
524

CDN. SEC. 2nd EDH. HQ. 21 ARMY GP.
RECEIVED
16 JUN 1945
WAR DIARIES SECTION

VOLUME
20 JUN 1945
CMHQ

6-123

234

APPENDICES 1 TO 5

ORIGINAL

1945

APR

355/1/550

WAR DIARIES, C.A.S.F.

Instructions for Compilation and Despatch

1. A War Diary is **SECRET**.

2. The War Diary takes the place of the Historical Record when on active service. (K.R. Can. Para. 1530). Its objects are: to supply authentic material for the history of the unit, and of the force; to furnish a historical record of operations; and to provide data upon which to base improvements in training, equipment, organization and administration.

3. Unless otherwise ordered, the original and duplicate copies are sent on the first day of the succeeding month, through the usual channels, to the A.G., 2nd Echelon, wherever that office may be. The triplicate copy may be held by the unit for three months and then forwarded, also through the usual channels, to A.G., 2nd Echelon.

4. Post-war disposal will be as under:

Original—retained at Ottawa for historical purposes.

Duplicate—to British Record Office for historical purposes.

Triplicate—to unit for custody with unit records.

5. The War Diary will be entered up daily on M.F.M. 11 and rendered monthly in triplicate (Mobn. Instr. for C.M. 1937. App. "C"). Each entry will be initialled by the officer detailed to keep the War Diary, which will be signed at the end of each month by the commander. (F.S.R. Vol. II, Sec. 35, para. 3 iii).

6. The following should be recorded daily as events occur:

- (i) Important orders, instructions, reports, messages or despatches received and issued, and decisions taken. *Original documents* should be attached as appendices to the Original copy of the War Diary.
- (ii) Daily map location, employment, movements and dispositions of unit headquarters and of batteries, companies, etc. March tables should be attached as appendices.
- (iii) Important movements of officers and matters relating to the duties of each branch of the staff. A complete set of the *routine orders and instructions, Part I Orders*, issued by the unit during the month should be attached as an appendix to the original copy.
- (iv) Detailed account of operations—to include:—
Exact hour, location and circumstances of important occurrences. Movements and names of neighbouring units. Commanders of batteries, companies, etc., names of Officers and number of O.R. (i) engaged and (ii) battle casualties. Dispositions, activities and identity of enemy forces. Prisoners and trophies captured. Ammunition expended. Factors affecting operations, topographical and climatic. *Maps and sketches* showing dispositions of batteries, companies etc., at important phases. The record of *communications, both written and verbal*, received or despatched during active operations as an appendix. A complete set of the *operation orders and instructions* issued during the month. Notes on conferences and *reports* rendered to higher formations, or received from lower formations, as appendices to the original copy.

(v) Nature and description of trenches, field works or accommodation occupied or constructed. Meteorological notes.

(vi) Changes in establishment or strength. Names and ranks of officers and number of O.R. Attachment of units and individuals. Reinforcements. *Copy of Part II Orders and Weekly Field Returns of Officers and O.R.* should be attached as appendices to the original copy. Changes in organization, stores, transport, etc.

7. It is essential that all copies of both text and appendices are legible. Appendices will be numbered and referenced to the text in the last column of the form. Current issues of any regimental publication should be attached.

8. It will be found convenient at the end of each month, when the War Diary is being completed and the correspondence in unit files for the month is being reviewed and distributed (F.S.R. Vol. I, sec. 171, para. 3) if the material considered to be of historical value in the light of the above is attached as appendices to the original copy of the War Diary.

9. A good war diary makes possible the accurate and detailed reconstruction of circumstances, conditions and action.

NOTE: If monthly diary is more than one inch thick, use a second folder. If appendices are bulky, tie folder up with tape or string to make a firm package.

PRESERVE IMPORTANT ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR POSTERITY: INSERT THEM AS APPENDICES IN ORIGINAL COPY OF WAR DIARY

THE EXTRACTION AND RETENTION OF APPENDICES, MAPS, ETC., FROM A WAR DIARY IS AN OFFENCE UNDER THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT

UNIT OFFICE FILING SYSTEM AND RECORDS

"Every office will arrange for the filing and custody of its own correspondence." (F.S.R. Vol. I. Sec. 171.3.)

1. *Titles and Numbering of Files.*

A simple filing system adaptable for use in any military office at home or in the field is illustrated by the "List of File Titles" overleaf.

All documents handled by a unit fall into one or other of the nine categories enumerated, 1 to 9. The titles of the nine main divisions are based on British army operations, organization, administration and the regulations governing. Each title may be broken down into ten component parts or sub-titles, by adding a dash and subsidiary numbers 0 to 9. In turn each of these may be further broken down by adding a second dash and a third digit, and if necessary a third dash and a fourth digit. Thus 4-7-3 might be "Cooking Course at Kingston." According to circumstances, a fighting unit would expand the 1-3 prefix to accommodate all arms and services with which it may be concerned.

2. *Date reference.*

In giving communications a reference number, it is convenient to use the date system of four figures indicating day and month, e.g. 0102 for 1st February; 3010 for 30th October.

3. *Combined Numeration.*

If the systems outlined in paras 1 and 2 are combined, by placing the four date figures under the subject file numbers, a simple and informative method of reference results, thus

$$\begin{array}{r} 2-6-1 \\ \hline 0804 \end{array}$$

might be immediately identified as a communication dealing with replacement of gas masks, dated 8th April.

NOTE.—This method is not applicable to signal messages, A.F.C. 2128, which bear serial numbers 1 to 9999. The use of dashes eliminates confusion between serial numbers and file numbers.

4. *Documents for Preservation.*

The monthly review of correspondence (F.S.R. Vol. I, sec. 171.3) is facilitated and future confusion avoided by jacketing the material in "Category ii" (i.e., "no longer required", etc.) to conform with the system.

5. *Correspondence in the Field.*

The functioning of the office of a formation or unit during active operations may be simplified by keeping a log or register of all orders and messages, written or verbal, received or sent during the action. This may conveniently be done by extending the use of the "Field Register of Communications Received or Despatched", (Army Form 2040, F.S.R. Vol. I. sec. 171) to include verbal as well as written orders and messages in chronological order as received or sent.

Time of sending and of receipt are of importance second only to time of event, and should be entered both on the office copy of every field message or other document, and in the log or register. A carbon copy for contemporary reference of the commander or others concerned is desirable.

A brief précis of written orders, reports and messages, with the sender's number, is sufficient, for they will be kept on file. But particular care is necessary in making entries of times of moves and of verbal orders, reports or conversations, by telephone or otherwise, which in the stress of action, may not otherwise be recorded on paper. In battle, operations messages dealt with by one officer may number over twenty-five per hour for several hours on end.

The record should be kept convenient to the telephone. Entries may be made by a clerk, or by the officer on duty at the telephone.

Such a record is invaluable to the commander in making appreciations of the situation during the action, and in compiling his report on the action afterwards. It is contemporary evidence of the highest quality, and therefore is of the highest historical value, and should be attached as an appendix to the original copy of the War Diary, together with the original documents sent and received.

(Appendix to Routine Order No. 147 C.A.S.F.
22 Nov. 39).

PRESERVE IMPORTANT ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR POSTERITY

LIST OF FILE TITLES

1. *Operations (G.S.) (or Technical Functioning).*

- 1-0. General.
- 1-1. Orders.
- 1-2. Instructions.
- 1-3. Co-operation and Liaison.
- 1-4. Intercommunication, sigs, etc.
- 1-5. Working Parties.
- 1-6. Scheme of Work.
- 1-7. }
- 1-8. } Available for allotment.
- 1-9. }

2. *Protection. (G.S.)*

- 2-0. General.
- 2-1. Guards and Patrols.
- 2-2. Alarm Posts.
- 2-3. Field defences.
- 2-4. Against air attacks.
- 2-5. Against A.F.V.
- 2-6. Gas.
- 2-7. Defence Schemes.
- 2-8. }
- 2-9. } Available for allotment.

3. *Intelligence.*

- 3-0. General.
- 3-1. Secrecy. Codes.
- 3-2. Censorship.
- 3-3. Enemy forces, Prisoners of war.
- 3-4. Reports and sketches.
- 3-5. Maps.
- 3-6. War diary.
- 3-7. Weather.
- 3-8. }
- 3-9. } Available for allotment.

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4. *Training. (G.S.) (or Technical).*

- 4-0. General.
- 4-1. Drill.
- 4-2. P.T.
- 4-3. Technical: Musketry, Gun Drill, etc.
- 4-4. Route Marches.
- 4-5. Tactical Schemes.
- 4-6. Courses and Schools.
- 4-7. Lessons learned and Pamphlets.
- 4-8. }
- 4-9. } Available for allotment.

5. *Organization and Administration (A.G.).*

- 5-0. General.
- 5-1. Establishments.
- 5-2. Medical and Sanitation. Dental.
- 5-3. Inspections. Ceremonial, Visitors.
- 5-4. Discipline. Police.
- 5-5. Office.
- 5-6. Routine Orders.
- 5-7. }
- 5-8. } Available for allotment.
- 5-9. }

6. *Personnel (A.G.).*

- 6-0. General.
- 6-1. Officers.
- 6-2. Strengths, Casualties, Reinforcements.
- 6-3. Part II Orders.
- 6-4. Chaplains and Welfare.
- 6-5. Pay. Financial.
- 6-6. Burials. Effects.
- 6-7. Honours and Rewards.
- 6-8. Demobilization and discharge.
- 6-9. Available for allotment.

7. *Movements and Quarters. (Q.M.G.)*

- 7-0. General.
- 7-1. Moves by road, rail, water, air.
- 7-2. Employment of transport.
- 7-3. Reliefs.
- 7-4. Barracks, Billets, Camps.
- 7-5. Baths and Laundry.
- 7-6. Boundaries and areas.
- 7-7. Traffic.
- 7-8. }
- 7-9. } Available for allotment.

8. *Supplies and Maintenance. (Q.M.G.)*

- 8-0. General.
- 8-1. Rations, forage, water, disinfectants.
- 8-2. Petrol and lubricants.
- 8-3. Fuel and Light.
- 8-4. Engineer Stores.
- 8-5. Postal.
- 8-6. Remounts and Veterinary.
- 8-7. Canteens, Comforts, and small consignments.
- 8-8. Printing and Stationery.
- 8-9. Available for allotment.

9. *Stores. (M.G.O.)*

- 9-0. General.
- 9-1. Arms and armament.
- 9-2. Ammunition.
- 9-3. Clothing and Necessaries.
- 9-4. Personal Equipment.
- 9-5. Unit equipment.
- 9-6. Vehicles.
- 9-7. Salvage.
- 9-8. }
- 9-9. } Available for allotment.

WAR DIARY JACKET

THE EXTRACTION AND RETENTION OF APPENDICES, MAPS, ETC., FROM A
WAR DIARY IS AN OFFENCE UNDER THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT.

APPENDICES TO WAR DIARY

APRIL 445

	ORIGIANL	DUPLICATE	TRIPLICATE
Part I Orders	X	X	X
1. Part II Orders	-	-	X
2. Field Returns (Offrs)	X	-	X
3. Field Returns (ORs)	X	-	X
4. Int Summaries	X	-	-

Original orders part.

Instructions regarding preparation of War Diaries (which will be kept from first day of mobilization, creation or embodiment), are contained in F.S. Regs. Vol. 1.

WAR DIARY

M.F.M. 11
40/P & S/37 (9/42)

OR

~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~

Original, duplicate and triplicate to be forwarded to O. i/c 2nd Echelon for disposal.

Title pages will be prepared.

(Erase heading not required)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks, references to Appendices and initials
Nijmegen	1 Apr		<u>THE PRINCESS LOUISE FUSILIERS</u> page 1 Dull with rain. No change in positions. Very quiet. Relief of 49(Br) Div has just taken place.	ge
Nijmegen	2 Apr		Brigade advances up to the Lower Rhine on sector West of Arnhem. 2 Pl MMG with Irish.	ge
Nijmegen	3 Apr		Dull. Very quiet. No change in positions.	ge
Nijmegen	4 Apr		Fine. Our own and enemy shelling has increased. No change in positions.	ge
Nijmegen	5 Apr		Dull and rain. Preparations for Rhine crossing steeped up. 49 Div going to cross. Smoke screen being laid.	ge
Nijmegen	6 Apr		Fair. Shelling and patrolling increasing. Still waiting to attempt crossing.	ge
Nijmegen	7 Apr		Fair. Machine guns fired on enemy positions across Rhine(Direct fire). No change in positions.	ge
<u>Nijmegen</u>	8 Apr		Fair. Machine guns did more shooting. No change in positions.	ge
Nijmegen	9 Apr		Dull with rain. Very quiet. Nothing to report.	ge
Nijmegen	10 Apr		Recce party, Major P B Kennedy, Lieut. DM Smith, Sgts., Corkum, Ingram, Lovett went to Duiven area(8074), reced area for MMG and Mortar positions. Mortars and MMGs RV at Gp HQ.	ge
NIJMegan	11 Apr		Main HQ and 4 Pls moved from Elst area to Duiven area. Major P B Kennedy contacts CO of Kensingtons and pls ordered to their respective positions.	ge
Nijmegen	12 Apr		All pls in action by 1800 hrs. Fire plan distributed. H hour was 2140 hrs.	ge
Duiven	13 Apr		49 Div show was very successful. CO. of Kensingtons gave credit to mortar pl for good smoke shoot, especially the shoot on area of Velst. Lieut. H Bookbinder came	ge

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WAR DIARY

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks, references to Appendices and initials
			Page 2	
Duiven	13 Apr		with information that we were to rejoin 11 Bde. Pls concentrated in Duiven area. HQ and Mortar concentrated in 11 Bde area.	Ge
Duiven	14 Apr		Major P B Kennedy received instructions from Bde. 1 Pl MMG and Mortar P ₁ under command C.N.H. and 2 Pl MMG under command the Perth Regt. Major P B Kennedy attended Briagiers "O" Group at 1500 hrs.	Ge
Duiven	15 Apr		HQ and Mortar P ₁ moved to concentration area at Arnhem, arriving at 1200 hrs. Remained there overnight, while infantry bns moved out following armoured thrust to Otterloo and Barnevold.	Ge
Arnhem	16 Apr		Left Arnhem at 0900 hrs arrived otterloo area at 1330 hrs. Before we left we were to become part of Shortreath Force in the Otterloo area to guard L of C against counter attacks, from N.E.	Ge
Otterloo	17 Apr		Shortreath Force stood down. Major P B Kennedy and Capt Blair reced conc area at 570946. Group conc there less 2 & 3 pls MMG .	Ge
Otterloo	18 Apr		Major P B Kennedy attended "O" Group. Moved to concentration area at Emerlo. Mopping up not completed in area. Fus J C Clark of Regt'1 Police captured two Armd G ^r mans outside HQ.	Ge
Emerlo	19 Apr		Bright and warm. "A" Echelon moved up to Emerlo. Pls getting cleaned up and straightened away. Officers entertained nurses from the local hospital. (No English spoken).	Ge
Emerlo	20 Apr		B ight and warm. Capt R S VB lair moved off on a recce in the Leeiwarden area. Unit expected to move tomorrow.	Ge
Emerlo	21 Apr		Cold with rain. Unit moved off at 0700 hrs and arrived Franeker at 1800 hrs. Move was a shambles. 2 P ₁ MMH Moved to a position at Sixbierum, mortar P ₁ remained with HQ.	Ge

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WAR DIARY

M.F.M. 11
40/P & S/37 (9/42)

OR

~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~

Original, duplicate and triplicate to be forwarded to O. i/c 2nd Echelon for disposal.

Title pages will be prepared.

(Erase heading not required)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks, references to Appendices and initials
Page 3				
Franeker	22 Apr		Bright and warm. 1 P ₁ MMG took up position in the Zurich xx area. Mortar Pl patrolled inland area at first ¹ and last light.	Ge
Franeker	23 Apr		V _e ry quiet. Mortar pl had noting to report on their patrols. Received information from Bde that Mortar Pl was to join Irish.	Ge
Franeker	24 Apr		Mortar Pl moved off at 0900 hrs. 4th Anti-Tank took over patrols.	Ge
Franeker	25 Apr		Bright and warm. Major Kennedy and Pl Comds left on recce at 0800 hrs. Unit left at 100 hrs and arrived in Thesing at 1300 hrs. 1 and 2 Pls MMG noved off and took up positions with the Perth and Irish.	Ge
Thesing	26 Apr		Bright and warm. V _e ry quiet. P ₁ s have nothing to report. 3 Pl MMG remains with Group HQ.	Ge
T _h esing	27 Apr		Dull with showers. Very quiet. Inf Bns moving forward slowly. Pls report enemy quite active with his artilley.	Ge
T _h esing	28 Apr		Dull with showers. Mortar pl at 486214. Enemy active with artilley .	Ge
Thesing	29 Apr		Dull with showers. Mortar Pls moved to 485243. Nothing to report.	Ge
Thesing	30 Apr		Dull with showers. V _e ry quiet.	Ge

P.B. Kennedy
(P.B. Kennedy) Major
O.C.
The Princess Louise Fusiliers

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

11th Reconnaissance Coy (Unit) For Week Ending 7 Oct 45

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1 Ranks.	2 W.E. less 1st Rfts.	3 Strength counting against W.E. less 1st Rfts.	4 Surplus to W.E. less 1st Rfts.	5 Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on W.E. less 1st Rfts.)	
				No.	Any Specific Qualifications
*					
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*					
Lieut-Colonels					
Majors	1	1			
Captains	3	3			
Lieutenants	5	5			
2nd Lieutenants					
Quartermasters					
District Officers					
TOTALS	9	9			

*Insert details of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

(i) Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name	Regt. or Corps.	Date.	Unit from which joined.

(ii) Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name	Regt. or Corps.	Date.	Cause or Unit to which proceeded.

(UNIT) week-ending A.F.W. 3008 (Revised)

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Regt. or Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

Unit 11th Reconnaissance Coy (P.T.) For Week Ending

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS.

(i) OFFICERS ON STRENGTH COUNTING AGAINST W.E. LESS 1st RFTS. (Total to agree with column 3 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Personal Number.	Substantive Rank.	Higher Acting or Temporary Rank if held.	Name and Initials.	Parent Corps or Regiment.	Date taken on Strength.	Whether present with Unit.	Appointment held.	Date Assumed present Appointment.	Remarks including how employed if absent from Unit.	
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(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED IN EXCESS OF W.E. LESS 1st RFTS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher Acting or Temporary Rank if held.	Name and Initials.	Regt. or Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.

Last A.F.W. 3010A rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon was Serial No. _____
 Last A.F.W. 3010B rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon was Serial No. _____
 Last A.F.W. 3010C rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon was Serial No. _____
 Last Draft received and included in Part A, Col. 3, was Serial No. _____

G.F. Murphy
 (Signature of Commander.)

6 Oct 45
 (Date of Despatch.)

5 C.O.
 (Bde., Div., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

(Unit) For Week Ending 14/10/45

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4	5	
Ranks.	W.E. less 1st Rfts.	Strength counting against W.E. less 1st Rfts.	Surplus to W.E. less 1st Rfts.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on W.E. less 1st Rfts.)	
				No.	Any Specific Qualifications
*					
*					
*					
*					
Lieut-Colonels					
Majors					
Captains					
Lieutenants					
2nd Lieutenants					
Quartermasters					
District Officers					
TOTALS					

*Insert details of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

(i) Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name	Regt. or Corps.	Date.	Unit from which joined.

(ii) Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name	Regt. or Corps.	Date.	Cause or Unit to which proceeded.

(UNIT) week-ending A.F.W. 3008 (Revised)

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Regt. or Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

Unit 11th Hussars

For Week Ending 14/10/45

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS.

(i) OFFICERS ON STRENGTH COUNTING AGAINST W.E. LESS 1st RFTS. (Total to agree with column 3 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Personal Number.	Substantive Rank.	Higher Acting or Temporary Rank if held.	Name and Initials.	Parent Corps or Regiment.	Date taken on Strength.	Whether present with Unit.	Appointment held.	Date Assumed present Appointment	Remarks including how employed if absent from Unit.	
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(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED IN EXCESS OF W.E. LESS 1st RFTS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher Acting or Temporary Rank if held.	Name and Initials.	Regt. or Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.

Last A.F.W. 3010A rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon was Serial No. _____
 Last A.F.W. 3010B rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon was Serial No. _____
 Last A.F.W. 3010C rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon was Serial No. _____
 Last Draft received and included in Part A, Col. 3, was Serial No. _____

(Signature of Commander.)

(Date of Despatch.)

(Bde., Div., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

TO BE MADE UP TO MIDDAY ON SATURDAY IN EACH WEEK.

Serial No. (Repeat at Part D.)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

11 Cdn. Indep. Mt. Coy (P.S.F.) (Unit.) For Week Ending 21 Apr. 45

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1 Ranks.	2 W.E. less 1st Rfts.	3 Strength counting against W.E. less 1st Rfts.	4 Surplus to W.E. less 1st Rfts.	5 Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on W.E. less 1st Rfts.)	
				No.	Any Specific Qualifications
Lieut-Colonels					
Majors	1	1			
Captains	3	3			
Lieutenants	5	5			
2nd Lieutenants					
Quartermasters					
District Officers					
TOTALS	9	9			

*Insert details of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

(i) Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name	Regt. or Corps.	Date.	Unit from which joined.

(ii) Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name	Regt. or Corps.	Date.	Cause or Unit to which proceeded.

(UNIT) week-ending..... A.F.W. 3008 (Revised)

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Regt. or Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

Serial No.

11 Cdn. Indep. Mt. Coy (P.S.F.)

For Week Ending 21 Apr. 45

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS.

(i) OFFICERS ON STRENGTH COUNTING AGAINST W.E. LESS 1st RFTS. (Total to agree with column 3 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Personal Number.	Substantive Rank.	Higher Acting or Temporary Rank if held.	Name and Initials.	Parent Corps or Regiment.	Date taken on Strength.	Whether present with Unit.	Appointment held.	Date Assumed present Appointment	Remarks including how employed if absent from Unit.	
1			P.B. Kennedy	P.S.F.	16 Mar 45	Y	2IC	14 Feb 44		
2			P.A. Blair	"	16 Mar 45	Y	2IC	16 Mar 45		
3			P.A. Baird	"	26 Mar 45	Y	2IC	16 Mar 45		
4			P. James	"	6 Apr 45	Y	2IC	16 Mar 45		
5			P. G. Allan	"	12 Mar 44	Y	2IC	16 Mar 45		
6			P. Robertson	"	24 Mar 44	Y	2IC	16 Mar 45		
7			P. M. Schindler	"	27 Mar 44	Y	2IC	16 Mar 45		
8			P. G. ...	"	6 Apr 45	Y	2IC	16 Mar 45		
9			P. D. ...	"	7 Apr 45	Y	2IC	16 Mar 45		
10										
11										
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(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED IN EXCESS OF W.E. LESS 1st RFTS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher Acting or Temporary Rank if held.	Name and Initials.	Regt. or Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
Capt		H. P. Murphy	CIC	14 Feb 45	By Ind

Last A.F.W. 3010A rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon was Serial No. _____
 Last A.F.W. 3010B rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon was Serial No. _____
 Last A.F.W. 3010C rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon was Serial No. _____
 Last Draft received and included in Part A, Col. 3, was Serial No. _____

(Signature of Commander.)

20 Apr 45 (Date of Despatch.)

(Bde., Div., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

11 Cde July 1945 (Unit.) For Week Ending 28 Apr 45

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1 Ranks.	2 W.E. less 1st Rfts.	3 Strength counting against W.E. less 1st Rfts.	4 Surplus to W.E. less 1st Rfts.	5 Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on W.E. less 1st Rfts.)	
				No.	Any Specific Qualifications
*					
*					
*					
*					
Lieut-Colonels					
Majors	1	3			
Captains	3	3			
Lieutenants	5	5			
2nd Lieutenants					
Quartermasters					
District Officers					
TOTALS	9	9			

*Insert details of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

(i) Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name	Regt. or Corps.	Date.	Unit from which joined.

(ii) Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name	Regt. or Corps.	Date.	Cause or Unit to which proceeded.

(UNIT) week-ending A.F.W. 3008 (Revised)

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Regt. or Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

Unit 11 Cde July 1945 (Unit.) For Week Ending 28 Apr 45
 PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS.

(i) OFFICERS ON STRENGTH COUNTING AGAINST W.E. LESS 1st RFTS. (Total to agree with column 3 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Personal Number.	Substantive Rank.	Higher Acting or Temporary Rank if held.	Name and Initials.	Parent Corps or Regiment.	Date taken on Strength.	Whether present with Unit.	Appointment held.	Date Assumed present Appointment.	Remarks including how employed if absent from Unit.	
1			P. B. Kennedy		18 May 42			14 Feb 44		
2			R. J. Blain		16 May 42			16 Mar 45		
3										
4										
5										
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7										
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(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED IN EXCESS OF W.E. LESS 1st RFTS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher Acting or Temporary Rank if held.	Name and Initials.	Regt. or Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.

Last A.F.W. 3010A rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon was Serial No. _____
 Last A.F.W. 3010B rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon was Serial No. _____
 Last A.F.W. 3010C rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon was Serial No. _____
 Last Draft received and included in Part A, Col. 3, was Serial No. _____

27 Apr 45
 (Date of Despatch.)

(Signature of Commander.)
 5 C A D
 (Bde., Div., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

Serial No. (Repeat at Part D)

Unit For week ending 11 Apr 45

To be made up to mid-day on Saturday in each week by all units of Foot Guards, Infantry of the Line, Reconnaissance Corps, R.A.V.C., A.E.C., R.A.P.C., C.M.P., Pioneer Corps, Intelligence Corps, A.C.C. and Non-Combatant Corps, and 1 copy rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon, and 1 copy to Reinforcement Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon (until instructed by G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon to discontinue rendering).

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

Table with 5 columns: Rank or Appointment, W.E. less 1st Rfts., Strength counting against W.E. less 1st Rfts., Surplus to W.E. less 1st Rfts., Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on W.E., less 1st Rfts.). Rows include W.Os. Class I, W.Os. Class II, Company Quartermaster-Serjeants OR Colour-Serjeants, Staff Serjeants, Serjeants, Corporals, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, etc., Buglers, Trumpeters, etc., and TOTALS.

* These Totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2.

Part B. Other ranks attached in excess of W.E. less 1st Rfts.

Table with 4 columns: Rank or Appointment, Unit and Corps to which they belong, Rank or Appointment, Unit and Corps to which they belong.

Unit Week ending 19 A.F.W.3009E. (Ft. Gds., Inf., etc.)

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Table with 5 columns: Army No., Rank, Name and Initials, Regiment or Corps, Remarks, (e.g. present whereabouts if known).

For week ending 14 Apr 45 Serial No.

Part D. Detail of trades and duties of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A.

Large table with columns for SURPLUS TO ESTABLISHMENT and REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED, categorized by trade (e.g., Blacksmiths, Boot Repairers, Bricklayers, etc.). Includes a 'TOTAL' row at the bottom.

Date of Despatch 13 Apr 45

Signature of Commander.

Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

Serial No. (Repeat at Part D)

11 Cdn Indep Coy (P27) Unit For week ending 21 Apr 45

To be made up to mid-day on Saturday in each week by all units of Foot Guards, Infantry of the Line, Reconnaissance Corps, R.A.V.C., A.E.C., R.A.P.C., C.M.P., Pioneer Corps, Intelligence Corps, A.C.C. and Non-Combatant Corps, and 1 copy rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon, and 1 copy to Reinforcement Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon (until instructed by G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon to discontinue rendering).

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

Table with 5 columns: Rank or Appointment, W.E. less 1st Rfts., Strength counting against W.E. less 1st Rfts., Surplus to W.E. less 1st Rfts., Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on W.E., less 1st Rfts.). Rows include W.Os. Class I, W.Os. Class II, Company Quartermaster-Serjeants OR Colour-Serjeants, Staff Serjeants, Serjeants, Corporals, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, etc., Buglers, Trumpeters, etc., and a TOTALS row.

* These Totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2.

Part B. Other ranks attached in excess of W.E. less 1st Rfts.

Table with 4 columns: Rank or Appointment, Unit and Corps to which they belong, Rank or Appointment, Unit and Corps to which they belong.

Unit Week ending 19 A.F.W.3009E. (Ft. Gds., Inf., etc.)

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Table with 5 columns: Army No., Rank, Name and Initials, Regiment or Corps, Remarks (e.g. present whereabouts if known). Entries include Shaw JV and Brown, A.H.

For week ending 21 Apr 45 Serial No.

Part D. Detail of trades and duties of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A.

Large table with columns for SURPLUS TO ESTABLISHMENT and REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED, categorized by trade (e.g., Blacksmiths, Boot Repairers, Bricklayers, etc.) and W.Os. Class I/II. Includes a TOTALS row at the bottom.

Date of Despatch 20 Apr 45

Signature of Commander. S.C.A.D. Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

Serial No. (Repeat at Part D)

11 Cdn Indep Mt Coy (PTZ) Unit

For week ending 28 Apr 45

To be made up to mid-day on Saturday in each week by all units of Foot Guards, Infantry of the Line, Reconnaissance Corps, R.A.V.C., A.E.C., R.A.P.C., C.M.P., Pioneer Corps, Intelligence Corps, A.C.C. and Non-Combatant Corps, and 1 copy rendered to G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon, and 1 copy to Reinforcement Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon (until instructed by G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon to discontinue rendering).

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

Table with 5 columns: Rank or Appointment, W.E. less 1st Rfts., Strength counting against W.E. less 1st Rfts., Surplus to W.E. less 1st Rfts., Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on W.E. less 1st Rfts.). Rows include W.Os. Class I, W.Os. Class II, Company Quartermaster-Serjeants OR Colour-Serjeants, Staff Serjeants, Serjeants, Corporals, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, etc., Buglers, Trumpeters, etc., and TOTALS.

* These Totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2.

Part B. Other ranks attached in excess of W.E. less 1st Rfts.

Table with 4 columns: Rank or Appointment, Unit and Corps to which they belong, Rank or Appointment, Unit and Corps to which they belong.

Unit Week ending 19 A.F.W.3009E. (Ft. Gds., Inf., etc.)

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Table with 5 columns: Army No., Rank, Name and Initials, Regiment or Corps, Remarks (e.g. present whereabouts if known).

11 Cdn Indep Mt Coy (PTZ) Unit

For week ending 28 Apr 45

Serial No.

Part D. Detail of trades and duties of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A.

Large table with columns for SURPLUS TO ESTABLISHMENT and REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED. Rows list various trades like Blacksmiths, Boot Repairers, Bricklayers, etc., and include handwritten counts and a TOTALS row at the bottom.

Date of Despatch 27 Apr 45

Signature of Commander

5 C.A.D. Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

5 CDN ARMD DIV

4 Apr 45

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 117
 (based on information up to 0800 hrs)

appx (4)

P A R T O N E1 ENEMY SITUATIONGeneral:

Despite numerous determined efforts of the enemy along the front, Allied columns made appreciable gains. GOTHA (IO6), well beyond EISENACH, was reached and MEINENGEN (H92) was threatened on both sides. Further NORTH fighting continued in KASSEL and HAMM. Repeated attempts by the German to break out from the RUHR pocket were repulsed. Nearer the IJSEL River, the TWENTHE Canal, which the German may have hoped to use as a delay line, was crossed and the village of HARISEN (OO99) reached. Just to the SW of this enemy resistance has been stubborn in the area of ZUTPHEN, where he fears a sudden crossing of the IJSEL and a breakthrough to the ZUIDER ZEE, and consequently a severing of his main escape route from HOLLAND. Evidence of his concern in this area is the appearance of elements of 361 Volksgrenadier Div, which had constituted the sole known reserve in the ARNHEM sector.

Although the enemy pattern across the front is clarifying and the situation seems a degree less chaotic, there still appears to be little central control. The manner in which the German resists or retreats on various parts of the front would suggest that he is fighting without knowledge of an ultimate plan. However, he no doubt will carry on doggedly with the hope that some miracle will be performed to rescue the fast disappearing WEHRMACHT from total destruction.

Own Front:

The operation to clear up to the NEDER RIJN was completed yesterday against little opposition. Except on the SE and NE corners of the 'Island', where 3 to 4 coys of 952 VGR and a coy of 46 MG Fortress Bn were protecting approaches to the WAAL-NEDER RIJN junction and ARNHEM respectively, little other than outposts were encountered. Our right neighbour disposed of these two bns, a good percentage, 3 offrs and 181 ORs, going to the PW cage. The NEDER RIJN was crossed at 8267 and 7872 and WESTERVOORT was reached with a minimum of incident.

PW taken by the Ir R C from 7 Coy and by the Perth Regt from 5 Coy 84 SS GR show us that the SS Nederland Div has recently extended its bdy to the EAST (OOSTERBEEK 6976), and that there is no knowledge of paratps in the area WAGENINGEN - OOSTERBEEK as had previously been reported by civs and PW.

A small body of enemy, 30 strong, crossed the river in the late afternoon and attacked, without success, a position of ours at HETEREN (6375). They retired to the shelter of a factory at 632765 where they apparently have decided to remain.

The stretching of SS Nederland Div's front and the reported departure of the reserve, 361 VG Div, indicates that the Boche is very thin on the ground from at least ARNHEM WEST. The conclusion to be drawn is that he is depending largely on the NEDER RIJN as a discouraging obstacle and that he must sacrifice security in this area in order to counter the more apparent threats in the ZUTPHEN sector where a crossing of the IJSEL would be most embarrassing to the ARNHEM defenders. Pertaining to an ultimate withdrawal, it is interesting to note that the rearguard in the ARNHEM-MAAS sector will be a Fortress Bn and a Dutch Division.

SDS/HAND

Time of Signature *040930* B hrs

Distribution: As per I Sum Distribution List.

W C Dick
 (W C Dick) Lt-Col
 GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

5 Apr 45

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 118
(based on information up to 0800 hrs 5 Apr 45)

P A R T O N E

1 ENEMY SITUATION

General:

The enemy on the ARNHEM ZUTPHEN sector have been forced back to the IJSSEL River. Between WESTERVOORT and DOESBURG we have reached the river and from the latter NORTH to ZUTPHEN some German units still remain on the EAST bank. Further EAST our columns continue to progress, one running NE from ALDENZAAL to LINGEN and two others have by-passed OSNABRUCK on either flank of the town, the Southerly one of these already reaching LUBBECKE.

The RUHR divisions continue desperately in their attempts to break free while further identifications from them give proof of the suspected enormity of this bag. Yesterday on the SE sector of the front American and French columns pressed the enemy closer into WURTEMBERG and BAVARIA.

German security in the mountain fortresses of Western AUSTRIA is being threatened by the Russian advances from the EAST and SOUTH closing in on VIENNA.

Army Gp SW no doubt received a jolt on 3 Apr when the defenders of the COMACCHIO spit on the Adriatic coast were dislodged by Eighth Army troops in a water-borne attack.

Own Front:

Patrolling has revealed that the German still has outposts on the SOUTH bank of the NEDER RIJN. Last night a Perth Regt patrol to the rly br at 707763 brought back 7 PW from a section of 4 Coy 46 MG Fortress Bn. The PW who state that their pl, a cycle pl, is the only element of the coy on the SOUTH bank where they have been for a week, also report the NEDER RIJN as being thinly held. The remainder of the coy on the NORTH bank consists of a mortar pl of 6 x 8.1cm mortars, an engineer pl and a coy HQ.

A civilian report suggests that the ARNHEM garrison is being increased, 250 tps having arrived on the night 3/4 Apr. The total complement is assessed to be between 750 and 1000 tps. 46 MG Fortress Bn is known to be in the area: this would have an approx total of 250. The remainder of the defenders might be made up from 952 VGR, which unlike the other inf units of 361 WG Div has not yet been identified in the DOESBURG - ZUTPHEN sector. On the Eastern edge of the town 1071 SICR Regt may contribute to the defense as they were last contacted withdrawing towards the IJSSEL in the WESTERVOORT area.

W.C. Dick
for (W.C. Dick) Lt-Col
GS 5 Cdn Arm'd Div

SDS/HAND

Time of Signature. 051000. B hrs

Distribution: As per I Sum Distribution List.

8 Apr 45

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 121

(based on information up to 0800 hrs 8 Apr 45)


P A R T O N EENEMY SITUATION

With little news of our immediate front, our attention nevertheless is drawn particularly to the HOLLAND situation. After a period of conflicting reports regarding Hun activity in the country, civilian information of the past few days has been consistent in its insistence that 25 Army intends to remain and fight in HOLLAND. Evacuation may have been in progress, but to successfully withdraw from a country with a sea in the middle of it and consequently limited road and rail routes would have required some weeks. The proximity of our forces to the ports of BREMEN and EMDEN now makes it clear that the Hun here has no alternative.

A summary of these many statements shows the following: 1) There are 10 - 12,000 tps in the ARNHEM - DEVENTER - APELDOORN sector; 2) The Northern VELUWE (SW of ZWOLLE) is occupied by 1500 tps; 3) 6000 paratps, the elements of two divs, are in the province of FRIESLAND; 4) At least 4000 civs are working on defences along the EEM River; 5) Preparations for flooding are being carried out at AMSTERDAM, THE HAGUE and UTRECHT; 6) Much flak has moved into the AMSTERDAM area.

The obvious conclusion is an enemy intention to fight from EAST to WEST, first along the IJSSEL River, secondly on the EEM line and finally on the islands (after inundation) of the Western cities: the flanks being protected on the SOUTH by the WAAL and NEDER RHINE and on the NORTH by guarding the huge dam at the top of the IJSSELMEER by a determined stand of paratps in the FRIESLAND.

Our own front has evolved little in the past 24 hrs other than patrol reports of no contact at the previously occupied factories at 583747, 622762 and 633764. The reason for this may well be that 34 SS Div (Nederland) feels that an attack on our part is imminent and that little is to be gained by retaining outposts whose danger of being eliminated most likely outweighs the possibility of their gaining any warning of our intentions much prior to the OPs and listening posts in the MLR.


(W C Dick) Lt Col
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

SDS/HAND

Time of Signature 081130 B hrs

DISTRIBUTION: As per I Sum Distribution List.

Att: Appendices 'A' and 'B'.

HOWL THE WEREWOLVES!

The call of a German Freedom Movement has come at last. Its first message delivered over Sender Werewolf on the 1 Apr 45 lists its aims and methods so thoroughly as to require NO further elaboration.

"As from tonight we shall broadcast every night at 1900 hrs important news items about GERMANY's struggle for freedom on 1339 m or 224 kc/s. The Werewolf, the Movement of the National Socialist fighters for Freedom in the Western and Eastern territories occupied by the enemy introduces itself with the following proclamation to the entire German nation:

"German men and women and above all German youth, the enemy has penetrated into our homeland and has violated the sacred soil of our Fatherland. By an unparalleled rule of terror he has been inflicting boundless disgrace and humiliation upon our German people who in a heroic struggle for almost six years have been resisting the onslaught of nearly the entire world, gallantly and without flinching. Innumerable are the cases of murder, rape and torture which German men, women and children have to suffer. Terrible is the misery which has beset our German people in the form of hunger, unemployment and infectious diseases following in the wake of the enemy hordes. The enemy thinks he is meeting a nation already so worn down and dulled by his barbarous air terror, by his Mongolian atrocities, as to be no longer capable of resistance to his cowardly and wanton rule.

"In this fateful hr of need of our country and people, countless men, women, boys and girls have rallied in the enemy-occupied territories of the German WEST and the German EAST to a movement of National-Socialist resistance under the name of Werewolf. They have made the inflexible resolution confirmed by a solemn oath never to yield to the enemy, to resist him at all times however difficult the circumstances and limited the means, to oppose him with pride and steadfastness, scornful of civilian comfort and of the possibility of death, and to avenge by death today, tomorrow or at any other time any misdeed which he commits against a member of our nation.

"The Werewolf is an org born of the spirit of National-Socialism. It does NOT heed the restrictions (Rusksichten) which are imposed upon combatants in our regular Forces. Any means is good enough to harm the enemy, the Werewolf has its own jurisdiction which decides over life and death of our enemies as well as of traitors to our nation, and which also has the necessary power to ensure the execution of its verdicts. Every Bolshevik, every Briton and every American on German soil is fair game (Freiwild) for our movement. Wherever we have an opportunity to extinguish their lives we shall seize it gladly without regard for our own lives. Any German, whatever his station and occupation, who offers his cooperation to the enemy will know our revenge.

"Our mandate springs from our nation's will to freedom and from the inalienable honour of the German nation to the guardianship of which we consider ourselves called. If the enemy believes that he has an easy task and can turn the German people, like the Roumanian, Bulgarian or Finnish peoples, into hordes of slaves to deport them into the Siberian steppes or British and French mines, let him realise that even where the German armed Forces, after hard and bitter fighting, have to abandon German territory, an opponent will arise with whom he had NOT reckoned; but that this opponent will become the more dangerous the less he needs to pay heed to obsolete ideas of so-called civilised warfare, which the enemy of our country employs only where it is to his advantage, while cynically discarding where it might cause him harm.

"Our cities in the WEST destroyed by cruel air terror and the starving women and children left on the RHINE have taught us to hate the enemy. The blood and tears of our slain men, of our raped women and murdered children in the occupied Eastern territories cry out for revenge. The men and women, boys and girls of the Werewolf will see to it that these cries of despair are NOT lost in the wind. Beware, Britons, Americans and Jews -- you who strut through our towns in the WEST as if they belonged to you! Beware, Bolsheviki and butchers of the GPU -- you who in the towns and villages of the EAST have set up your cruel rule of terror!

"In GERMANY's hr of destiny all those who esteem honour higher than life and who prefer an honourable death to the cowardly submission, gather around the flag of the National-Socialist Revolution. Men, women, boys and girls, in the enemy occupied territories in the EAST and in the WEST, are hereby called upon to place themselves at our disposal for our struggle and for our work.

"Recruiting offices will be announced by word of mouth or by secret leaflets. In addition, the transmitter Werewolf will address the adherents and fighting members of our freedom movement every evening from 1900 hrs onwards. The enemy will feel its effect. "Battle" is our prayer and "Revenge" our battle cry.

"Woe to the enemies of the country who want to torture and oppress the German people. But thrice woe to the traitors of our own people who put themselves at their disposal. The threat of the "Court of National Revenge" hangs over them.

"Werewolf men and women, Werewolf boys and girls, to work; be brave as lions and cunning as serpents. Work in silence and make darkness your ally. Attack the enemy wherever a suitable opportunity presents itself. Do NOT spare the life of him who tries to destroy the life of our people. Every foreign soldier who stands on our soil is an outlaw before your court of justice (Eurem Freigericht übergeben). Do NOT ask whether he has women and children at home because he is in the service of the enemy powers who want to exterminate the entire German people.

"If necessity demands it, disguise yourselves and await the hr until you can act. Listen to our transmissions every night. They are to give you courage and strength. Make use of the days and make even better use of the night.

"Be conscious that the Führer's eye is constantly upon you and that the most ardent wishes of the whole of your people accompany you. The dawn of freedom will once more rise over our people but only if we prove ourselves as Germans and take up arms even under enemy oppression and exact sacrifice upon sacrifice from the enemy.

"Those who show friendliness towards the enemy are our enemies. Those who resist the enemy belong to us and enjoy our protection. Although Werewolf cannot come before the public with great demonstration, it is yet mighty and strong and its arm is far-reaching. It will reach everyone who commits a crime against the National honour of our people. Werewolf, to work!

"Rise in the fight for the freedom and honour of our people. In the occupied territories, the old battle cry of our mov is now the slogan: "Soon HITLER flags will fly over all streets, servitude will only last a short time now!" Long live our National-Socialist Werewolf Mov. Long live our Führer, Adolf HITLER. Long live our people." DNI on the 2 Apr 45 had this further comment to make to this vivid statement: "When competent BERLIN quarters were asked today about the National-Socialist Freedom Mov Werewolf which has been formed in the German territory occupied by the enemy, it was stated that this org would act on its own authority. BERLIN official quarters and Party authorities had nothing to do with these def fms, which were acting by themselves. The "Werewolves" had risen of their own accord. As brave men and National-Socialist they could no longer witness the mil rabble of the Western Powers and the Bolshevik hordes who ignore every consideration for the civ population, and, in the WEST in particular,

the unrestrained bombing of residential quarters was crying out for action in self-def."

A P P X "B"

STR ESTIMATE OF ENEMY TPS IN THE RUHR POCKET (Ninth US Army)

General

A conservative estimate of 82,500 and a max estimate of about 100,000 is believed by First US Army to rep the number of enemy tps now trapped in the RUHR Pocket. Average overall str figure for the Inf Divs is calculated at 3,500 with 3,000 for the Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions.

Army Gp B, 5 Panther Army, 15 Army and elements of 1 Para Army have contributed a total of at least 13 Inf Divs, 4 Panzer Divs, a Panzer Grenadier Div and elements of another Panzer, plus Volks arty and aslt gun units and GHQ Tps to the pocket.

Out of the grand total at least 57,000 are combat tps (including all elements) and the rest, estimated at NOT less than 25,000, include Volkssturm and GAF.

Breakdown

The 13 Inf Divs include 180, 190, 2 Para, 183, 176, 338, 3 Para, 62, 353, 363, 59, 12 and 326.

The four Panzer Divs are 9, 11, 116 and 130 Lehr.

3 Pz Gren Div is the only one of that type in the pocket.

10 Apr 45

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 123
(based on information up to 1200 hrs 10 Apr 45)


P A R T O N E

ENEMY SITUATION

Enemy activity on the NEDER-RHINE front has shown a marked increase during the night. It may be that the Dutch SS are impatient to know of our intentions in this sector. However, since there have been lately many civilian reports of troop concs in the immediate rear areas, it may well be that the increase in activity is due to an increase in strength on the river front. The WAGENINGEN - OOSTER-BEEK stretch was weak on our arrival at the river, with only three coys of II/84 SS in the line, and it could well stand some thickening up. Track and veh movement, MG and mortar fire, reports on mines and A tk guns (64717878, 64867878, 62907863, 65137849), and the general aggressiveness of his patrolling definitely suggests that this 14-kilometre front is peopled by more than three low-strength coys.

More light has been thrown on the ARNHEM situation, the Southern anchor of the IJSSEL Line. The location of II/858 GR on the river EAST of the rly bridge (7776) was revealed on identification of PW. Civilian sources state that a Hungarian Bn is disposed along the rly between this bridge and the town. Adding to these two the belief that 46 MG Fortress Bn is still in ARNHEM and the possibility of a fourth bn also in that area, the strength of the ARNHEM garrison reaches a much more imposing figure than that known a week ago.

The impression gathered during the past few days from the trend of the battle and civilian reports on troop movements and concs and general preparations for defence is that 25 Army, virtually cut off from escape into GERMANY, is quite resigned to a battle in HOLLAND and has hastily organized a plan of defence that is daily presenting a more concrete picture than can be displayed elsewhere on the Western Front.


for (W C Dick) Lt-Col
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

SDS/HAND

Time of Signature...1600...B hrs

DISTRIBUTION: As per I Sum distribution list.

ATT: Appendices 'A' and 'B'.

THE LAST WORD IN SECRET WEAPONS (Ninth U S Army)

The PW who gave the following info has been turned over to the proper authorities for detailed interrogation on the "Endwaffe" and Radar eqpt. The following is a gen description of what the Germans term the "Endwaffe" or Final Weapons.

As of 21 Dec 44, the Research and Development Sec for Hy Weapons of the OKL was located in HENSCHEL Works I, BERLIN-SCHOENFELD. It was here that the Final Weapon was developed under the supervision of the Viennese Professor WAGNER.

According to PW, a highly knowledgeable engr who helped develop the weapon, the "Endwaffe" is a 22 ton radio-controlled, rocket-propelled weapon with a maximum range of 1500 km. The weapon carries 15 tons of explosives and, according to PW, will be filled either with HE or liquid air. The weapon can be detonated either electrically or upon contact.

Two other types of rocket projectiles have been previously produced but have NOT been put to use as yet. These are the HS 293 and HS 294. They have been manufactured in series A through G. The HS 293 and HS 294 have been developed primarily for use against enemy aircraft fms. Being radio-controlled, they can also be electrically detonated.

These weapons have been in process of research and production since 1942 and, according to PW, are now technically perfected and ready for use. The weapons have been stored in Central GERMANY by the thousands (a pint locn was unobtainable). PW believes that if the Germans are able to form a line of def, the necessary Radar eqpt will be brought to the front and that these weapons will be put into use.

A P P X 'B'BRIEFLY SUPS AND TN (SHAEP Weekly Int Summary No 54)The Current Enemy Logistical Posn

In the present rapidly changing situation EAST of the RHINE and with Allied forces penetrating deep into GERMANY, apparently restricted only by their own logistical problems, and with increasingly large numbers of prisoners falling into our hands, evidence of eqpt shortages and the poverty of the once well-to-do sup branches of the Wehrmacht daily becomes more apparent.

The results of the enemy tpt shortage were seen in the speed with which Allied breakthroughs WEST of the RHINE were exploited and in the number of prisoners and amount of eqpt taken in the process, in the reports of abandoned and enemy-destroyed arty and AFVs, and in the almost total inability of the German command to regroup its forces with sufficient speed in the face of a fast-moving situation. With his fuel production at a new record low and with increased demands upon alternative tpt means, which as a result of air attacks had already shown signs of inadequacy, the enemy has now been forced into a position which will demand a high state of tpt efficiency for purposes of sup and rft or, failing that, one which will result in complete chaos and disintegration.

Because of tpt losses, amn sup will be even more difficult than in the past and through loss of producing units in the path of Allied advs available stocks are limited still further. More evidence that over-all amn sups are short is found in a recently captured enemy document dated 21 Jan which originated with German First Army. It is particularly interesting because of its date, showing that this shortage too has been felt for some time. It reads, in part:

"Amm sups for 105mm and 150mm howitzers are rapidly decreasing; for by Inf weapons still sufficient on hand. 120mm mor amm presents a severe bottle neck. 75mm A tk amm is critical. For Nebelwerfers there will be no further sups for the time being..."

"There will be no further sups of mines of all types for some time to come. It will be necessary to improvise mines. Stocks of explosives as used by Army engrs are entirely insufficient. Only commercial dynamite is on hand."

Evidence of German logistical disorg and disintegration is seen in some of the recently taken prisoners. The need for speed evidently has precluded the adequate equipping of replacements and the result has been that some have fallen into our hands without fd packs, some without overcoats, some without helmets. Others were given only a rifle and belt and thrown into battle. Amm for small arms has been reported short, comms eqpt lacking and weapons deficient, and a degree of gen disorg apparently exists which indicates the inability of the Wehrmacht to sup and re-equip its battered tps.

How long the enemy can continue to resist under these handicaps is a matter for conjecture, but without proper means to combat Allied progress at the present time, it is difficult to foresee the restoration of order in his currently increasing sup difficulties.

APPENDIX

THE CURRENT GERMAN LOGISTICAL SITUATION

In the present rapidly changing situation EAST of the RHINE and with Allied forces penetrating deep into GERMANY, apparently the only way for the German High Command to maintain its position is to attempt to break through the Allied lines and to re-establish contact with the West. The High Command is aware of the fact that the German High Command is in a very difficult position and that the German High Command is in a very difficult position and that the German High Command is in a very difficult position.

The situation of the enemy has changed very rapidly since the beginning of the year and the German High Command is in a very difficult position. The German High Command is in a very difficult position and that the German High Command is in a very difficult position. The German High Command is in a very difficult position and that the German High Command is in a very difficult position.

Because of the losses, and the fact that the German High Command is in a very difficult position, the German High Command is in a very difficult position. The German High Command is in a very difficult position and that the German High Command is in a very difficult position.

14 Apr 45

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 126

(based on information up to 0800 hrs 14 Apr 45)

P A R T O N EENEMY SITUATION

361 Volksgrenadier Div have been pushed steadily back a distance of some 9 miles from their positions on the IJssel. Only on their right flank do they still cling to their river posns: however, these units between ZUTPHEN and DOESBURG must soon withdraw or risk the danger of encirclement for 346 Div on their right flank in the ARNHEM area is steadily yielding ground to our left neighbour.

The outskirts of APELDOORN have been reached and the enemy has taken up posn along the APELDOORN canal. Civilian reports of this morning state that 1200 tps are still in the town and defending this narrow water line. 361 VG Div has committed all its own bns along with auxiliary units of its own and 346 Div and some GHQ tps. The para defenders of ZUTPHEN have been identified on the SOUTH flank of the Canadian bridgehead, while the Fusilier Bns of both 361 and 346 have been launched into the fight. The div Field Ersatz Bn has also appeared and paraded to the PW Cage. 591 Mixed AA Bn has had two tps, 2 and 4, identified fighting as arty and A tk as long as they have guns and then as infantry.

346 Div on the ARNHEM to DOESBURG front is undergoing similar treatment. This div which is minus one of its two regts, 857 GR believed fighting elsewhere on the Western front, has already committed its Trg Bn and Div Battle School. The units so far identified are 46 Fortress MG Bn, 346 Fd Ersatz Bn, 346 Battle School and II/858 while PW state that I/858 is on the river EAST of VELDT while 346 Engr Bn is in the RIEDEN - NIESBEEK area. Apparently the kitchen sink remains uncommitted, as PW statements have it that 300 tps of 310 Construction Bn are in the ARNHEM area.

On our own front the capture of a 4-man patrol in the PRONKBERST area opposite BRUMMEN (9188) by the C B Highrs has fitted another piece into the jig-saw. These willing PW had been despatched to bring back a PW from us, whom they believed to be Dutch tps! They were members of 3 Coy 361 Fd (AA/A tk) Bn and their coy disposes 100 metres on either side of the ferry at 928883 indicate the importance the enemy places on this as one of our possible crossings, since the coy fighting strength is 125! The PW were ignorant of the whereabouts of the rest of their bn, but as their Bn HQ is in the BRUMMEN area it is reasonable to believe that the other coys, like themselves without guns, are fighting as infantry. According to them their right flank is held by 361 Arty tps, also infantrymen protem. Some of these were withdrawn recently on the arrival of guns. The only armour support on their sector of the front appeared on the 11 Apr when 5 SPs fired from their rear.

A change has probably taken place in the DOESBURG salient. PW statements suggest that a bn of 951 GR was recently relieved by an OST Bn.

The fighting generally has not been severe, the enemy on the APELDOORN front putting up fairly stiff resistance, but it has been sporadic, and once the outcome appeared obvious a decided willingness for the safety of the PW cage became apparent. Small counter-attacks on coy scale have been launched, but more with a view to retain a vestige of org in the line rather than with the intention of restoring the original situation. In the ARNHEM sector a similar c/a from the EAST flank was repulsed. Opposition here has been mainly sniping while some mines and booby traps have been encountered.

The two divs 346 and 361 VG are not yet broken although becoming badly battered and it may be that they hope to organize defence along the APELDOORN Canal with its advantage of high ground in the rear. The reluctance to leave the ZUTPHEN - DOESBURG area supports this. However, losses in men and eqpt have been serious and it may be some days before he is strong enough to withstand another solid crack.

ENEMY LOSSES

Our right neighbour has considerably weakened 361 VG Div and its various units u/c in both men and eqpt. The PW total is rising steadily with 19 effrs and 936 ORs in the cage up until last night and the 1000 mark passed early this morning. Eqpt knocked out and captured includes 4xFrench tks, 2x15cm guns, 6x8.8cm guns, 5x2cm guns, 1x7.5cm A tk guns, 3 SPs (7.5 cm on Mk III), 12 plus vehs and mors and MGs. On the left flank Brit tps have captured 250 plus PW. No eqpt reports yet available.

SIS/HAND

Time of Signature 4/215 B hrs

W C Dick
 W C Dick Lt-Col
 GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

16 Apr 45

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 127

(based on information up to 0800 hrs 16 Apr 45)

PART ONEENEMY SITUATION

A misappreciation by the enemy has led to a virtual arm'd breakthrough. Lt-Col Lais, OC 858 Grenadier Regt and commanding all tps 346 Div with the exception of 346 Fd Ersatz Bn, carefully explained to the Interrogator his inability to contain the ARNHEM bridgehead. He had not known of the existence of an arm'd div on this part of the front and had expected the ARNHEM battle to proceed to VELP and to the NE. This explains the appearance of I Bn 858 GR between the main APELDOORN rd and II Bn in VELP. It was moved over from the ARNHEM area too late to be effective in stopping an advance up the APELDOORN rd. It was a complete surprise to Lais to find himself and his staff in the midst of 35 Canadian tks.

This incorrect deduction of our intention explains the apparent lack of a solid and organized defense NORTH of the town, and the hodge-podge of sub units encountered. 346 Fd Ersatz Bn which had fought well in ARNHEM and still had 300 plus able bodies had been considered the most likely candidate for this area, but except for two stragglers was not contacted. Instead our drive NORTH brushed the right flank of 858 GR and overran various AA and A tk pls. Turning WEST arty tps were reached at SCHAARSBERGEN and DEELEN and also at the latter 858 Regt HQ was bagged plus a good percentage of the 110 untrained 40 yr olds of 3 Coy Police Weapon Trg School. These latter recently from ZWOLLE, are typical of the small conchs of tps adding depth if not str to the IJSSEL Line. On the OTTERLOO area and its approach from the SE stiffer opposition was encountered with A tk guns of I Bty 18 GAF AA Regt covering the rds and 3 Coy 346 Fd Ersatz Bn in the town itself. The main A tk resistance is supplied by a bty of 18 GAF AA Regt who are believed to have about 10 x 88cm guns left. 5 Tps 346 AR and 4 Tps 890 AR (190 Div) comprise the enemy's arty support on our front and have already lost 10 guns to our tps leaving an approx total of 30 x 10.5cm guns. PW state that a shortage of amm prevails.

No indication has been received from PW or other sources of any new formation arriving EAST of the GREBBE Line and it appears that resistance until this is reached will take the form of isolated strongpoints manned by police, trg schools or whatever military can be mustered to slow our advance to the water line. From civilian reports such areas include BARNEVELD (5395) VOORTHUIZEN (5401) HOEVELAKEN (4400) and HOENDERLOO (7293).

TAILPIECE

806 Bn North Caucasian Legion is no happier to be a fighting unit of the Wehrmacht than were the OST Bns that were occasionally and unsuccessfully introduced to the line in ITALY. Two members of 3 Coy stationed in DOESBURG paved the way by first asking permission of the Perth Regt then went back for the coy. The small German element wouldn't play, but the results were good anyway, 101 Russians.

(Signature)
 (W G Dick) Lt-Col
 GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

SDS/HAND

Time of Signature... 16/1600 B hrs

DISTRIBUTION: As per I Sum distribution list.

ATT: Part Two and Appx 'A'.

P A R T T W O

1 ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

- (i) 346 VG Div 858 GR - 1 and 7 Coys, PW, 788800; 3 Coy PW 761832. 14, 4 Coys PW, 7786, also PW from 2 Coy.
- 346 A Tk Bn - 1 Coy PW 7784, 768845; 3 Coy PW 768845.
- 346 AR - 3 Tp PW 7685.
- 346 FEB - 5 Coy straggler, ARNHEM.
- 346 Sigs Bn - Straggler, ARNHEM.
- (ii) 190 Inf Div 890 AR - 4 Tp PW area DEELEN (7387) and 743863. HQ III Bty PW SCHAARSBERGEN (7283).
- (iii) Miscellaneous Police Weapon Trg School, 3 Coy 23 PW DEELEN. 21 Flak Regt, I Bty (4 Tp) PW HOFENDERLOO. 529 A Tk Ersatz Coy, PW, 768845. Fliegerhoist Coy, PW, (airfield DEELEN). 27 Army Arty Svy Unit, 2 Tp, PW, 7683.

2 ENEMY ORG & STR

- (i) 346 VG Div 858 GR - I Bn left area 8179 at 142200B and were in posn at dawn 15 Apr. PW were taken from all coys; 2 Coy on left, 1 Coy str 35, 2 Coy str 60 - 70, 7 LMGs, 3 Coy str 60, 6 LMGs, relieved at GIESBEEK (8480) by a Caucasian coy (str 80) on 142350B, claim 2 Coy EAST and 3 Coy on right flank of I Bn. 4 Coy is a rifle coy, 14 Coy str 14, 4 bazookas, 5 Faustpatrone.
- 346 A Tk Bn - 1 Coy has 3 pls each 3x7.5cm PAK long 8 guns remain in coy. 1 Pl moved from VELD (7979) night 14/15 Apr to area 7684 and defended rd in this area.
- (ii) 190 Inf Div 890 AR - 7.8 and 9 Tps each 3x10.5cm guns. No shortage of amm. regt consists of 3 Btys only.
- (iii) Miscellaneous 529 A Tk Ersatz Coy - Coy has 3 guns (believed 7.5cm or 8.8cm).
- Police Weapon Trg School - The 23 PW taken from this unit were all over 40 yrs old, one was 53. They had had no trg whatsoever, after being issued with rifles they were despatched to the front and committed area 768845.....they were slightly disgusted with the way in which they had been treated!

3 PERSONALITIES

<u>858 GR</u> - OC 1 Coy	-	2/Lt PLUMP
OC 4 Coy	-	2/Lt KNESSL
OC 3 Coy	-	2/Lt MIRSCHIN
OC 14 Coy	-	2/Lt WBERNHARDT
<u>890 AR</u> - in 4 Tp	-	2/Lt BERNSHAUSEN (PW)

4 PW COUNT from 141800B to 151800B:

Through PW cage	-	1 Offr	182 ORs
Through led channels	-		11 ORs
		1 Offr	193 ORs
Previous Total (to 12 Apr)			13 ORs
GRAND TOTAL (This Theatre)		1 Offr	206 ORs

ENEMY ORDER FOR DEFENCE OF WESTERN HOLLAND

The following order is reported to have been seen by one of our agents (4 Apr). Neither the exact contents of the order nor the order itself are guaranteed as the planned def of WESTERN HOLLAND by the GERMAN Comd, although this is what it is claimed to be.

- 1 When Allied tps cross the rivers IJSSSEL and RHINE and adv WEST the first line to be defended by the enemy runs from ARNHEM - EDE E8884 - BARNEVELD E59 - HOEVELAKEN Z40 - NIJKERK Z40 - IJSSSELMEER.
- 2 Staff of 25 Army will withdraw from APELDOORN to AMERSFOORT.
- 3 The first def line - para 1 - has to be defended until the second and MAIN def line has been consolidated.
- 4 The MAIN def runs from AMSTERDAM along the new highway to UTRECHT - SW via SCHALKWIJK E28 - CULEMBURG E27 - GELDERMALSEN E36 - ZALTBONMFL E26. UTRECHT is to be a fortress in front of the MAIN def lines.
- 5 Should the main def line be broken, a withdrawal will be executed in two ways.
 - (a) To AMSTERDAM and then to DENHELDER Z08 partly by boats now at IJNDEN Z10 - AMSTERDAM Z13 - EDAM Z13 - HOORN Z65.
 - (b) By ass embling in the triangle ROTTERDAM - ZEVENHUIZEN D88 - THE HAGUE and the NORTH SEA.
- 6 In the last stage when the Germans withdraw in small ships by way of the NORTH SEA the following dykes are to be blown:
 - (a) NORTH SEA DYKE near PETTEN Y96 - and MONSTER D58.
 - (b) IJSSSEL DYKE
- 7 All tps are stated to have received orders to reach GERMANY by boat via the NORTH SEA.

(Source: 49 (WR) Inf Div Int Summary No 132)

19 Apr 45

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 129

(based on information up to 2300 hrs 18 Apr 45)

P A R T O N EENEMY SITUATION

As expected, yesterday we encountered stiff opposition after crossing the APELDOORN - AMERSFOORT rd, for although before this artery had been severed many of the APELDOORN and IJSSEL defenders had moved along it to the WEST there still had not been time for all of 361 VG and 6 Para Divs to get completely out of the fast-forming pocket. The remnants of 346 Div had made a hasty departure in the BARNVELD area and 6 Para Div took the responsibility of holding the gate open. Heavy fighting took place in the woods NORTH of VOORTHUIZEN when enemy infantry supported by a screen of A tk guns slowed our advance for a few hours. The defence was finally broken the enemy suffering by casualties and especially in PW and equipment, the latter consisted of 15 A tk guns, 3 dual-purpose guns, one arm'd car and 9 vehicles. During the night a further attempt was made to discourage us from pushing on when 50 men equipped with Cfenrohr and Panzerfaust attacked the armour. Today the stiffest resistance was met near PUTTEN after the fall of which the advance continued on to the ZUIDER ZEE first by the Westm Regt (M) at NULD (5010) and then by the LdSH at HARDEWIJK (5519). The fall of HARDEWIJK is well contained in a message from the armoured bde, "had deal with 100 enemy to surrender with HD equipment. 20 surrendered and deal collapsed."

6 Para Div's order of battle is even more of a puzzle than those of 361 VG and 346 Divs. Its regts 16, 17 and 18 have been identified on our front and normally should constitute the infantry of this div, but these are trying days in the Wehrmacht and 6 Para which has been fighting steadily from CALCAR to here is no longer what it was designed to be. The div now is a collection of Battle Gps which have incorporated everything in the country that carried the name of Para plus any body of troops in need of a parent unit. And so we find 18 Para Regt's coys labelled as "Einheits" and fighting in Bn Birg or Bn Brunk. Bns Brunk and Rauscher are grouped under Battle Gp WITZIG, an organization under the div command and of fair regt str. The only identification from 16 Para Regt is 10 Coy which goes under the name of Battle Gp Muller. Some of the units which are contained now in 6 Para Div either in the inf regts or under their comd are Herman Goering Ersatz and Trg Regt, III Para Trg Regt, 1031 GR, the bulk of 3 Bn SS Police Regt, and 6 Coy 30 Fortress MG Bn. 6 Para Mortar Bn now without mortars has become a bn of 17 Para Regt. And so Order of Battle IOs bite their fingernails and mutter to themselves.

From more recent PW interrogation it is evolved that had a breach been made in our narrow salient at OTTERLOO more units of 361 VG Div were to follow and it is thought that probably the remainder of the Div would have used it as the escape route. 361 VG Div, however, has succeeded in name at least in getting away to the WEST, but from reports on numbers of PW taken by 1 Cdn Inf Div, the Div must now consist of little more than HQs and L of C.

It is impossible to estimate what is contained yet in the area between ourselves and the IJSSEL, but it is quite reasonable to conclude that all did not safely run the gauntlet on such a fast moving op. No doubt mopping up will find small pockets that may total into several hundred weary and browned-off warriors.

The enemy intention naturally is mainly a matter of conjecture. He has two defence lines on which he can sit, the question is how determined is he going to be in standing on the first and weaker one before retiring to the second? The first line follows the courses of two small rivers which are strengthened by diggings and earthworks.

However, the security of the line is based mainly on inundation of a fairly narrow tract of land on either side of the streams. Some small areas have already been flooded but the water right now is too low for complete inundation. To man this line the German would require at least three fairly strong divisions: four have taken part in the IJSSEL battle, 6 Para, 361 VG, 346 Inf and 34 SS Nederland, but only the first and last of these are in any shape to man a divisional sector. What there is to the WEST to fill in the holes we cannot be sure, one would think a fair representation of it should have appeared within the past few days to help effect a more orderly withdrawal to the GREBBE Line. The answer to it all may lie in reports received tonight made by two rather sound and military minded civilians whose firm belief is that the GREBBE will be but a delaying position while 25 Army organizes itself on the New Water Line to the WEST. Their deductions are based chiefly on observations of troop movements in the past 72 hours which they say has continued right through to UTRECHT and HILVERSUM, the AMERSFOORT area acting mainly as a collecting and staging camp. Although the source is not considered to be of the highest strategical nature, one civilian states that a German paymaster from APELDOORN en route to UTRECHT clearly intimated that AMERSFOORT would not be held longer than a day. The GREBBE, they say, is manned however, but by whom they don't know: 34 SS Div is a fairly safe bet for the Southern sector as their withdrawal has been more orderly than the other three divs.

(Handwritten Signature)
 (W C Dick) Lt-Col
 GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

SDS/HAND

Time of Signature 19 0900 B hrs

DISTRIBUTION: As per I Sum distribution list.

A P P X 'A'

CDN PsW

There was much ado at HQ 951 VG Regt over a lucky catch of 4 Cdn PsW taken near RHA (?) on 4 or 5 Apr. The cpl of the quartet is supposed to have spoken German, and according to our PsW has stood up well under interrogation. The only discriminating evidence found on the PsW in favour of the enemy was a GSGS map with def overprints which aroused gen glee and some fast actions of tactical amendments. The cpl is supposed to have had in his possession a check to the amount of \$1000.00 - drawn on an English bank (more likely to the amount of £10-0-0. At their first interrogation the OC of the regt - Lt Col NEUENDORF took a direct hand but when his brusque personal ways were not causal to a gen thawing out of the PsW they were then handed over to the regt adjt, Lt Meier. This offr, a former Lutheran minister from ESSEN and gifted with a knack of meeting and getting along with people tried his luck but apparently with no more luck than his more uncompromising OC. The PW from 951 Regt describes the bearing of the Cdns as one of cocksureness and the cpl gave the offr the benefit of his own prediction that the war would end on or about 20 Apr.

A hy squeeze was put on the PsW during interrogation as to the policies of the Allied Mil Government towards the German civ population. With the interrogation ended at regt HQ (unsatisfactory to the extent that not even their units became known) the PsW were shisked away to Div HQ where they were given first of all an "excellent meal" and then interrogated further. The results of the final interrogation are not known but rumours at regt HQ spoke of a tight mouth attitude of the Cdns to the end.

Our PW stated that the Cdns were treated well and apparently they kicked off with a good start towards an amicable footing by handing out cigarettes prodigiously.

(Source: 1 Cdn Corps Interrogation report, dated 17 Apr 45)

20 Apr 45

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 130
(based on information up to 1200 hrs 20 Apr 45)

PART ONEENEMY SITUATION

Except for contact along the highway approaching HOEVE-LAKEN and in the woods 4300, 4301 and also just to the NE of NIJKERK there is little activity on the front. Yesterday mopping-up operations continued and the area WEST of the IJSSEL to the present front except for possibly a few stragglers is virtually cleared.

Little is known of enemy dispositions as his intentions regarding the GREBBE Line are not definitely ascertained. An impression gathered from the consistency of recent civilian reports is that heavy opposition will not be encountered on this first line as the bulk of the IJSSEL Army has gone on to the New Water Line.

Two points of interest that have now come to light regarding the recent operation, although now history still bear mention as they indicate the somewhat catastrophic nature of it from the enemy point of view. A captured map outlines a two bn attack from the area of VOORTHUIZEN that was apparently to at least contain our armour SOUTH of the APELDOORN - AMERSFOORT highway. Battle Gp WITZIG must have had the job for the bns were 'BIRK' and 'BRUNK'. The reason that it never took place must have been because of the by-passing of BARNEVELD and rapid advance to VOORTHUIZEN. The damage then had been done. The second point, and it has a relationship to the above, is a report by civilians via PW statement that some 2000 tps were evacuated by boat from HARDEWIJ to AMSTERDAM(?). Obviously had the highway not been cut too soon these tps who were believed to be from 361 VG Div and 858 GR (a sad remnant) would have been spared the water route out.

(Signature)
W. C. Dick Lt-Col
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

SDS/HAND

Time of Signature.....B hrs

DISTRIBUTION: As per I Sum distribution list.

ATT: Part Two and Appendices 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D'.

PART TWOENEMY LOSSES

- (i) PW by 5 Cdn Armd Div: a) for op - 38 offr 2045 ORs (incl med channels)
b) for NORTH - 38 offr 2166 ORs.

- (ii) GUNS & EQPT NOTE: 1) The following totals are based on PW Statements only as complete returns from own tps have not yet been received. They are considered reasonably accurate, but are not claimed in toto by 5 Cdn Armd Div.
2) 5 Cdn Armd Div totals will be published at an early date.

	346 VG Div	361 VG Div	6 Para Div	Misc Units	TOTALS
2cm AA/A tk	6	-	3	11	20
3.7cm AA/A tk	-	-	6	12	18
7.5cm A tk	3	4	-	-	7
88mm AA/A tk	-	-	6	20	26
10.5cm fd guns	19	12	13	-	44
10cm (t)	-	2	-	-	2
7.5cm (mtn)	-	4	3	-	7
15cm fd guns	4	3	18	2	27
8.1cm mortars	13	10	-	6	29
7.5 Aslt guns	-	-	-	4	4

ERRATUM

In our Int Sum 129 we stated erroneously that the first tps to reach the Zuider Zee were from the Westmr Regt (M). The latter have now drawn our attention to the fact that a Recce tp of the 8NBH were actually the first to reach the sea, as they were already bathing their feet when the Westmr Regt (M) arrived on the scene.

A P P X "A"

ENEMY METHODS

Non-Fraternization in Reverse

(Source: 18 US Airborne Corps)

German cooperation with Allied non-fraternization policies might be assured if all Nazis remained obedient Nazis and provided their comms hadn't broken down under pressure of Allied adv. According to documents found by Counter Intelligence at SIEGEN G200530, the German people were to be prepared systematically for the possibility of Allied occupation then told to behave. First, the possibility itself is hinted at in a propaganda document purporting to quote a United Press news story from EUPEN last winter in which the splendid steadfastness of the Germans of that place is remarked by an American correspondent. Second instalment, as occupation seems surer, is a call to German people not to harbour deserters, while the third of these messages specifically directs what the peoples' behaviour should be. Unfortunately, these interesting documents did not reach the Nazis for whom they were intended; the black envelope containing the series of instrs was found with the seal unbroken, warning that it would not be opened except on orders of the Fuhrer. In case the Fuhrer doesn't get around to putting out the news, here's what he wants the Herrenvolk to do:-

"How to Behave Upon Occupation of the Allies

- (i) The enemy has prophesied that Germany will collapse when the Allies begin the occupation of German soil. The enemy is wrong! Behind each one, who keeps his dignity as a German, stands a nation of 85 million.
- (ii) Do not give the enemy the honour of looking at him - don't talk to him - have no social intercourse with him.
- (iii) If there should be someone who transgresses this rule, that person shall be an outcast in every way - for he is worse than the enemy, he is a traitor.
- (iv) You can't feel anything but hate and disdain for the enemy. For he is the author of the bomb terror. Mislead soldiers when they ask you for directions on rds, alw ays direct him to the cemetery.
- (v) If the enemy demands service from you, you have the right to refuse according to the laws of Land Welfare. Do not share food with the enemy - there is barely enough for you.
- (vi) If you are forced under threat of weapons to serve, remember the name of the offr or official in charge. He will be punished in due time.
- (vii) Do not read their newspapers, their leaflets, their pamphlets. Do not listen to them on the radio. Do not look at his films.
- (viii) Nobody must be present if the enemy stages a parade. The enemy troops must go through streets of silence. The enemy soldier must be made to feel alien in this country. No one shall say about us that in the fd the Germans fight like lions, but at home we are harmless "suckers".
- (ix) Women must preserve their honour - show not even small favours to Allied soldiers.
- (x) Help each other in your plight without order or urging."

THE SECOND BATTLE OF OTTERLOO

The oddity of the incident, rather more than its reflection on matters pertaining to the enemy, urges us to include a word or two regarding the Second Battle of Otterloo. The first battle was fought and decided to the credit of the LdSH and Westmr Regt (M) about 18 hrs previously, and it was certainly not in the cards that Otterloo continue to be the scene of further hostilities, although a counter thrust from Hoenderlo, where a conc was building up, had been expected earlier in the day. However, the Boche would have it that this road centre was far enough behind our armoured spearhead to have become L of C, so he picked on it as a good place to breach a gap to make good the escape of the bulk of 361 VG Div and 858 GR of 346 Div. The latter no doubt were anxious to make amends for having spelled the fate of the entire army by sitting on the wrong "up-route" two mornings before. Anyway various enemy units coming from Apeldoorn via Hoenderloo and points EAST assembled near Harskamp (6593) and began infiltrating towards Otterloo. Unfortunately for the Hun the Ir R C had liked the pleasant surroundings of the village and had decided to dig in and check on the local colour, but like all their antecedents, despite the minor distractions, needed no second invitation for a fight. The results were good, multi PsW and multi stiff Krauts, and some very burned up about the whole thing. The Irish were a bit perturbed with this untimely interruption to a decent night's sleep and invited their friends from the 617 Aslt Sqn RE to join in with some nasty devices which played no end of havoc with the misinformed Boche.

This was not all, for the enemy axis of advance also included the gun lines of the 17 Cdn Pd Regt. One would have expected this rather unorthodox incident to have produced but grave results for the gunners. But no so with these, none left their positions and a heavy toll on the assaulting German was taken with 25 prs firing over open sights, with Brens, Stens, rifles, pistols and bare hands! Many of the enemy dug in right in the bty areas, and a fight continued during the hours of darkness until daylight when the gunners proved themselves better infantry than their baffled opponents.

Meanwhile the "Schwerpunkt" of Battle Gp Hoffmeister sat dug in on the right near flank awaiting the onslaught which seemed inevitable. During darkness the story of the battle was told them by mortar bombs and the continual whine of SA over their heads. At first light enemy were seen and HQ Sqn 6 Royal Hussars took the offensive some with tanks and some as infantry. The main body of the latter consisted of a pl of the Ir R C, the MT section, batmen, clerks, runners, engineers and swarms of signallers. This was indeed the last straw for an already puzzled and unhappy enemy, and together with the Ir R C and 17 Cdn Pd Regt the hunt was on, and no holds barred. The total live Kraut count for Div HQ was 4 offr and 109 OKs, the majority gained in actual conflict and an uncertain number by barter and other means. However, an excellent job was done by the ex-base-wallas, and it's not without some pride that Main 40 refers to the Second Battle of Otterloo.

PERSONALITIESOpinions of a German Corps Commander (Source Third US Army)

A German Lieutenant General, PW, gave the following infm in the course of an informal conversation:

(i) Unconditional Surrender Impossible

The Allies should NOT expect a surrender by the German Army, or by the Germans, en masse. The reason lies in the fact that in Germany today there is NOT a single authority or agency which might conduct negotiations with the Allies. No member of the German Armed Forces will ever be authorized to contact the Allies for this purpose. And if some influential and high ranking offr were to undertake such a mission on his own, it is certain that the Armed Forces would NOT carry out his orders because the strangle-hold which the National Socialist state has gained upon the military is too powerful. After the failure of the Ardennes offensive of 16 Dec 44, Rundstedt was emphatically in favour of capitulation. He would have undertaken negotiations if it had NOT been for his certain knowledge that he would NOT be able to carry out his commitments. Rundstedt thought more of himself than to get trapped out on a limb. He even knew that a great majority of the higher ranking members of the offr's' corps would support him in such a move; but these offr's knew as well that any order they might issue for a wholesale surrender would be blocked effectively by the Nazis.

The National Socialist Party and the German state amount to the same thing, thus anyone in that government is a political criminal or war criminal by the Allied definition. None of them could have any conceivable interest in negotiating with the Allies, in view of the punishment which the Allies promised they will mete out to such men, - even if the Allies were willing to accept such a representative in negotiations. For the Nazis the measure of retribution will be the same if the war ends today or in a few months; they lose and suffer nothing by continuing the war as long as it is possible to do so by any means. Thus they are at least able to stave off the day of reckoning for some time. If, in doing that, they are able to make an even more impressive mark in history, so much the better.

Individual commanders will continue to surrender bodies of troops piecemeal where they know that the Nazis will NOT be able to take reprisals against them anymore. But the unconditional surrender of Germany, de facto, will only come about with the total physical occupation of Germany.

(ii) The National Redoubt

It is certain that such a redoubt is being prepared. It is a corollary to the Nazis' avowed intention to fight to the last. But what of it? German staff offr's do NOT believe that this will be taken seriously by the Allies. To accord it the dimensions of a serious military capability is ridiculous. Reducing the redoubt will tie down some assault troops and specialized troops equipped to deal with this type of warfare. Beyond that the general did NOT believe that it would be a military venture of any particular significance. Medieval romanticism has little room in the ear of modern weapons.

6 Para Div

Div HQ

GOC

11 Apr 45

DIV ORDER OF THE DAY

The Fuehrer has again strongly emphasised that with present enemy tactics, flank and counter attacks, even with small but determined forces affords the best opportunity of slowing down and checking the progress of enemy attacks. Flank attacks led by comds of all ranks shrewdly and unhesitatingly have time and time and time again in the division's battle history met with success.

Tks, which have broken through, must be attacked and destroyed by courageous and eager tk hunting tps.

The Tk Can be Destroyed.

This is made easier by the thickly overgrown terrain with its many canals and ditches, solitary farms and clusters of trees in our present battle area. Since the enemy mostly attacks at dawn or dusk, even at night with his tks, we have often succeeded in shooting them up at very close range.

I know what a tremendous strain the fighting of the last days and weeks has been. But each one of you realises too how vital it is for us to fight for every square yard of territory. This necessity demands of you infinite courage and tenacity.

Our Div has with all its units under comd proved itself in its entirety; a fact repeatedly admitted by the enemy. In the days ahead, as before, this same bravery and determination are required of you.

Today, I warn you again:

"Whoever strays or is separated from his unit in action, must report immediately to the comd of the nearest fighting unit and continue to fight with his comrades. The noise of battle indicates clearly in what direction fighting is going on.

Unfortunately in the last days there have been some pitiful spectacles behind the Div FDLs. This must cease. It is utterly inconceivable that individual weaklings should for no reason desert their comrades and unit. Henceforth, the very strongest action will be taken against such traitorous creatures, who leave their comrades in arms in the lurch. He who causes the death of his comrades through cowardly desertion has forfeited his own life."

Such strict measures are necessary in the interest of all the decent and brave fighting men of the Div.

I and all your comds are proud of your bearing and accomplishments.

Your finest recognition is, however, the gratitude of the Fatherland for whom you fight on our own and foreign soil.

Keep it up.

Your Commander.

This order is to be destroyed immediately it has been brought to the notice of the troops.

DISTRIBUTION: Down to Coys.

(Source: 5 Cdn Armd Div Interrogator)

DIARY FOR THE DAY

The weather was fairly clear and bright. I went to the office and worked on my reports. I had a meeting with the staff at 10:30 AM. We discussed the progress of the work and the plans for the future. I also had a letter from the Director and replied to it. The afternoon was spent in writing reports and in talking to the staff. I went to bed at 10:00 PM.

PLF

I have been thinking a great deal lately about the future of the country. It seems to me that we are in a very critical position. The war has brought about a great change in our lives and in our thinking. We must now think in terms of the future and of the responsibilities that we have to the world. I believe that the only way to meet these responsibilities is by working together and by following the principles of justice and fairness. I hope that I can do something to help in this work.

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1 AN APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER

Gefr Richard Hiller
4/Sich. Btl. 1076

KAMBERG
25 Jan 45

Application for Transfer

To Sich. Btl. 1076

I hereby apply for transfer to a unit in the Reserve, if possible in the Berlin Wehrkreis. Owing to my wounds (shell splinter in lung) I cannot be employed on outdoor duties and the company has no way of employing me indoors, as I have merely a limited working capacity. Medical grade: conditionally k.v., not for front line service. I have been awarded the Golden Wound Badge.

signed. Gefr. Richard Hiller.

4/Sich. Btl. 1076
To Sich Btl. 1076, Abt. IVb

26 Jan 45

The state of health of Gefr. R. Hiller deserves serious consideration. Hiller is unfit to perform outdoor duties of any kind. Permanent indoor employment is not possible in this company, so that Hiller, try as he may, is unable to perform normal duty and is merely a burden on the unit. The company therefore requests that medical examination be arranged with a view to his transfer to the reserve.

signed (Illegible)
Lt and Coy Comd

The MO's endorsement, given at the foot of the above application, reads:-

"Hiller is to stay on duty until he collapses."

signed (Illegible)
Ass. Arzt.

(Source: SHAEF Int Notes No 58)

2 TREATMENT OF SHOT-DOWN ALLIED AIRMEN

Two captured documents, translated below are eloquent enough to need little comment. The first (whose early date is interesting) refers to an article in the Volkischer Beobachter which apparently condemned civilians for their rough and independent handling of Allied airmen who were forced to land in enemy territory. The second shows little change in the official view after a lapse of eight months

To: Garrison Commander, COESFELD COESFELD, 18 Jun 44

Secret Order

Ref Voelkischer Beobachter 148, Berlin Edition, dated 27 May 44.
(A word on enemy air terror).

The Director General of Training requests that urgent orders be given to all Headquarters, etc, and units under territorial command with reference to the above-mentioned newspaper article. Steps will be taken to prevent soldiers interfering in such cases against the civilian population by demanding the surrender of enemy airmen to them for the purpose of taking them prisoner, or by protecting terror flyers, thus openly taking their part.

Signed ??????????

Wehrmachts Garrison MUNSTER

ARNSBERG, 26 Feb 45

Message from the "Gauleiter" Headquarters, concerning annexe to the conference resolutions: Gauleiter and Reich Defence Commissar for Gau South-Westphalia.

No shot down fighter-bomber pilots will be protected from the rage of the public. I expect of all party agencies not to act in any way as protectors of these gangsters. Official agencies which try to counteract the public sentiment of revenge will be called to account by me in person. All policemen and gendarmes will be informed accordingly.

Signed ALBERT HOFFMANN

Gauleiter

3 TAILPIECE

A Day at the Cage - or Never a Dull Moment

"I must speak to you about paragraph 362 immediately" said the PW. "Paragraph 362 as directed by the Soviet Union". "What about it?" the interrogator queried. "I'm an agent of Soviet Russia and I have important information for you", whispered the PW. "Here! You can see my badge of identification". With this he reached cautiously inside his coat and after a brief moment of groping withdrew his hand - empty. "What other proof have you?", asked the interrogator doubtfully. "Ah", answered the Russian agent, "I have a letter from Josef Stalin", and he reached into his coat once more. Here ensued a slight struggle since the spy insisted on groping a round inside his coat without unbuttoning it. "Why don't you unbutton your coat?" suggested the interrogator helpfully. "Don't have to", he snapped back, "I won't be able to find it anyway".

(Source: SHAEF Int Notes No 58)

PLF